



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Staff of the Directorate

Evaluation Regional Program

For Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 – 2014

Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division





Evaluation Regional Program

For Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 – 2014

Contents:

- I Management Response and Agreement at Completion Point**
- II Evaluators' Final Report**

Annexes

Bern, December 2014

Evaluation Process

Evaluations commissioned by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) Senior Management were introduced in SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more critical and independent assessment of SDC activities. These Evaluations are conducted according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of SDC's concept for implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution which requires Swiss Federal Offices to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. Joint SDC/SECO¹ programs are evaluated jointly.

SDC's Senior Management (consisting of the Director General and the heads of SDC's departments) approves the Evaluation Program. The Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division, which is outside of line management and directly reporting to the Director General, commissions the evaluations, taking care to recruit evaluators with a critical distance from SDC.

Country and regional strategy evaluations

Country and regional strategy evaluations constitute central instruments of the new SDC Evaluation Policy (2013). They are mandated and coordinated by SDC's Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division.

Until 2007, SDC's Cooperation Strategies (CS) were assessed by independent evaluation teams. In September 2010, the Board of Directors mandated the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division to introduce a new approach with a stronger focus on learning and the application of a relatively high degree of standardization. In fulfilling the strengthened learning objective, assessments of CS's are realised by means of hybrid evaluations, which are conducted by a mixed team consisting of one external consultant and two internal resource persons of SDC ("peers").

The **goal** of country and regional strategy evaluations is to assess the relevance and coherence of the Swiss development cooperation in regard to national development priorities and the Federal Council Dispatch. They assess the results achievement of the CS portfolio at the level of domains of intervention and according to the performance of the CS implementation (management and monitoring mechanisms). In doing so, these evaluations help SDC's Management in their strategic and operational steering and in improving aid effectiveness.

The **objectives** of country and regional strategy evaluations include the following:

- To assess – through a mutual learning process – whether SDC and its partners reach the strategic objectives in the country or region, as defined in the CS, and to appraise the efficiency of the strategic and operational steering mechanisms of the Cooperation Office;
- To timely build the foundation for the definition of key elements for the new CS;
- To assess the significance of the Swiss contribution to national (and regional) development results, and to identify key factors, which enhance or hinder aid performance and results achievements;
- To identify good practices and innovative approaches as well as share experiences in managing CS.

¹ State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO

The evaluation results are based on the analysis of existing documents and are augmented by a field mission which includes peer exchanges and semi-structured interviews along the four Evaluation Areas: EA1 Context analysis, EA2 Relevance and appropriateness of projects/programmes with regard to the current strategy, EA 3 Implementation of the strategy and its portfolio and EA 4 Results achieved in relation to the results at country level. The Final Evaluators' Report is published together with the management response of the head of the responsible operational unit.

Time table

Step	When
Terms of Reference of the evaluation	October 2013
Desk study and inception report	October 2013
Peer review on-site and final report	November 2013
Final evaluation report	February 2014
Management Response SDC	April 2014

I. Management Response

Management Response to the Evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy - Regional Program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 – 2014

by SDC Humanitarian Aid: E/MM Division

General appreciation of the Evaluation report

We would like to thank the Evaluation team for its thorough analysis and evaluation of the Cooperation Strategy – Regional Programme Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010 – 2014. E/MM highly appreciates this very timely exercise as the context of its intervention has dramatically transformed and as it is about to elaborate a new Cooperation Strategy 2015 – 2018. The valuable questions, remarks, inputs and recommendations made by the Evaluation team will certainly benefit this exercise.

The final evaluation report is very well written and structured capturing very well the main challenges and allowing to easily identify the conclusions and recommendations, be it in the evaluation abstract or in the developed analysis. Besides being a substantial exercise of institutional self-critique, this report represents a key strategic milestone and gives the necessary elements for the elaboration of the future coming SDC engagement / strategy in this region.

The Evaluation team very well identified and analyzed both the institutional and the environment challenges. The E/MM Division – field and HQ – shares most of the findings and recommendations made by the report. However, the findings and recommendations constitute an ideal basis for discussions towards the new Cooperation Strategy. The following Management Response is drafted by HQ but integrates comments and responses from the regional office in Amman.

April 30, 2014



Manuel Bessler

Ambassador,
Director Hum. Aid



Rudi von Planta

Head a.i., E/MM



Yvan Loehle

Programme Officer, E/MM

Management Response by Evaluation Area

Evaluation Area 1: Context analysis – Choices “How to adapt”

Purpose: Appraise how well the CS reflects the development priorities of the partner country and the policies of the Federal Council Dispatch (FCD)

Recommendations to:	Management Response
1.1 Positioning and adaptation of the strategy with respect to countries and regional contexts and Swiss policies	
R1 At SDC HQ, conditions for swift reaction to exceptional situations, which are likely to be protracted, should be revised. Expanding existing activities with known partners, fewer projects with higher financial volumes and in-built longer term goals are options to be emphasized.	Keeping in mind that this situation partly results from unexpected additional CHF 20 mio funding (June 2013), E/MM fully agrees on the principle with this recommendation and has already taken measures to implement it.
R2 In complex situations requiring urgent responses, choices for allocating financial and human resources in SDC Offices are to make optimum use of resources already in place.	E/MM is aware that a major crisis (like the current Syrian war) has a strong impact on human and financial resources in a field office as well as at HQ. E/MM is constantly trying to adapt to the rapidly changing context, be it with additional human or financial resources. E/MM takes note of the recommendation of the PR team and continues improving and optimizing the use of resources.
R3 Medium term scenarios of the evolution in the region and in single countries are to be developed for the planning of future Swiss interventions, helping to define and quickly adapt respective “weighting” of Swiss interventions (intervention areas, modalities, choice of partners). They provide a sound basis for Task Force discussions and decisions.	During a Mid Term Review (MTR) exercise in 2012, scenarios have been developed. Nevertheless, it was difficult to foresee the current worst case scenario (not only for SDC). But indeed, the weakness not much of the scenarios themselves but rather of the related programmatic changes, has made it the adaptation of the Swiss interventions to the dramatic transformation of the humanitarian situation in the region more difficult. The elaboration of the future WOGA / joint Cooperation Strategy will include a profound common context analysis including the development of scenarios in order to facilitate the possible adaptation of the Swiss interventions. E/MM considers that its response was quick and efficient, despite the several interferences from the political division which resulted in

	important additional work for HQ at a critical moment.
1.2 Quality of context analysis	
R4 The new Cooperation Strategy for the region is to be drafted in 2014, based on a joint analysis of Swiss stakeholders and on scenarios.	E/MM agrees on this recommendation. The process will be launched in May 2014 and will last until 2015. Scenarios will be developed.
R5 Given the high probability of a protracted crisis, choices have to be made regarding the selection of partner countries, the definition of domains and target groups, and the financial volume and types of cooperation with them as well as the instruments used. Lebanon appears to be the one country in the region where Switzerland can make a difference: positive results and impact are potentially big, because of the country's dimensions, increased fragility and local needs.	Today, the protracted nature of the crisis is evident (estimated to a minimum of 5 to 8 years). Undoubtedly, Lebanon shows the most worrying signs of fragility, mainly for political and historical reasons. However, the economic fragility of Jordan, combined with a strong and authoritarian political system should not be disregarded when it comes to assess the capacity of the Jordan society to cope with such a socio-economic shock. Moreover, the small country's dimension of Lebanon is unfortunately offset by the enormous humanitarian needs it has to address. But E/MM fully concurs with the Evaluation on the key question of "where can Switzerland make a difference?" as a criteria for intervention. E/MM would however tend to privilege its "priority key" along modality lines (financial support, direct actions, secondments) rather than along geographical lines. For instance, SDC expertise in WASH or DRR enables to make a difference just by deploying a few Swiss technical experts within UN agencies. The thematic Swiss added value should not be neglected when it comes to assess the impact of Switzerland. Nevertheless, discussions concerning the future CS will include the question of choices to be made.
R6 Support is to be provided for stabilising and improving livelihoods <i>and</i> for changing and stabilising fragile situations in a sustainable way, hence by facilitating transformational change.	Fully sharing this analysis and convinced by the importance of a comprehensive (contiguous) approach, E/MM requested the SDC Directorate in June 2013 to be able to mobilize development funds for the region. In the absence of this opportunity, E/MM funds are limited to the Humanitarian budget. Nevertheless, E/MM always uses sustainability as a key criteria for selecting its interventions. Furthermore, E/MM favours the interventions of Global Programmes like GPMD (GPMD staff is based in the Amman regional office) and GPWI in the region.

<p>R7 The “Whole Of Government Approach” is to guide Swiss analysis in a mid-term perspective; it is to prepare the ground for defining interventions and appropriate instruments in all phases: analysis, planning, implementation and monitoring.</p> <p>R8 The common analysis should allow each Swiss actor to remain true to their mandates and to the quality standards defined for their work.</p>	<p>The next CS will be a WOGA / joint one. Starting with a profound common analysis becomes today a crucial tool for intervening in such a conflictive and fragile environment. Partly supporting this process, the Chatham House project on Syria will aim at developing and disseminating a better understanding of the impact the Syria crisis is having on the neighbouring countries. This initiative with a natural partner of AMON will hopefully feed into a joint analysis of the various Swiss administrative players.</p> <p>As stressed in this report, it is indeed essential to have a joint analysis as a common ground while respecting the respective mandates of the various Swiss actors. An alert mechanism should be considered when the mandate of one of the actors becomes jeopardized by the intervention another one.</p>
---	---

Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and appropriateness of project with regard to the Regional Strategy / Coherence of projects/programmes portfolio – Choices “What to do”

Purpose: Appraise the coherence of the project portfolio with the CS and its relevance for achieving the country/domain objectives

Recommendations to:	Management Response
<p>2.1 Relevance of projects / programme portfolio</p>	
<p>R1 More focus to define the domains: For the next Regional Strategy, it is proposed to sharpen the focus of the chosen domains and eventually to reduce the number of domains of cooperation. Hence:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The next RP strategy could consist of the two domains “protection” and “basis services and livelihoods” – and each of them with a clearer focus allowing choices of partners and programs. - The current domain of intervention “Disaster Risk Reduction” should not be continued as a domain of its own. An exit strategy for this domain is to be prepared, targeting mainly the sustainability of investments made so far and “capitalising” Swiss visibility and good will. 	<p>Currently, E/MM tends to think that protection should become a transversal theme rather than a domain, be it through a narrow definition of protection (Protection of Civilians) or through a broader understanding (protection as a rights based approach). There can be no doubt that this regional crisis has become today a severe protection crisis. It would therefore make sense to use protection as a transversal lens and ensure that all the projects / programmes clearly entail a protection objective.</p> <p>E/MM takes note of the recommendation to eliminate the DRR as a domain <i>per se</i>. Nevertheless, there have been major results achieved in this domain and SDC/Switzerland is highly appreciated for these interventions in Jordan and Lebanon. The</p>

	<p>recommendation will be thoroughly discussed in the planning workshop. But to take it out from the new CS might be difficult considering that SDC has made DRR a spearhead of its institutional expertise and advocacy.</p>
<p>R2 Few but bigger projects/programmes, strengthening of a programme approach: For giving the portfolio more focus, and for increasing the efficiency of the programme management, the following measures on project level are recommended:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning and realisation of projects with bigger financial volumes - Planning projects with a longer term horizon - When responding to crisis situation: checking the possibilities to reorient ongoing projects and invest additional financial and other resources in them. - More co-financing with other bilateral actors - Realise cross border projects, i.e. in the framework of the GP Water Initiative. 	<p>E/MM agrees with these recommendations. Apart from efforts to be made to elaborate longer term humanitarian interventions (protracted crisis), we furthermore refer to the above mentioned issue on the humanitarian funds vs development funds.</p> <p>It is not clear what is meant by “More co-financing with other bilateral actors”. Regarding the direct actions, E/MM would tend to be careful with co-funding for two reasons. First, flagship projects become less interesting if co-funded. Second, the credibility of Switzerland as a neutral and impartial player in such a politicized environment requires careful selection of a funding partner.</p>
<p>R3 The understanding of “Comprehensive Aid Approach - CAA” is to be further developed. It does not necessarily consist of combining Humanitarian Aid and “traditional development cooperation”. It can also combine HA and support to macroeconomic stabilisation, normative / regulatory systems (of service delivery to citizens, of governance, etc.) and peace building measures. CAA importantly consists of supporting transformational change of the situation (for instance by strengthening institutions and addressing refugees and host communities / local population).</p>	<p>A “concept” which keeps on evolving in the UN world (renamed now a “Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework – CRSF), it however remains vague when facing the “how question”. Despite this current weakness, there is a large consensus in the IC on the need to mobilize development actors, instruments and funds in parallel to humanitarian tools for addressing a protracted crisis which not only destroys a state and its population but also dangerously threatens its neighbours with social, economic and political destabilization.</p> <p>Regarding the internal SDC point of view towards CAA , E/MM welcomes the suggestion made to explore the “middle space” between humanitarian and development tools, for instance by emphasizing and focusing on innovative conflict sensitive approaches. The “cash for hosting” project in Lebanon represents indeed an innovative approach which could inspire other actors. E/MM agrees that transformational change interventions should take place as soon as possible and in parallel with the humanitarian response.</p>

<p>R4 The humanitarian response itself needs improvement, e.g. optimisation of the management and delivery of the response, integrating reflections on sustainability on replication.</p>	<p>We agree. The vacant position of the regional director in Amman combined with the unexpected additional CHF 20 mio to be spent in six months pushed the field and HQ under huge strain. This left little space for reflection on sustainability and replication of interventions and produced a huge HR turnover for the regional office (about one third of the staff left in 2013).</p>
<p>R5 Financial volumes of the Swiss portfolio and the partner landscape do not permit to implement a fully regional approach. Nevertheless, the Swiss programme addresses regional issues regionally through UNRWA, and there seems to be a potential for enhanced work in the water sector. Shorter term activities should enhance to longer term objectives pursued with the respective partners (e.g. Syrian response by UNRWA)</p>	<p>There are potential opportunities for more Swiss engagement on water issues. But WASH programmes are often high cost and mid-term projects, two features which limit E/MM intervention through its humanitarian budget. The Jerash project in Jordan (in a Palestine refugee camp) as well as the UNRWA water project in Lebanon are among the most expensive projects of the portfolio. Both projects could only be funded thanks to the 0.5% money initiative and will end in 2014. “Niche” WASH projects in which Switzerland has a strong added value will be explored.</p>
<p>2.2 Consistency of projects / programme objectives with the results framework of the domain</p>	
<p>R6 The coherence of SDC’s intervention with national and international efforts is very good. The position of SDC programmes and projects in the form of results framework and their monitoring based on such positioning provides the basis for coordinated and efficient use of resources and for reporting on effects of Swiss support.</p>	<p>E/MM will make sure that this coherence remains a key priority for the new CS.</p>
<p>R7 SDC’s support of multilateral agencies is well managed. SDC could increasingly use the coordinating role of multilateral organisations (UNDP, OCHA) when defining its interventions and contributions. Co-financing of activities with other bilateral donors could also be envisaged. Switzerland could also take a pro-active role in this field, in order to reduce transaction cost for partner governments.</p>	<p>E/MM does not agree with this recommendation, except regarding UNRWA. Since the beginning of the crisis, E/MM was indeed very proactive in supporting the multilateral organizations (OCHA, UNHCR) in their coordination roles. It was also very active in the various multilateral fora and played an important role – both at the HQ and in the field – of a conveyor and a host for coordination initiatives.</p> <p>Furthermore, E/MM makes important efforts to mobilize other actors contributions (other Swiss actors like FOM, HSD and GPMD through the Protection in the Region platform, other donors like with the government of Liechtenstein).</p>

2.3 Transversal themes at the level of the regional strategy and the domains	
R8 The number of transversal themes is to be reduced to what makes sense and can be implemented. This increases the chances that they can be fully taken up when planning and implementing projects and the programme as a whole.	E/MM shares this analysis and will reduce them in its next CS.
R9 Gender and DRR appear as good candidates to be maintained as transversal themes and to be applied best. The existing Credit Proposal's check list could also be adapted to the needs of the region and the SCOs.	E/MM shares this analysis, see also comments above.
R10 Conflict sensitive project and programme management is to be made a mandatory approach (not a transversal theme), orienting all Swiss activities in the region.	E/MM fully agrees with the “mandatory” nature of CSPM. Each intervention should be accountable for complying with this approach. This been said, a WOGA CS reinforces the importance and the need for the other Swiss actors to a) understand the Conflict Sensitive Approach (CSA) and b) integrate it in their interventions. Just like at the international level the development players progressively integrate the CSA (for instance the WB in Jordan), so shall the Swiss actors do. This will allow Switzerland to keep its very good acceptance and perception of a constructive and neutral player (honest broker) in the region.

Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the regional strategy and its portfolio – Choices “How to do it”

Purpose: Appraise the efficiency of the portfolio management by the SCO and its contribution to an optimal achievement of results

Recommendations to:	Management Response
3.1 Management Performance	
<p>R1 Roles and responsibilities and lines of accountability among offices and people: need to be spelled out clearly for increased efficiency, effectiveness and smooth functioning. Discussions on strategic, institutional and personal aspects are not to be mixed. This especially applies in periods when important unplanned management tasks are to be realised – as is the response to the Syria crisis. Especially on short term projects, the cross-consultations in the office and between offices and HQ have to be minimised, allowing for quick decision making.</p>	<p>E/MM agrees on the principle. In practice however, it is extremely difficult to find a balance between the needs for quick decision making on one side, and a coherent and coordinated regional response to a complex crisis on the other side. Moreover, if all three field offices (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey) face each different contexts, HQ adds a layer of complexity as, from a field perspective, it constitutes an unavoidable step for both sending political inputs/requests and briefing/advocating towards the political Heads of the FDFA. In such setting and with the close attention paid by the political Heads on this complex crisis, the transfer of competencies designed by the REO shows its limits.</p>
<p>R2 Cooperation with single partners active throughout the region requires a coordinated approach to such actors. For instance, E/MM is to speak in one single voice with UNRWA (the lead being with the Jerusalem SCO)</p>	<p>Better collaboration and coordination between SCOs in Amman and Jerusalem would be indeed desirable on the principle. Actually, E/MM tried to improve it but had to change several times the lead for the UNRWA file between these offices due to priorities to UNRWA itself (UNRWA having three headquarters – Amman, Jerusalem and Gaza). Since 2013, the SDC lead for the UNRWA file is with SCO Jerusalem.</p>
3.2 Quality of the monitoring system	
<p>R3 SDC’s monitoring is to be organised more selectively and differentiated according to project type. It is acceptable to rely at least in parts, on the monitoring of multilateral partners, possibly contributing to it through secondments.</p>	<p>The issue has been recognised. Therefore, the suggestion is well taken and welcomed.</p>
<p>R4 The lessons learnt and other insights gained from the programme’s implementation are to be made more systematically available within</p>	<p>E/MM shares this concern for improving the institutional learning but not the critique. E/MM used numerous and various spaces</p>

<p>E/MM and SDC as well as to other actors.</p>	<p>to share its insights: the last two Annual conferences, numerous SDC reports, SDC newsletters, H-Info presentations, NGO symposium, events with the Conflict & Human Rights network, invitation of UNHCR to Bern for sharing its experience with the <i>“beratende Kommission”</i> just to name a few. As a current example, an evaluation of the “cash for hosting” project in Lebanon is ongoing, whose main objective is to capitalize and highlight the lessons learnt of this innovative project (knowledge management). E/MM will share the results within SDC and with others humanitarian actors.</p>
<p>3.3 Coordination and aid effectiveness in the regional set-up</p>	
<p>R5 Coordination (in view of maximised aid effectiveness and a coherent presence of SDC within the region) is to start within SDC. The structures in the region and HQ are to communicate relevant information quickly and in appropriate ways.</p>	<p>As written in the report and despite huge efforts by the field and by HQ, the flows of information within SDC are not “optimal”. The current regional set up is highly complex with a regional office covering five countries in a regional crisis consisting of different challenges. Nevertheless, E/MM believes until today that the regional set up is the most efficient solution in the given context. However, this issue will have to be discussed in the planning workshop for the future strategy. In addition to the above mentioned complexity of both the crisis and the institutional setting, the “Sonderfall” status of SDC office for the OPT is not included in the regional approach and therefore does not ease fluid and rapid information flow.</p>

**Evaluation area 4: Results of the regional strategy – in relation to the results at the levels of countries and of the region – Choices
“What to achieve”**

Purpose: Appraise and compare the contribution of the Swiss Cooperation portfolio at the output and outcome level to the achievement of the development results of the partner country

Recommendations to:	Management Response
4.1 Results and aid effectiveness / Swiss contribution to country (regional) results	
R1 Results at output level are to be interpreted so as to provide hints about the outcomes and even the impact of SDC interventions. As for monitoring, the assessment of the programme’s effectiveness is also to make use of supported (multilateral and other) organisation’s reporting on achievements.	E/MM acknowledges this recommendation and notices some remaining confusions between outputs and outcomes in the AR 2013. E/MM has mentioned this issue in its Management Response to the AR 2013. The regional SCO is constantly working on improving quality aspects of reporting mechanisms.
4.2 Sustainability and scaling up	
R2 The sustainability of interventions is to be prepared mainly by capacitating local partners – both Government units and NGOs. This implies intensive cooperation with selected partners and the channelling of support through these actors whenever possible.	E/MM fully agrees with this recommendation and is convinced that capacity building is key in long term development. It is already doing it, including in high emergency programmes such as its crossborder action. Working on a protracted crisis whose international funding is already seriously challenged, E/MM will put even more focus on this issue in the coming years. It has of course to be kept in mind that capacity building, supporting and empowering local partners are processes which require time and energy.
R3 The scaling up of selected interventions (not all projects have respective potentials) is to be foreseen as early as the planning phase, and these projects are to actively prepare and promote the rolling-out of successful interventions (realised by SDC itself and/or by other actors).	E/MM agrees with this recommendation. Several SDC projects have been scaled up and seen as good practice among donor community in the region. Nevertheless, space for improvement as mentioned in early planning stages of projects exist and will be tackled.

II. Evaluators' Final Report

The Evaluation report for the evaluation of the Regional Program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 - 2014 has been elaborated in collaboration with Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division and a consultancy team constituted by KEK/CDC, ETH-NADEL and Peers from SDC.

KEK/CDC

Daniel Kessler kessler@kek.ch

National Consultant

Jalal Al Hussein (jalal_husseini@yahoo.com)

Peers

Gabriela Spirli gabriella.spirli@eda.admin.ch

Willi Graf willi.graf@eda.admin.ch

February 2014

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team thanks all persons involved in the evaluation of SDC's Regional Program in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Representatives of the E/MM Division at Headquarters, of the FDFA (PD/HSD, PD/AMON), staff of the SDC offices in Amman and Beirut, the Swiss Ambassadors in the two countries openly shared views, thus allowing for fruitful discussions. The Embassies also organized meetings with local actors not participating in the Swiss projects and Programs, who shed additional lights on their countries and on the region. The SDC Offices also supported the evaluation process by organizing all logistic aspects (schedule of visits, hotel reservations, and transportation).

Thanks are also extended to the local partners of the SDC Programs and projects as well as to representatives of other humanitarian and development agencies who contributed to the evaluation by communicating their views on the region and its countries, discussing the issues they are faced with and reflecting their cooperation with Switzerland.

Table of Content

List of Abbreviations	1
Evaluation Abstract	2
1. Introduction	6
1.1 Objectives of the Regional Strategy Evaluation	6
1.2 Methods and Structure of the Report	6
1.3 Overview of the Regional Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014	7
2. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations	9
Evaluation Area 1: Context Analysis – Choices “How to Adapt”	9
1.1 Positioning and Adaption of the Strategy with respect to the Countries’ and Regional Contexts and Swiss Policies	9
1.2 Quality of Context Analysis	11
Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and Appropriateness of Projects with regards to the Regional Strategy / Coherence of Project / Program Portfolio – Choices “What to Do”	15
2.1 Relevance of the Projects / Program Portfolio	15
2.2 Consistency of Projects / Program Objectives with the Results Framework of the Domain	19
2.3 Transversal Themes at the Level of the Regional Strategy and the Domains	20
Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the Regional Strategy and its Portfolio – Choices “How to Do It”	21
3.1 Management Performance	21
3.2 Quality of the Monitoring System	23
3.3 Coordination and Aid Effectiveness in the Regional Set-Up	24
Evaluation Area 4: Results of the Regional Strategy – in Relation to the Results at the Levels of Countries and of the Region – Choices “What to achieve”	25
4.1 Results and Effectiveness / Swiss Contribution to Country (Regional) Results	25
4.2 Sustainability and Scaling-Up	25
Appendix:	
Appendix 1: Evaluation Matrix	27
Appendix 2: Persons Consulted	29
Appendix 4: Documents and Websites Consulted	32
Appendix 5: Projects in Reaction to the Syria Crisis (until October, 2013)	33
Appendix 6: All Projects and their Duration	34
Appendix 7: Structure of the Regional Program’s Portfolio	37
Appendix 8: Intervention Logics	39
Appendix 9: Basic Statistical Data (2012, unless indicated otherwise)	41
Appendix 10: Results Framework (from the CS 2010-2014)	42

List of Abbreviations

AR	Annual Report
CAA	Comprehensive Aid Approach
CS	Cooperation Strategy
CSPM	Conflict Sensitive Project / Program Management
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
EMM	Europe and Mediterranean Basin Division
FDFA	Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HSD	Human Security Division
HQ	Headquarters
IDMC	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
oPt	Occupied Palestinian Territory
RP IJLS	Regional Program Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
RP	Regional Program
SCO	Swiss Cooperation Office
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
WB	World Bank
WOGA	Whole of Government Approach

Evaluation Abstract

Donor	SDC – Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Report title	Evaluation Regional Program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (IJSL) 2010 – 2014
Geographic area	Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria
Sector	Regional Country programme
Language	English
Date	December 2014
Authors	Daniel Kessler – KEK/CDC Biel (www.kek.ch) Peers SDC: Gabriela Spirli and Willi Graf

Constituting one out of four peer review missions of a pilot program initiated by the SDC Controlling Division, two SDC staff, one Swiss and one locally recruited consultant evaluated the regional program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria between November 16 and 25, 2013. The objective of the mission was to assess the strategic orientation, the operational steering and the achievements of the program. Based on this, it should express its views about the efficiency and effectiveness. The process of conducting the review and discussing the findings within SDC is designed to enhance SDC's culture of institutional learning.

Evaluation Objectives and Methodology

Prior to visiting the field offices the review team delivered an inception report based on a document review and a total of six interviews in Berne. The interviews were conducted with line managers and other entities of the Department of Foreign Affairs involved in the Region as well as the former Regional Director. The delegation visited offices in Beirut and Amman, met the resident Swiss Ambassadors and embassy staff, held group briefings with all SDC staff in thematic sub-groups, and met with implementing partners, other donors and analysts. Field visits were possible to the Syrian border of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon and two camps of Palestine refugees in Jordan. The review was also inspired by the findings of the external review of SDC instruments of working in fragile contexts and elements of the on-going process of adapting SDC instruments to working in fragile environments.

Major Findings and Conclusions

The review team was most impressed by the way the involved teams at HQ and in the Region and in particular the management prepared and accompanied the mission. Documents were easily available; staff was openly expressing views and expectations. Security was ably managed. This was all the more impressive as the teams are under stress from the implications of the Syrian crisis, the consequences of violence in Iraq and the risk of outbreaks of violent conflicts in all other countries. At the same time the operational and managerial challenges due to a high number of staff changes, increased availability of funds, restrictive conditions of host countries with respect to working with refugees and enhanced needs of coordination among Swiss actors and with donors added to the pressure. Management and local staff deal remarkably well with a very heavy workload and show strong commitment to the cause of relieving the suffering of refugees. They want to make a contribution to the stabilization of the region being aware that it is way beyond Swiss capacities to control the forces behind the problems. The relations between Embassies and SDC Offices are smooth, marked by mutual respect and a sense of solidarity reinforced by the difficult environment they are called upon to

operate. All findings should be seen in the light of the great recognition the review team wishes to express regarding the dedication and professionalism of the teams involved.

Context Analysis: Joint understanding of Needs and Potentials

The size and composition of the SDC offices in Lebanon and Jordan allows for a critical mass of exposure to different political and social groups in the host countries especially when combined with the respective networks of the Embassies. However, Switzerland has still a long way to go to live up to the requirements of what could be called a joint analytical understanding of the situation by all Swiss Government stakeholders and a joint approach to constantly adapting the understanding of the situation and discussing the operational, managerial and political implications. The reviewers found that the statement of the Evaluation “Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts” which reads “develop a clear common understanding of the transformation to be supported as the basis for discussions and reference point for developing objectives” fully applies to the issues the regional program IJSL is faced with. Switzerland needs to better understand where it can add value within the plethora of other international actors. The current set-up of the Task Force Middle East involves all the relevant actors but seems (from what the review could see) not to be able to provide clear guidance on how to read the context and on how to adapt action accordingly. Especially through their connections with multilateral and local partners, Field Offices and Embassies gather a wealth of knowledge which could be better exploited (see recommendation 1). The review team considers that the relative weakness of such context analysis has probably induced sub-optimal choices at various levels. As an example the team believes that Switzerland could make a distinctive contribution to stabilization in Lebanon, where space and potential to innovate exist in a medium-term perspective, rather than in Jordan and Iraq, where massive foreign assistance already exists and, in the case of Jordan, where stability is relatively less at risk (although the humanitarian situation is also critical). Jordan will remain of critical importance in the coordination of the Syrian response. In Lebanon we see scope for a reinforced Swiss intervention, especially with innovative approaches to conflict sensitive interventions applied in a sustainability perspective. After reflection and identification of some valid entry points, we could see more financial and human resources allocated to Lebanon in the new strategy. The review team doesn't see such potential for Switzerland to make a difference in Iraq.

The review strongly recommends using scenario planning for the new strategy (foreseeing also differentiated reactions to scenarios) and to devise a clear understanding of the concept for comprehensive development. The review team totally buys into the call for a comprehensive approach to the involvement in the Region as outlined in the draft UN strategy on the subject (“Towards a comprehensive regional strategy”, Draft 29.10.13). However, it considers that comprehensiveness in the context of middle income countries may be more of a combination of humanitarian tools and peace-building, macro-economic and normative instruments (the latter addressing regulatory levels of State interventions) than a traditional sequence of tools moving from prevention to emergency assistance and then to early recovery and development (often referred to as continuum/contiguum). Comprehensive development in that sense is strongly linked to political and macro-economic dimensions. However, while strongly advocating for joint analysis of the context by all Swiss actors and close links to international partners, the review team also wants to stress the need for a consequent application of humanitarian principles, of principles of good humanitarian donorship and development cooperation. While Switzerland has to make its own choices on important issues, it is crucial for implementation to adhere to these principles (reflected also in the mandates of the FDFA units involved) of which impartiality in humanitarian work is among the most important ones.

Efficiency and Effectiveness of SDC action: How choices are made is decisive

In the limited time available the review team came to the conclusion that both offices visited, for partly different reasons, can be compared to engines which run hot because of external (context related) and internal (organisational) stress factors. In fact, from various interviews we got the impression that the SDC engine in the region got rather too hot. This results in staff doubting it can live up to expectations (their own or others') and in loss of confidence and hence efficiency. Easier said than done, the solution is to cool down the engine. This means to come to a situation where ambitious but reachable goals are formulated at all levels and the related resources are considered sufficient. To do this management and in fact all staff have to make choices at various levels. It is acknowledged that in the IJSL case higher level choices within FDFA and especially circumstances in the region were the main drivers of stress. However, even under these difficult circumstances, in a range of fields, other options could have been considered, e.g. in the choice of partner organizations, the size of projects to develop, the way of managing processes between offices and within offices and in the allocation of staff resources to tasks. Additionally, a more focused definition of domains of interventions could have allowed better strategic choices, more efficient allocation of human and financial resources, a sharpened Swiss profile, and ultimately increased effectiveness. The review team came to the conclusion that at least some of these choices could have been made differently with significant positive effects on staff satisfaction, workload and effectiveness. The review team also considers that in the current humanitarian response some interventions could work in a medium term perspective and take up more efficiently sustainability dimensions which are crucial in a situation of a protracted crisis.

Implementation and Effectiveness – reach and measure results

Despite the above-mentioned challenges, the Program is well under way. In all three domains of cooperation, SDC makes significant contributions to alleviate the suffering of target populations and for their protection. The program strengthens the capacities of partners, and, especially in Jordan, cooperation has resulted in the durable establishment of a system for Disaster Risk Reduction giving Switzerland high visibility and good will with the Jordanian Government.

Yet, the mission came to the conclusion that many of the humanitarian projects with short duration and operation in hardly reachable locations are difficult to monitor at reasonable cost (follow-up on what is done). It is even more difficult to assess results and impacts. SDC instruments like Annual Reports (AR) must be adapted to this reality. The mission considers that indeed the AR is better adapted to development than to humanitarian contexts. The gap between the monitoring ambition and institutional requirements and the actual capacity for monitoring creates considerable frustration within SDC staff. Adapting tools could reduce pressure on them.

The review team therefore considers that there is an institutional need to work on the understanding of monitoring in humanitarian contexts. Differentiated monitoring schemes are acceptable. Where SDC has the ambition to propose an innovative approach, monitoring must be more detailed and include the critical dimensions of the innovation in view of potential replication. For other activities, minimal monitoring should be acceptable. Secondments to multilateral partners seem to be an efficient and effective tool to enhance monitoring by these partners and may allow for exploration of Swiss contributions – if properly managed and followed up. Win-win situations for SDC and the partner organisation are realistic for monitoring of the context and results. We consider that SDC could add value to international coordination by orienting secondments on monitoring schemes of multilateral partners. For instance, we found the mapping of Syrian refugee presence in Lebanon combined with the poverty map of the host country to be a most useful instrument. It has value as a baseline for the cash for hosting project of SDC and is

at the same time used by multiple partners as a reference, including the Lebanese authorities.

Main recommendations

Under all circumstances the principles of good humanitarian donorship and standards of international development cooperation must be held up by Switzerland.

- 1. Context analysis – political and strategic choices:** The FDFA should use the considerable capital of trust and mutual understanding in its ranks to base its interventions in the wider region (Near East of West Asia) on a sound joint analysis. Updating periodically a dashboard-like instrument with relevant dimensions and developing scenarios based on the dashboard should be an option. Task Force meetings to update analysis and scenarios should have stringent facilitation to be efficient.
- 2. Efficiency – Management choices:** Management at all levels must seek to make choices which reduce stress especially for frontline staff, be it operational or administrative. Suggested lines of action: Use staff already in place before bringing in new persons; create tools which reduce administrative burdens in project management (e.g. “Globalkredite”, work with known partners before identifying new ones, use the space for interpretation of higher level instructions, reduce levels of cross-consultations within the office (e.g. of credit proposals); consequently centralize or decentralise administrative project management. At the program level the following could help: More focused definition of the domains of intervention (e.g. wash for basic services) and reduction of the number of transversal themes.
- 3. Effectiveness – reach and measure results.** The Domain Humanitarian Aid and the Quality Assurance network should come up with a suggestion on how to deal with results monitoring and evaluation in a humanitarian context. It is often justified to resort to the overall international monitoring of a situation (e.g. the number of refugee children attending school) and just conclude by deduction that SDC through respective projects has made a plausible contribution to this. When a crisis situation is likely to be protracted, project design could be for a longer period and include a framework of results monitoring. The use of the framework could then be conditioned to the protracted situation. Buying into and influencing the monitoring schemes of multilateral partners should be a main objective of secondments.

1. Introduction

1.1 Objectives of the Regional Strategy Evaluation

The overall **goal** of the country and regional strategy evaluations is to enhance the coherence of Swiss development cooperation and humanitarian aid in regard to national development priorities or partner priorities and the Federal Council Dispatch, and to provide a basis for SDC's management for strategic and operational steering in order to enhance development results and/or respectively improve humanitarian response in emergency situations / fragile contexts.

The **objectives** of the evaluation realised in the IJSL region (one of four pilots, organised by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division in view of introducing a standardised procedure for peer evaluations) are (i) to assess, through a mutual learning process whether SDC with its partners is reaching the strategic objectives defined in the Regional Cooperation Strategy, and how efficient the strategic and operational steering mechanisms of the Cooperation Office are; (ii) to assess to what extent the Swiss contribution is making a significant contribution to the national development results and to humanitarian efforts, and to identify the key factors, which foster or hinder aid performance and results achievements; (iii) to identify good practices and innovative approaches, and share experiences, in managing the RS; (iv) to build the basis for defining the key parameters of subsequent Regional Strategies. This last objective was highlighted by the Program's management, since a new process of strategic reflection will be realised in 2014, defining the new medium term orientation of the Swiss presence in the region.

1.2 Methods and Structure of the Report

The present evaluation report is structured according to the provisions of the Corporate Controlling Section's concept for country strategy evaluations, touching upon four evaluation areas (context analysis; relevance, implementation, results), for which specific evaluation questions were identified (see appendix 1). The evaluation process, realised by two SDC staff, the peers, an international and a local consultant, consisted of the three following major steps:

Preparation Phase

The Swiss members of the evaluation team, in October and November, 2013 read the very well prepared background documents provided by the EMM Division; and they carried out interviews with representatives of the Swiss Federal Administration (SDC, PD/HSD, PD/AMON) who are involved in the Regional Program's management or whose activities outside the SDC Program touch the region. The preparatory phase resulted in the drafting of an Inception Report that, amongst other, proposed working hypotheses on which the further evaluation process built. The comments of stakeholders of the Swiss presence in the region on the Inception Report additionally alimented the evaluation process.

Field Mission in Lebanon and Jordan (16-26 November, 2013)

The mission to the region, realised in Jordan with a local colleague, allowed for gathering additional information – through meetings with the staff of the SDC offices in Amman and in Beirut, visits to SDC partners representing Governments, Multilateral Organisations and International NGOs, and through visiting project sites. A debriefing meeting with the team of the Amman Office on November 26, 2013, permitted to test preliminary findings and recommendations, thus further contributing to the evaluation's reflection.

Reporting

The present draft report summarises the evaluation results and makes recommendations that, ideally, contribute to the EMM Division's reflections on the next Regional Cooperation Strategy. Comments to the draft report by the Evaluation and Corporate Controlling and the EMM Divisions will provide the basis for the establishment of a finalised evaluation report.

1.3 Overview of the Regional Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014

The Program "Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria" (RP IJLS) has two main specificities: It is a **regional Program**, covering four countries (even five if the interventions in Turkey reacting to the Syria crisis are considered), and its thrust is mainly **humanitarian** (with the ambition, to implement a comprehensive aid approach (CAA)). The Swiss Program in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria is motivated and driven by the large number of **refugees** in the region (almost 5 million Palestinians, more than 2 million Syrians, an estimated 2 million Iraqis) living in several countries. Chances are that the number of refugees and IDPs will continue to increase in the next months and years. Switzerland's current cooperation with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria is mainly a **humanitarian Program**. Other target groups consist of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and labour migrants mainly.

The dominant factor for Program development in the



past two years has been and continues to be the **Syrian civil war** which, since 2011, has taken over 120,000 lives according to the UK based NGO Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The Swiss response to this crisis has co-determined many aspects of the Program, leading to the mobilisation of additional funds (i.e. 20 Mio. CHF in June 2013), to the planning and implementation of additional projects, and even to the realisation of activities in Turkey, a fifth country covered by the regional Program. The Syria crisis adds

Regional Program for Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, 2010-2014

Domains

Basic Services & Livelihoods

Protection

Disaster Risk Reduction

Transversal Themes

CSPM, Gender Equality, Climate Change Neutrality/Adaptation, Disaster Resilience

Palestine Refugees in the Region

(Registered in UNRWA - 2010 figures)	
in Gaza	1,167,361
in the West Bank	848,494
in Jordan	1,999,466
in Syria	495,970
in Lebanon	455,373
Total	4,966,664

Source: UNRWA:

www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011120434013.pdf

Iraqi Refugees in the Region

(2009 figures)	
in Syria	1.2 – 1.4 million
in Jordan	0.5 – 06. million
in Lebanon	20,000 – 30,000
IDPs in Iraq	over 2 million

Source: UNHCR: [www.unhcr.org/cgi-](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4981d3ab2&query=iraqi%20refugees)

[bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4981d3ab2&query=iraqi refugees](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4981d3ab2&query=iraqi%20refugees)

Syrian Refugees in the Region

(November 2013 figures)	
in Lebanon	831,457
in Jordan	560,059
in Turkey	522,111
in Iraq	208,054
in Egypt	128,158
Subtotal	2,249,839
North Africa	17,139
Total	2,266,978
IDPs in Syria	over 6,500,000

Sources: UNHCR for refugees:

<http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

IDMC for IDPs

<http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/syria>

to the region's complex and complicated situation, which is at the crossroads of global geopolitical interests and of local and regional dynamics.

2. Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

Choices are to be made for Switzerland's future cooperation with the region; choices to increase the Swiss interventions' effectiveness and profile and ultimately their impact on the ground. These choices concern both the **strategic level** (choice of partner countries, selection and concise definition of domains of intervention, relative importance of different cooperation modalities) and **operational aspects** (amongst other: selection of implementing partners, SDC structures in the region and respective financial and human resources, monitoring instruments, coordination). The upcoming definition of a next Cooperation Strategy with the region provides an excellent opportunity for preparing and applying respective choices.

The following paragraphs provide analyses and recommendations which are meant to allow the RP's management to prepare respective choices – both in the short term and in view of the definition of a new Regional Cooperation Strategy.

Evaluation Area 1: Context Analysis – Choices “How to Adapt”

1.1 Positioning and Adaption of the Strategy with respect to the Countries' and Regional Contexts and Swiss Policies

The context in which the RP IJLS is being implemented is extremely fragile – both in single countries (to a lesser extent in Jordan) and in the region. Unrest, security problems and armed conflicts in one country affect severely its neighbours. Thorough analysis of context and diligent subsequent selection of interventions which are to target both the alleviation of suffering *and* the change of the fragile situations are therefore crucial for the quality of the Program's implementation.

Conclusions

- Switzerland reacted quickly to the Syria crisis and met the needs of refugees (and the hosting communities); however different Swiss actors (SDC, FDFA's PD/Human Security Directorate) reacted rather in their respective institutional logic. Coordination was often sub-optimal.
- The SDC response to the Syria crisis consists of a big number of diversified projects, adding importantly to the management tasks of the pre-existing cooperation Program and its already important number of projects.
- The reaction to the crisis is partly regional (support to UNRWA, 20 Mio. CHF made available for responding to the Syrian crisis), but articulated mainly at national levels (Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey).
- The conditions attached to the additional 20 million CHF for responding to the Syria crisis, as understood by the evaluation team, were not conducive to efficient identification of projects. Having to commit and disburse funds by the end of 2013 constrained the quality of the Program's implementation

Recommendations

- At SDC HQ, conditions for swift reaction to exceptional situations, which are likely to be protracted, should be revised. Expanding existing activities with known partners, fewer projects with higher financial volumes and in-built longer term goals are options to be emphasized.
- In complex situations requiring urgent responses, choices for allocating financial and human resources in SDC Offices are to make optimum use of resources already in

place.


- Medium term scenarios of the evolution in the region and in single countries are to be developed for the planning of future Swiss interventions, helping to define and quickly adapt respective “weighting” of Swiss interventions (intervention areas, modalities, choice of partners). They provide a sound basis for Task Force discussions and decisions.

The Syria Crisis

Switzerland's Response

Switzerland's quick reaction to the unfolding and the full outbreak of the Syrian crisis responded mainly to the needs of (displaced) groups in Syria and of the refugees who fled to neighbouring countries (food, housing, education, health, and cash). Funds are channeled through contributions to humanitarian partners (some of the active within Syria), the implementation of own projects (also through cross-border cooperation), deployment of technical experts to UN agencies and support to international coordination and humanitarian dialogue. Additional human resources (SKH staff) were mobilised to manage the programme and to implement, for instance, together with a local partner organisation, a “cash for hosting families” project in Lebanon. An additional person is positioned in Turkey, where Switzerland also contributes to international efforts in response to the Syria crisis.

So far (November, 2013) 30 projects have been or are being realised in reaction to the Syrian crisis (some of them during longer than one year, the projects in the graph can therefore not be summed up). The financial volume of the support amounted to more than 40 Mio CHF (including the 20 Mio CHF announced by the Federal Council in June 2013) in September, 2013. By the end of 2013, SDC has allocated 55 Mio CHF to the Syria crisis. All SDC projects were attributed either to the RP's domain “Basic Services and Livelihoods” (BSL) or “Protection”.



The allocation of funds for SDC's activities reacting to the Syria crisis was done both at Headquarters (HQ) and in the region. While HQ identified the ways of cooperating with multilateral organisations that have continued presence in Syria and for providing refugees arriving in Turkey, the offices in Amman and Beirut identified possibilities to intervene in favour of victims of the Syrian civil war in the two countries and in Iraq as well as of hosting communities, and in Syria itself, targeting IDPs and isolated communities (the Swiss Embassy and the SCO being closed at the end of February, 2012). SDC funded projects reached beneficiaries in Syria through chains of cooperation, resulting also in capacity building for the actors involved in the chains. The HSD also funded projects in Syria, targeting the strengthening of the country's civil society.

Do No Harm

In emergency situations, the support of populations in need is a priority for humanitarian interventions. Tensions arising from such situations are to be avoided; a Conflict Sensitive Project and Program Management must be systematically applied. SDC's reactions to the

Syria crisis have been much aware of these tensions. “Do no harm” in this region means support to the refugees as well as to the local population; both types of support have to be designed in conflict sensitive manner and with clear criteria. Interventions should not do harm – as the hosting communities could consider the help provided mainly to the refugees as unjust, since they themselves face difficulties. Issues can also arise among beneficiaries of support, if access to services provided is considered to be unequal. Moreover, it has to be noted that the refugees are located in poorer areas of Lebanon and Jordan (based on UNCHR poverty/refugees maps). Tensions between the host societies – in Palestine Refugee camps, around camps recently established for Syrian refugees in Jordan, and in the Middle East at large – do exist. They chiefly concern three areas: the labour market, Syrian workers being prepared to work for lower salaries than local workers or migrant workers from other countries, the housing market, where rents are said to have increased in some densely inhabited Syrian refugee areas, and the pressure on host country education systems and water resources. Host society grievances against Syrian refugees per se are growing as the number of Syrian refugees continues to increase daily and conflicts tend to increase over time.

The Pre-Existing Program

Simultaneously to the Syrian response program, SDC’s pre-existing Program, targeting to a large extent the Palestine refugees in the region, has continued to be implemented. Some of the pre-existing projects are affected by the Syrian refugee crisis (the SDC supported UNRWA has had to face and adapt to the arrival of more than 50,000 Palestine refugees from Syria in Lebanon, many of them now residing in Palestine refugee camps and other overcrowded localities, thus adding to the promiscuity and its consequences. Other pre-existing projects were less affected by the Syria crisis and are being carried out as planned (e.g. the support to Jordan’s disaster preparedness which, so far, deals mainly with natural disaster risks). The equation appears obvious: many pre-existing projects + many new projects = too many projects for the existing structures in place.

1.2 Quality of Context Analysis

The region is probably the number one spot world-wide when it comes to the need for a comprehensive context assessment (political, military, social, economic, and ecological), providing a sound basis for strategic and operational choices for interventions. While single Swiss actors did analyse the Syria crisis and the situations resulting from it in neighbouring countries, the analysis was hardly carried out jointly, resulting in a lack of coordination.

Conclusions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The possibility of a major crisis in Syria was not foreseen as a realistic scenario (by SDC in its Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 and other relevant actors, including multilateral organisations). Reactions to the crisis were therefore mostly <i>ad hoc</i>. Coordination took quite a long time to be put in place. - The context analysis performed after the Syria crisis had emerged was strongly driven by the immediate humanitarian impact of this crisis and rather hasty assessment of political opportunities and less by a systematic, integrated approach to reading the situation in the region.

Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The new Cooperation Strategy for the region is to be drafted in 2014, based on a joint analysis of Swiss stakeholders and on scenarios.


- Given the high probability of a protracted crisis, choices have to be made regarding the selection of partner countries, the definition of the domains and target groups, and the financial volume and types of cooperation with them as well as the instruments used. Lebanon appears to be the one country in the region where Switzerland can make a difference: positive results and impact are potentially big, because of the country's dimensions, increased fragility and local needs.
- Support is to be provided for stabilising and improving livelihoods *and* for changing and stabilizing fragile situations in a sustainable way, hence by facilitating transformational change.
- The “whole of Government approach” is to guide Swiss analysis in a mid-term perspective; it is to prepare the ground for defining interventions and appropriate instruments in all phases: analysis, planning, implementation, and monitoring.
- The common analysis should allow each Swiss actor to remain true to their mandates and to the quality standards defined for their work.

Analysis of the Context

SDC's Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 for the Region addresses the main dimensions of the region's and the countries' needs and dynamics: The countries covered by the strategy are middle income countries affected by specific social and economic inequalities; the political and demographic situations are complex, and the “threat of war and potential regional spill-over” as well as the possibility that Syria's fragile political balance be affected by a worsening socio-economic situation are explicitly stated by the CS. But, as other observers and actors of the region, it did not foresee the possibility of a civil war in Syria. Rather, it oriented its plans on a “most likely scenario”, characterised by coping deficiencies of host countries' deficiencies in managing refugee situations, the possibilities of erupting violence in the West Bank and Gaza and military confrontation between Israel and its neighbours as well as droughts affecting the region with their socio-economic consequences. It can be concluded that the strategy is currently outdated and needs renewed analysis and adaptation starting in 2014.

Context Analysis and Program Implementation and WOGA

The rapid deterioration of the Syrian crisis required a fast identification of projects amidst repeated international fund raising calls. This put limits to the analyses of Swiss actors involved (SDC and PD/HSD) and to their coordination. The foremost important issues in such situations is the “do no harm principle”. It is very easy to fall into the trap of partiality and lose out on freedom of action both in humanitarian terms (access to people in need on all sides) and from a development policy perspective (loss of confidence of main players for reconstruction and policy dialogue). Ideally, joint and consensual analyses of the Swiss actors involved, conducted during a workshop, for instance, would have provided the basis for a shared understanding of the appropriate reaction (when supporting target groups in Syria especially), and it would have allowed for more efficient implementation of support. (With the Working Group Middle East (AGNO) and the Interdepartmental Working Group Syria-Lebanon, Swiss actors had the instrument to realise such joint analyses.) Also, and despite the emergency situation, the time horizon of analysis ought to have allowed for medium term planning of interventions – both at strategic level and at the level of single projects. This would have further increased the coherence, and strengthened the quality of Swiss interventions in term of risk awareness and regarding the “do no harm” principle.



Efficient and effective implementation of coordinated interventions of Swiss actors (WOGA) requires ongoing contacts between them. During future analytical work and planning (which is to be done in a medium term perspective, and based on scenarios), these contacts are to be especially close, both at HQ and on the ground, and are to result in a jointly drafted document which demonstrates the shared understanding and the willingness for coordinated interventions.

In the medium term perspective of the integration of Cooperation Offices into Embassies, it is of utmost importance that SDC continues to operate according to internationally agreed quality standards. On the ground, coordination of actions in fragile and conflict affected contexts is crucial.

From Context Analysis to Strategic Choices: Where to be active and how?

Switzerland needs to better understand where it can add value within the plethora of other international actors. What will be Switzerland’s unique contribution to the stabilisation and development and humanitarian response in the region?

One choice to be made for the future SDC strategy in the region concerns the countries of intervention and their relative importance. The following table proposes an instrument for respective decision making (the list of criteria is not exhaustive) providing a possible rationale for interventions. This table should be then combined with the scenarios to determine the relative weights of the Swiss presence. The presentation below is a proposal to guide analysis, make choices and draw conclusions.

Criteria →							
Country/Region ↓	Fragility	Need for Humanitarian Aid	Development Potentials	Can CH/SDC make a difference?	Possibilities for direct intervention	Swiss interests	...
Lebanon	big	big	big	Yes	Big	big	
Jordan	Small	big	moderate	No	Big	moderate	
Iraq	Big	big	big in the long term	No	Small	potentially big	
Syria	Big	big	uncertain	No	small in the short term	moderate	
Region	Big	big	big	No (except UNRWA)	Big	big	

Lebanon: Switzerland can contribute to reach the best case scenario, i.e. “absence of war”. The country needs support, it suffers from an “absence” of Government, aid is much politicized (i.e. Hezbollah is a constraining factor). There is space for Swiss interventions, but the unstable situation contains risks. Switzerland can make a difference in Lebanon and innovate when defining, for instance, unique contributions to host communities of refugees in the medium-term. Support is to be provided in line with the WB/UNDP Stabilization Road Map and making use of Switzerland’s comparative advantages.

Jordan: The rationale for Swiss interventions is weaker. In responding to the Syria crisis, Jordan, unofficially, controls the influx of Syrian refugees, allowing not more than 300 persons per day to enter the country. In response to the Syria crisis, two refugee camps were already opened; a third camp is ready, but it has not opened yet, as there are apparently not enough refugees to use it. There are lesser tensions between the local population and Syrian refugees than in Lebanon. In addition, the Government has set a rule the 30% of the beneficiaries of response to the Syrian crisis in Jordan are to be Jordanians (while 70% can be Syrian refugees). This mechanism carries a good potential to diminish tension between the resident population and refugees. Switzerland could be support the definition of criteria for the allocation of external support to different target groups and coordinate this conflict sensitive action. The role of Jordan as a pivotal country for the Syrian response (regional hub) and the positioning of SDC’s Regional Office are not questioned by these reflections.

Jordan’s development problems are located at three levels: 1) problems already existing before the Syrian crisis, 2) problems amplified by the crisis, and 3) new problems arising as a result of the crisis. The rationale for a Swiss intervention in Jordan’s development could be justified only for the second and third levels. But Switzerland’s comparative advantages for a longer term classic development intervention are difficult to identify in an almost overcrowded support environment.

Iraq: A choice is to be made between stopping (the already very limited) cooperation (or reducing it to the Embassy’s small actions) and a full-fledged intervention. For the latter, not enough resources are available, the conditions for cooperation are extremely arduous (except for the country’s northern parts, i.e. Kurdistan), and reaching impact and making a difference is quite difficult or not achievable for Switzerland.

Syria: In the short term, support to the populations affected by the civil war is to be continued. In the medium-term, reconstruction (of infrastructure, of society, of the State) will be a task to which Swiss actors should contribute selectively (e.g. in the water sector, and obviously based on thorough analysis). The mission was not able to evaluate the role of Switzerland in the peace process for Syria. If Switzerland is decided to contribute to peace building adequate resources must be made available through the respective channels. In most cases it is better not to link humanitarian action directly with political negotiations, but to assure overall coherence of Swiss intervention.

Region: The regional level can be addressed through actors active regionally (e.g. UNRWA), and by supporting projects that target the region. The Global Programs (Water/Blue peace and Migration) could be better exploited if the respective potential is demonstrated. The Blue Peace program may need to be better integrated at the local level and in the Regional strategy. It has to be noted that the Global Programme Migration uses another definition of region.

Interventions should be planned where fragility is high, where the potentials for development in a 20 years horizon exist, and where Switzerland has an interest in and

can make a difference in participating in the stabilisation efforts of partners – representing both the countries themselves and international actors (multilateral organisations, INGOs).

Evaluation Area 2: Relevance and Appropriateness of Projects with regards to the Regional Strategy / Coherence of Project / Program Portfolio – Choices “What to Do”

2.1 Relevance of the Projects / Program Portfolio

SDC’s Regional Program in the Near East is basically humanitarian – its initial logic was a humanitarian one and its funding is from the humanitarian budget – even though EMM representatives highlighted the fact that many of them are “development driven”, targeting also durable change of organisations and enhancement of their capacities. In 2010, development projects (addressing “Governance” and “Environment”) were phased out. Currently three domains and four implementation modalities characterise the regional Program’s portfolio. The “Basic Services and Livelihoods” domain and the multilateral channel modality absorb the most important part of the Program’s budget.

Domains (according to CS)	Implementation Modalities (according to CS)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic Services and Livelihoods: 72% of financial means • Protection: 14% of financial means • Disaster Risk Reduction: 14% of financial means 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multilateral: 67% of financial means • Bilateral: 17% of financial means • Secondments: 10% of financial means • Direct Actions: 6% of financial means

Conclusions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The mainly humanitarian Program consists of well over 100 projects and targets mainly (Palestine, Iraqi, Syrian) refugees and other migrant populations (IDPs, labour migrants). - The largest number of projects are realised with costs less than 1 Mio Swiss Francs, and an overwhelming majority are funded with less than 200,000 Francs. This results in a scattered and “unmanageable” and “unmonitorable” portfolio. - The regional approach mainly consists in the fact that the Program is active in four (five) countries and that the Palestine refugees – a focal target group, supported mainly through UNRWA – are present in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (and the oPt). The Syria crisis added a regional dimension, but was not exploited clearly as an opportunity to strengthen the response’s regional character. - So far there is not a clear added value for increased effectiveness due to the Program’s regional dimensions. There is need to define better what the regional approach consists of, i.e.: 1) target groups; 2) partners – additional coordination needed (e.g. UNRWA / lead Jerusalem), 3) approaches – as of now: rather national responses adapted to country context.

Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More focus to define the domains: For the next Regional Strategy, it is proposed to sharpen the focus of the chosen domains and eventually to reduce the number of domains of cooperation. hence:

- The next RP could consist of the two domains “protection” and “Basic Services and Livelihoods” – and each of them with a clearer focus allowing choices of partners and Programs
- The current domain of cooperation “Disaster Risk Reduction” should not be continued as a domain of its own. An exit strategy for this domain is to be prepared, targeting mainly the sustainability of investments made so far and “capitalising” Swiss visibility and good will.
- Fewer but bigger projects/programs, strengthening of a program approach: For giving the portfolio more focus, and for increasing the efficiency of the Program’s management, the following measures on project level are recommended:
 - planning and realisation of projects with bigger financial volumes
 - planning projects with a longer time horizon
 - when responding to crisis situation: checking the possibilities to reorient ongoing projects and invest additional financial and other resources in them.
 - more co-financing with other bilateral actors
 - realise cross boarder projects, i.e. in the framework of the GP Water Initiatives.
- The understanding of “Comprehensive Aid Approach” is to be further developed. It does not necessarily consist of combining Humanitarian Aid and “traditional development cooperation”. It can also combine HA and support to macroeconomic stabilisation, normative / regulatory systems (of service delivery to citizens, of governance, etc.) and peace building measures. CAA importantly consists of supporting transformational change of the situation (for instance by strengthening institutions and addressing refugees and hosting communities/local population).
- The humanitarian response itself needs improvement, e.g. optimisation of the management and delivery of the response, integrating reflections on sustainability and replication.
- Financial volumes of the Swiss portfolio and the partner landscape do not permit to implement a fully regional approach. Nevertheless, the Swiss Program addresses regional issues regionally through UNRWA, and there seems to be a potential for enhanced work in the water sector. Shorter term activities should enhance to longer term objectives pursued with the respective partners (e.g. Syrian response by UNRWA)

Assessment of the Portfolio

The initial financial planning (realised in 2010) was overthrown due to the Syria crisis. Financial means were more than doubled compared to original plans, and the number of projects was increased by about 25% (30 additional projects responding to the Syria crisis).

Given the institutional setting and SDC rules, and the imperative to respond rapidly to the unfolding Syrian crisis, it was difficult for the Regional Program IJSL to reduce the number of projects. The issue was taken up in successive Office Management Reports. The set-up of the Program with a regional office and two sub-offices (currently: one) constitute an additional difficulty. While important means for reacting to the Syria crisis were channelled through multilateral organisations, the Swiss response was and is being articulated specifically in the neighbouring countries, i.e. Jordan and Lebanon, and recently Turkey, where one additional staff is to be out posted early in 2014. This allows for responding to the specific situations and needs of the refugees in these countries, and those of the host societies that are – at least in part – also targeted by the Swiss interventions.

Initial Financial Planning and Actual Budget 2013 (in Mio. CHF)		
Initial budget	disbursed	
BSL	16.0	38.0
PRO	3.0	13.5
DRR	3.5	1.5
Offices and others	3.0	3.1
Total	25.5	56.1

Sources: CS and AR 2013

The Domains of Cooperation

In the two domains “Basic Services and Livelihoods” and “Protection” quite different types of projects can be and are grouped (result: “all inside”). This allows for flexibility in the selection of projects. But encompassing domains may entail lack of focus, thus affecting the effectiveness of interventions and the program’s profile. The broadly described domains don’t allow for strategic choices. According to Program managers interviewed, “Protection” especially is not focused enough; some would prefer to put “protection” as a transversal theme. Both these domains have to be defined with clearer foci. For instance, they can target populations more specifically defined or subsectors more precisely described (e.g. Wash); types of intervention can be sharpened by a selection of instruments to be applied. Other means to give the two domains clearer foci consist in area-based interventions, in the definition of selected geographical areas on which Switzerland intervenes within partner countries, and/or of levels of intervention (central - local).

The “Disaster Risk Reduction” (DRR) domain allowed for relevant results with comparably small investments, even though they entail important efforts of the Program staff. Since the domain has shown excellent results in Jordan, where the Jordan Search & Rescue Team was INSARAG classified, it now appears to be the right time to prepare the phasing out of the domain and, for a limited period of time, to concentrate on the sustainability of supported partners. If in Lebanon, the support for disaster risk reduction continues, is to accompany the elaboration of the law based on the approved national action plan and possibly the monitoring of its implementation.

Number of Projects

The reduction of the number of projects – a necessity for various reasons, including the Program’s profile and its effectiveness, the efficiency of Program management (administration, monitoring and reporting above all) – can be achieved by choosing more programmatic approaches, by designing projects absorbing larger sums, longer project phases (e.g. three year phases, possibly with foreseen “breaking points” when an activity can be terminated if not satisfactory or no more required, grouping projects under umbrella / Globalkredit modality). A more programmatic approach

In the future, response to crisis may not necessarily lead to an increase in the number of projects, there may be possibilities to provide aid through ongoing, expanded projects – without deviating the projects’ purposes and without forcing implementing partners to realise activities that are outside their own strategic orientation and capacities, obviously.

Regional Approach

The regional character of the Program – resulting mainly from the fact that the program is active in more than one country, the regional impact of crises (refugees), and the support to partners active regionally (UNRWA) – can be strengthened in order to legitimate

Possible Domains Orienting SDC Activities in the Next Strategic Phase of Cooperation with the Region

Basic Services & Livelihoods

Strategy

Program approach with a clear focus on specific topics and / or target groups and including transformational change

Projects

Not more than five projects per country.

Instruments

...

Financial Volume

...

Protection

Strategy

Program approach with a clear focus on specific topics and / or target groups and including transformational change

Projects

Not more than five projects per country.

Instruments

...

Financial Volume

...

Switzerland's regional presence. While a future Program is to give leeway for projects to react to specific problems in the partner countries, it is also to reinforce its regional scope by addressing regional problems regionally. This is obviously not an easy task, since the Syria crisis has accentuated the vulnerability of the states in the region, thus making it more difficult to unite them around common initiatives and interventions. Still, the Global Programs "Water Initiatives" (which carries potential for WOGA and for the application of a regional approach) and "Migration and Development" clearly have the potential for enhancing the regional character of SDC's cooperation (although the GP Migration and Development rather targets the Gulf region and is not closely linked to the IJLS region). For this to happen, the interaction between EMM and the two Global Programs and the Embassies are to be intensified. EMM is also to explore possibilities to identify new projects which are designed as "regional" from the start.

The regional character of SDC's intervention also consists of its coordination with EMM's activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In this respect, common multilateral partners – mainly UNRWA – are to be addressed and supported in coherent and coordinated ways, at SDC HQ, regional and national levels, so as not to give room for misunderstandings and contradictory messages from different Swiss actors.


Comprehensive Aid Approach

EMM is the result of the merging of a Humanitarian Aid and a Development Cooperation section, it has been established as a unit that is to explore and pilot possibilities of implementing CAA. The comprehensiveness of the aid approach, so far, has mainly been an implicit one. A more explicit version of CAA will, amongst other things, allow SDC support for fully being in line with the BUSAN principle of "act fast but stay engaged". The planning of the next strategic phase of the regional cooperation is to develop a more specific understanding of CAA and its concrete implementation in the region. This applies both on a regional level and for single partner countries. Comprehensiveness of aid is to include activities targeting the transformation of the context they are active in in view of stabilisation and its conduciveness to development.

At the regional level, the comprehensiveness of aid approach is to be increased, including through the further strengthening of the capacities of regional actors (e.g. UNRWA) to contribute to the development (the livelihood improvement) of their target groups within the host societies, and thus to the development of the region overall.

Regarding the partner countries, the comprehensiveness of the Swiss aid is to be defined by positioning it between the countries' needs for humanitarian aid (and the respective support already received) and their development potentials (including the national planning and the support provided by third parties). Once this position is found, appropriate instruments are to be selected, and cooperation partners are to be identified. This, together with increased foci defined for the domains of cooperation, will increase the profile and possibly the impact of SDC's support to the region.


Lebanon



Swiss Reaction

Potential for WOGA and implementation that considers SDC principles. SDC can make a difference in the "middle space" between the country's humanitarian situation and its development potential, e.g. innovative conflict sensitive approaches..

Jordan



Swiss Reaction

Improvement of the humanitarian response, e.g. regarding considering sustainability of interventions more systematically (e.g. how to continue Cash support in case of protracted crisis?)

2.2 Consistency of Projects / Program Objectives with the Results Framework of the Domain

Since 2011, the issue of the Program's and of single projects' consistency with results frameworks was side-lined by the Syrian crisis and the resulting emergency situation in Syria and in neighbouring countries. Still, the documents produced by the Program

management (e.g. AR) show that the coherence of the portfolio remains an important concern.

Conclusions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the absence of national strategies for many efforts provided by the SDC Program in the partner countries, reporting assess coherence, at least in parts, against the strategies of relevant (humanitarian) actors (UNRWA, UNHCR, UNDP, ICRC).

Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The coherence of SDC's interventions with national and international efforts is very good. The positioning of SDC Programs and projects in the form of Results Framework and their monitoring based on such positioning provides the basis for coordinated and efficient use of resources and for reporting on effects of Swiss support. - SDC's support of multilateral agencies is well managed. SDC could increasingly use the coordinating role of multilateral organisations (UNDP, OCHA) when defining its interventions and contributions. Co-financing of activities with other bilateral donors could also be envisaged. Switzerland could also take a pro-active role in this field, in order to reduce transaction cost for partner Governments.

While the Results Framework of the Cooperation Strategy 2010-2014 does not make extensive reference to national and sector strategies of the partner countries, or to overarching strategies of multilateral actors, the AR do establish such links. They measure outcomes achieved in domains against regional and national Programs and "country development results" – or state that country development results are not defined.

SDC does not simply channel funds through multilateral agencies, but is in discussion with these organisations and, in the framework of its possibilities, follows their activities. The information obtained during these contacts has an influence on SDC's analyses of the region. SDC should use the overview of multilateral organisations to target its future interventions and contributions where effectiveness is especially promising and where its comparative advantages can be fully used.

2.3 Transversal Themes at the Level of the Regional Strategy and the Domains

The relevance of the four transversal themes defined in the Regional Strategy – CSPM, gender equality, climate change, and disaster resilience - is doubtless. Their consideration by the Program's implementation is to be assessed

Conclusions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The large number of transversal themes (4) and their appropriate implementation requires efforts that appear to be currently beyond SDC's resources.

Recommendations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The number of transversal themes is to be reduced to what makes sense and can be implemented. This increases the chances that they can be fully taken up when planning and implementing projects and the Program as a whole. - Gender and DRR appear as good candidates to be maintained as transversal themes and to be applied best. The existing Credit Proposal's checklists could also be adapted to the needs of the region and the SCOs.

- Conflict sensitive project and Program management is to be made a mandatory approach (not a transversal theme), orienting all Swiss activities in the region.

The transversal themes are quite different in nature, and the Syria crisis may have relegated their importance momentarily. The Annual Report for 2013 does not make statements on achievements regarding the transversal themes. It can be assumed that gender equality and CSPM as well as disaster resilience are quite systematically considered when planning and implementing projects. They should therefore continue to orient Swiss interventions in the region. Climate change neutrality/adaptation, on the other hand, is currently not really addressed – although it is obviously a very important one, since the region is affected by climate change in various ways, the scarcity of the resource “water” being only the most obvious one. Open conflicts around water are a risk which contributes to the region’s fragility and which can be traced back, at least partly, to climate change. In view of implementing conflict sensitive project and program management more systematically, specific training is to become a requirement for all staff involved in the programme’s management.

Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the Regional Strategy and its Portfolio **– Choices “How to Do It”**

3.1 Management Performance

The management structure of the RP IJLS is a complex one: HQ, the Office in Amman, comprised of the Regional and the Jordan Offices and of a total of 24 staff, and the Office in Beirut (previously also the Damascus Office) all participate in the steering of SDC’s interventions. In addition, two Global Programs (Water and Migration & Development) are active in the region, the latter also with one staff in the Amman Office. In addition, the RP is also in contact with the Jerusalem Office managing the SDC Program in the oPt – last not least because UNRWA is a partner for both Programs.

Conclusions

- SDC’s response to the Syria crisis has required additional efforts entailing additional management staff in its offices in the region.
- The regional structure of SDC offices – a necessity under the current layout of the RP – together with HQ’s participation in the Program management (more intense than elsewhere) requires important coordination efforts and the goodwill of all persons involved.


Recommendations

- Roles and responsibilities and lines of accountability among offices and people: need to be spelled out clearly for increased efficiency, effectiveness and smooth functioning. Discussions on strategic, institutional and personal aspects are not to be mixed. This especially applies in periods when important unplanned management tasks are to be realised – as is the response to the Syria crisis. Especially on short term projects the cross-consultations in the office and between offices and HQ has to be minimised, allowing for quick decision making.
- Cooperation with single partners active throughout the region requires a coordinated approach to such actors. For instance, EMM is to speak in one single voice with UNRWA (the lead being with the Jerusalem SCO).

Management Challenges in the Reaction to the Syria Crisis

The engine “RP IJLS” is at risk of overheating due the many additional tasks to be performed in reaction to the Syria crisis, to the integration of new staff in the offices, and to staff fluctuation (both Swiss and local). It is important that management is aware of this risk and adapts its procedures accordingly.

The operational aspects highlighted in the graph below, are amongst the main criteria to be considered when organising the work of the SDC structures in the region. Minimising the risks of “overheating” the engine, potentially resulting in decreasing quality of work and dissatisfied staff, is an important management task. Choices are to be made which allow for an environment conducive to effective and efficient work.



Reo II is not fully implemented in the region. The division of labour between HQ and the offices in the region still reserves large parts of responsibilities for managing support by Berne, where contributions to multilateral organisations are decided and followed. This results in the necessity for especially efficient communication. Due to the Syria crisis and the necessity to act fast, communication was sometimes perceived as unmethodical by SCOs.

Regional Structure

The Program management in the SDC Offices in the region and in HQ mastered the heavy workload stemming from the high number of projects, the political and media attention on the region and above all the Syria crisis. On top of that it appears that significant improvements were made on very often neglected administrative procedures such as filing (e.g. the evaluation team found it quite impressive how swiftly files could be

provided). A major concern of the offices was the high staff turnover. The Amman Office especially saw quite a significant number of Swiss and local staff being replaced and new staff members join the team to manage SDC's response to the Syria crisis. Moreover, in response to the difficulties to keep up-to-date with projects and country specific processes, more responsibilities were delegated to the country offices, which put the coordination among SDC structures to the test.

Financial Planning Instruments

The Program's Financial Planning takes place on two levels. For the medium term, percentages of the overall budget are allocated to domains and to aid modalities (some of them managed by HQ, others by the offices in the region). In the short term, the allocation of financial resources reacts in *ad hoc* ways to the situation in the region and in single countries. This is exacerbated by the financial means made available for the Swiss response to the Syria crisis (20 Mio. CHF in June, 2013, alone; almost an annual budget of the initially planned regional Program, most of which is to be spent in 2013). This flexibility results, amongst other things, in an important number of Credit Proposals to be prepared, and in important management efforts. These could be reduced by developing fewer and larger projects under an umbrella type of arrangement.

3.2 Quality of the Monitoring System

The often short term nature of commitments and the subsequent important number of projects make the development of a monitoring system a challenging if not impossible business. The Program management had prepared a formal monitoring system, comprised also of monitoring sheets for the domains. But with the Syria crisis, the importance given to context monitoring – MERVs were established at a two monthly interval in 2012 – the use of such monitoring instruments was curtailed.

Conclusions
- The important number of projects and the emergency activities have reduced SCOs' resources for monitoring and reporting.

Recommendations
- SDC's monitoring is to be organised more selectively and differentiated according to project type. It is acceptable to rely at least in parts, on the monitoring of multilateral partners, possibly contributing to it through secondments.
- The lessons learnt and other insights gained from the Program's implementation are to be made more systematically available within EMM and SDC as well as to other actors.

In the SDC contexts results are usually not the final product of a one to two year cycle but must be seen as a flow of information originating from activities which can date back several years. The monitoring of the Program is thus very much linked to the quality of the monitoring system of multilateral partners and in fact depends on them. Suggestions on how to adapt the system to both the particularities of the portfolio and the fragile situation are interesting issues for further institutional discussion and learning. The topic of programmatic, security related risk management is also to be addressed. One possibility to develop the monitoring consists in supporting multilateral organisations' monitoring systems by providing secondments specialised in this area, that would benefit the multilateral organisations and SDC's monitoring at the same time. Meanwhile, and for the present portfolio, monitoring is to proceed selectively, identifying the information to be made available for the Program's steering, and relegating other information to a secondary level of importance.

The knowledge management within the SDC structures in the region is not systematic. The communication of lessons learnt and of good practices within EMM is especially important when staff rotation is high, and when the set-up is a regional one, involving large number of staff who often does not interact directly.

3.3 Coordination and Aid Effectiveness in the Regional Set-Up

Donor Coordination is a precondition for aid effectiveness. In a regional set-up marked by continuous emergency responses such coordination faces specific challenges that are to be dealt with, first of all, through optimum coordination within SDC's regional structures.

Conclusions

- Switzerland is a small but well appreciated donor that participates constructively but selectively in donor coordination and that can play a leading role regarding innovative approaches.
- Switzerland is a comparatively small actor in the region, but it is regarded by local and international actors as playing a positive role, especially within the framework of innovative, ground-breaking initiatives. More is to be done where SDC has comparative advantages.

Recommendations

- Coordination (in view of maximised aid effectiveness and a coherent presence of SDC within the region) is to start within SDC. The structures in the region and HQ are to communicate relevant information quickly and in appropriate ways.

SDC participates in donor working groups and has well established contacts with other donors; organising coordination remains the task of multilateral organisations (UNHCR, UNDP, and OCHA). In Jordan, SDC chaired the donor coordination for supporting the Syrian refugees, and thus played an important role in making the aid of the many actors involved more efficient.

With its approach to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon, where Lebanese hosting families are supported by stabilising their capacity to host Syrian refugees over long phases, the Swiss Program introduced an innovation that sharpens the intervention's profile (also see below, paragraph 4.2).

The flows of information within SDC (between Offices in the region (including oPt), with HQ) are not always perceived as optimum by the actors involved. Quick transmission of information – e.g. about strategic options, the conditionality attached to the provision of financial resources and, more generally, the situation in the region, the experience made with single partners – needs to be shared in ways allowing for swift and efficient working and for coherent approaches in the region. During emergency situations and in times of stress, the quality of information flows is especially important in order to guarantee the quality of work.

Evaluation Area 4: Results of the Regional Strategy – in Relation to the Results at the Levels of Countries and of the Region – Choices “What to achieve”

4.1 Results and Effectiveness / Swiss Contribution to Country (Regional) Results

The measuring of results against local strategies is not easily achieved in a region and in countries where planning capacities of local actors are limited (mainly due to poor human and financial resources and the overall fragile context). An efficient monitoring which adequately and realistically plans the resources required for this task can enhance the quality of reporting on the Program’s effectiveness.

Conclusions

- The RP IJLS is on its way to achieve its initially targeted results. With its participation in the international response to the Syria crisis – both through multilateral channels, other partners and by self-implemented projects – the RP also contributes to the alleviation of the emergency situation of Syrian refugees.
- Switzerland’s involvement in Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness both in Lebanon and in Jordan emerge as very significant contributions. In Jordan, a full-fledged system is in place, in Lebanon the basis for such a system are laid with the support provided (through UNDP) for the establishment of a national action plan.

Recommendations

- Results at output level are to be interpreted so as to provide hints about the outcomes and even the impact of SDC interventions. As for monitoring, the assessment of the Program’s effectiveness is also to make use of supported (multilateral and other) organisation’s reporting on achievements.

The Program’s reporting indicates “very satisfactory” and “satisfactory” achievements at the outcome level. Reporting mainly stresses the output level, though. The quality of reporting on results can be further developed by providing interpretations of the results at output level. And it can rely on multilateral organisations’ reporting to which SDC has contributed. The outcomes on which they report and the impacts of their efforts can be emphasised, and the Swiss contributions to these achievements are to be stated (see also above, paragraph 3.2).

Monitoring and reporting on SDC’s activities in the region would be made easier if the portfolio showed a clearer profile. The issue is not to group the large number of projects, but to give the domains of intervention more profile (strengthening the program approach, fewer projects, longer lasting projects, projects with bigger financial volumes, etc. – see also above, paragraph 2.1). The future planning, especially the definition of a new CS, is to consider this dimension, reduce the number of domains of intervention and sharpen their definition. This would also help the programme to respect the principles of good humanitarian donorship even more thoroughly.

4.2 Sustainability and Scaling-Up

The sustainability of humanitarian aid – especially when it reacts to emergency situations – is often not the first concern – saving lives and alleviating the suffering of victims is a priority in the short term. Still, with the increasingly protracted situation, sustainability as well as potentials for scaling-up approaches gain in importance. Especially in politically induced crisis it is often possible to anticipate that a crisis is going to be protracted.

Conclusions

- SDC's support to Jordan's efforts for Disaster Risk Reduction is likely to be sustainable, since the respective projects targeted institution building.
- Support to UNRWA's organisational development is an important thrust to achieve sustainable results. At the same time, UNRWA, besides many positive aspects and the paramount importance of its mandate, as a large institution, comes with a history of heavy bureaucracy and partly non-innovative staff.
- The reaction to the Syria crisis does not consider scaling-up potentials of single projects priority. Still, in Lebanon, the replication of the approach "cash for hosting" was taken up or is in the process of being replicated by other bi- and multilateral actors (Poland, UNHCR).

Recommendations

- The sustainability of interventions is to be prepared mainly by capacitating local partners – both Government units and NGOs. This implies intensive cooperation with selected partners and the channelling of support through these actors whenever possible.
- The scaling-up of selected interventions (not all project have respective potentials) is to be foreseen as early as the planning phase, and these projects are to actively prepare and promote the rolling-out of successful interventions (realised by SDC itself and/or by other actors).

Sustainability

It appears that SDC's steady support efforts have contributed to improving the UNRWA's management capacities – although these require continued support, and although the organisation's performance continues to be criticised. The abovementioned support to Jordan's DRR body is an additional example of support resulting in sustainable improvement of local capacities. Sustainability of interventions can also be strengthened by contributing to the transformation of the contexts the program is active in, e.g. by strengthening the capacities of local actors and by working on the regulatory framework for the protection of citizens. A changed, more stable context is more likely to absorb external support more sustainably.

Scaling-Up

The scaling-up of activities co-funded by SDC and implemented by other organisations, multilateral ones especially, is usually outside the Program's reach. The replication of successful approaches which can be realised by SDC mainly concerns the modalities "bilateral cooperation" and "direct actions". The scaling-up of the "cash for hosting" approach in Lebanon was made possible by an open sharing of SDC's experiences and ways of working with other agencies seeking to support families hosting Syrian refugees. The SDC promotion and strengthening of DRR in Jordan also have an important potential for scaling-up – through support provided to the rolling-out of DRR structures and mechanisms by local actors.

Appendix 1: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Area 1: Context Analysis (referring to the partner countries' and to the Swiss context)	
EMM's Questions	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Syrian crisis: How did SDC react to the constant deterioration of the humanitarian situation and crisis in Syria and the region (Strategy, operation, Human Resources etc.)?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the volatile and fragile context been sufficiently taken into consideration in the Program implementation?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has the "do no harm approach" been well respected?
1.1	Positioning and adaption of the Strategy with respect to the countries and regional context and Swiss policies
114	What were the most important changes in the context and what has been their effect on the CS, and what adaptations have been taken?
1.2	Quality of context analysis
121	How realistic and relevant is the context analysis? How the broad political context is assessed in the CS and ARs? Does the analysis include issues such as social and economic inequality, power relations, regional disparities, the state apparatus, the political parties, institutions and powers?

Evaluation Area 2: Coherence of project / Program portfolio	
EMM's Questions	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How effective was the regional approach and its application (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and newly Turkey)? Recommendations for improvement.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How has SDC applied the BUSAN principle of "act fast but stay engaged" to adapt its Program to the context of humanitarian crisis in the region.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Application of the comprehensive aid approach (CAA): What are the indications that the CAA is well applied? Where is potential for improvement? Which are the supporting/hindering factors for the implementation of the CAA?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How flexible are SDC activities and portfolio according to the changes and challenges in each country and the region?
2.1	Relevance of the projects / Program portfolio
211	How is the project/Program portfolio structured?
2.1	Consistency of projects/Program objectives with Results Framework of the domain
221	How is the project/Program portfolio aligned with the results frameworks of the domains/sub-domains of the CS?
2.3	Transversal themes at the level of CS and the domains
231	How relevant are the selected transversal themes and how are they integrated in the CS and the domains?

Evaluation Area 3: Implementation of the CS or MTP, and their portfolio	
EMM's Questions	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Program implementation and REO II process: How well are the challenges handled in the field?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do you assess the financial planning tools for the RO? (H-cash, Multi-funding, 0,5 % water money). Are the financial instruments appropriate and in line with the CS?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the regional structure of SDC efficient?
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The regional Program IJSL is not eligible for regional cooperation funding (RZ) along the lines of the parliamentary bill, nevertheless the CAA is included in the CS. The current situation and the mid- and long-term prognostics require a more comprehensive approach including development interventions. Recommendations in this respect.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If applicable given the short duration of the mission: What are thematic areas/ activities /domains recommended to be included and/or scaled up or/and merged in the future strategy (i.e. Water/DRR; Protection/Migration).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relevance of the domain approach/continuation in the future CS? Recommendations.
3.2	Management Performance
321	How are decisions for steering the country Program made if the results differ considerably from planning?
3.3	Quality of the Monitoring System
3.4	Coordination and aid effectiveness in the country set up
341	Which role does SDC play within the donor community?
342	Which information and through which mechanisms is the achievement of results shared with the governments of the partner countries, the Swiss community (incl. SDC's networks), other relevant stakeholders?
344	<p>“WOGA” Which are the areas where coordination and synergies with other Swiss governmental agencies are well achieved? Are there gaps? Recommendations for improvement and future WOGA Strategy?</p> <p>In view of the future integration of SDC offices into the Embassies, what are main factors to be considered following a regional approach?</p>

Evaluation Area 4: Results of the CS – in relation to the results at country level	
EMM's Questions	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How to group more than 100 projects in three domains and five countries so that meaningful expected results can be formulated? Recommendations in this respect.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Were the principles of good humanitarian donorship respected?
4.1	Domain Results, Effectiveness and Contribution to Country Results (CS follows regional approach)
413	To what extent have the Swiss portfolio results (outcomes) of the different domains and transversal themes been achieved? Or what is the likelihood to achieve them?
415	How significant is the Swiss contribution to the achieved results at country level for the different domains?
4.2	Sustainability and scaling up
422	What has been done at country level to enhance the sustainability of the investments of SDC?

Appendix 2: Persons Consulted

Switzerland

Christian Eggs, Global Program Water Initiatives
Pierre-Yves Fux, FDFA
Anita Kälin, FDFA
Konstantin Obolensky, FDFA
Björn Schranz, SDC, Program Officer EMM
Beat von Däniken, SDC, former Regional Director of Cooperation Amman
Rudi von Planta, SDC, Deputy Head of EMM
Thomas Rüegg, Global Program Migration and Development

Lebanon

Abdelnasser el Ayi, Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Project Manager
Fadil Abilmonna, UNDP, Program Analyst
Hala Acouri, SDC, Administrative / Finance Officer
Jacco Bos, Embassy of the Netherlands in Lebanon
Fatima Amine, SDC, Finance & Admin Assistant
Soumaya Berri, SDC, National Program Officer
Fabrizio Carboni, ICRC, Head of Delegation
Jean-Paul Cavalieri, UNHCR, Deputy Representative
Roger Davies, UNRWA, Deputy Director in Lebanon
Ruth Flint, Ambassade de Suisse au Liban, Ambassadeur
Scarlett Haddad, journaliste
Heba Hage Felder, SDC, Director of Cooperation,
Karl-Friedrich Glombitza, SDC, Project Manager
Lina Hamdan, Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee, Communication & Strategy Advisor
Khalil Hasan, UNRWA, Donor relations and projects officer
Stine Horn, Norwegian Embassy, First Secretary
Nabih Jabr, Croix Rouge Libanaise, Directeur adjoint Département EMS
Michelle Jalkh, SDC, Project Assistant
Dalia Lakiss, SDC, National Program Officer
Fredrick Lee-Ohlsson, Embassy of Sweden, First Secretary
Simon Little, British Embassy Lebanon, Humanitarian Advisor
Rafael Knus, SDC, Program Assistant Finance
Robert Nicolas, National Program Officer
Isabelle Peillen, Mada
Maureen Philippon, EU Delegation Lebanon, Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection – ECHO, Technical Assistant
Luca Portacolone, Cooperazione italiana allo sviluppo
Luca Renda, UNDP, Country Director
Boris Richard, Embassy of Switzerland in Lebanon, Deputy Chief of Mission
Shombi Sharp, UNDP, Deputy Country Director
Clément Nadim Zakhia, Mada, board member

Jordan

Carlos Afonso, ECHO

Mahmoud Akrabawi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General of the Department of Palestinian Affairs

Majida Alassaf, UNDP

Zena Ali-Ahmad, UNDP, Country Director

Khaled Awamieh, Arab Governance Centre, Founder and Board Member

Mohammad Barakat, SDC, NPO Basic Services and Livelihoods

Thomas Böni, SDC, Regional Head of Finance and Administration

Vincent Cauche, Terre des hommes, Delegate

Irene Fellmann, German Embassy, Development Counselor

Gloria Fernandez, ECHO

Giacomo Hijazin, US Embassy, Bureau Population, Refugees and Migration

Maha Homsy, UNICEF, ECD/Child Protection

Sami Hourani, Leaders of Tomorrow

Ali Kassay, Ace House

Randa Kuhail, SDC, Program Assistant

Daoud Kuttab, Community Media Network, General Director

Miriam Lopez, Medair, Project Manager

Claudia Niederer, SDC, Program Officer

Caroline Pontefact, UNRWA, Director of Education

Pascal Raess, SDC, Program Officer GPMD

Mariza Rogers, US Office for Disaster Assistance response Team / USAID

Marco Rossi, SDC, Regional Director of Cooperation

Volker Schimmel, UHCR

Anna Segall, UNRWA, Acting Director

Michele Servati, UNICEF

Sarwar Shehryar, Canadian Embassy, Counsellor, Development Cooperation

Iesha Singh, DFID

Paul Stromberg, UNHCR

Lea Valaulta, SDC, Director of Cooperation Jordan, Iraq & Deputy Regional Director

Michael Winzap, Swiss Embassy in Jordan, Ambassador

Jürg Zumstein, SDC, Deputy Country Director

Appendix 3 Program of the Field Visits

Lebanon					
17.11.	– Visit to the Bekaa Valley				
17.11.	– General briefing at SDC – Discussion with SCO staff – UNDP – Lunch with Swiss Embassy staff – Discussion with SCO staff				
18.11.	– UNRWA and Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee – UNICEF – Political Analyst				
19.11.	– ICRC – Red Cross – SDC Cash for hosting project – Like minded donors – Debriefing				
Jordan					
20.11.	– General briefing at SDC – Discussion with Staff – Terre des Hommes				
	<table border="1"> <tr> <td><u>Team A</u> – UNHCR</td> <td><u>Team B</u> – Team BS & L – Team Protection</td> </tr> </table>	<u>Team A</u> – UNHCR	<u>Team B</u> – Team BS & L – Team Protection		
<u>Team A</u> – UNHCR	<u>Team B</u> – Team BS & L – Team Protection				
21.11.	<table border="1"> <tr> <td><u>Team A</u> – UNRWA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td> <td><u>Team B</u> – UNICEF – UNDP</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">– Medair – Swiss Embassy, political analysts</td> </tr> </table>	<u>Team A</u> – UNRWA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<u>Team B</u> – UNICEF – UNDP	– Medair – Swiss Embassy, political analysts	
<u>Team A</u> – UNRWA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs	<u>Team B</u> – UNICEF – UNDP				
– Medair – Swiss Embassy, political analysts					
22.11./ 23.11.					
24.11.	<table border="1"> <tr> <td><u>Team A</u> – Team DRR – GP Migration</td> <td><u>Team B</u> – Jordan Civil Defense – OXFAM</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">– Dinner with like-minded donors</td> </tr> </table>	<u>Team A</u> – Team DRR – GP Migration	<u>Team B</u> – Jordan Civil Defense – OXFAM	– Dinner with like-minded donors	
<u>Team A</u> – Team DRR – GP Migration	<u>Team B</u> – Jordan Civil Defense – OXFAM				
– Dinner with like-minded donors					
25.11.	<table border="1"> <tr> <td><u>Team A</u> – Baqaa School – Jerash Camp</td> <td><u>Team B</u> – SRK – Danish Refugee Council</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">– Debriefing</td> </tr> </table>	<u>Team A</u> – Baqaa School – Jerash Camp	<u>Team B</u> – SRK – Danish Refugee Council	– Debriefing	
<u>Team A</u> – Baqaa School – Jerash Camp	<u>Team B</u> – SRK – Danish Refugee Council				
– Debriefing					

Appendix 4: Documents and Websites Consulted

Documents

Linde, Thomas: Concept Note: SDC's Support of Cross-border Assistance for the Syrian People in Need. 2013

Schweizerischer Bundesrat: Botschaft über die Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2013–2016. 15. February 2012

SDC: Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, 2012

SDC: Consolidated Statements 2010-2012

SDC: Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014

SDC: ICS Reports 2010

SDC: ICS Reports 2011

SDC: ICS Reports 2012

SDC: ICS Reports 2013

SDC: MERVs Iraq 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

SDC: MERVs Jordan 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

SDC: MERVs Lebanon 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

SDC: MERVs Syria 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013

SDC: Office Management Reports 2010-2012

SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2013

SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2011

SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2012

SDC Regional Office in Amman: Quarterly Report 04.2012. Period covered: February 2012 – April 2012

SDC Regional Office in Amman: Annual Report 2013

Swiss Regional Office Amman: Mid Term Review (2012) of the Cooperation Strategy Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 2010-2014

UNDP: Improved Government Response to Crisis and Major Civilian Operations . Technical Support to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers on Disaster Risk Management. September 2013

United Nations: Towards a Comprehensive Regional Strategy. Dealing with the effects of the Syria Crisis. Working Document. Draft 29 October 2013

Websites

www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/

[www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC in the Region/SDC Jordan](http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC_in_the_Region/SDC_Jordan)

[www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC in the Region/SDC Lebanon](http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC_in_the_Region/SDC_Lebanon)

[www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC in the Region/SDC Syria](http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC_in_the_Region/SDC_Syria)

[www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC s Response to the Syrian Crises](http://www.swiss-cooperation.admin.ch/middleeast/en/Home/SDC_s_Response_to_the_Syrian_Crises)

[www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Die DEZA/Organisation/Globale Zusammenarbeit/Globalprogramm Migration und Entwicklung](http://www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Die_DEZA/Organisation/Globale_Zusammenarbeit/Globalprogramm_Migration_und_Entwicklung)

[www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Die DEZA/Organisation/Globale Zusammenarbeit/Globalprogramm Wasser Initiativen](http://www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Die_DEZA/Organisation/Globale_Zusammenarbeit/Globalprogramm_Wasser_Initiativen)

www.lebanongovernment.org

www.jordan.gov.jo

www.insarag.org

www.unrwa.org

www.unicef.org

www.unhcr.org

Appendix 5: Projects in Reaction to the Syria Crisis (until October, 2013)

Project/WBS	Description	Resp.Person	Organ. Unit	Geographic Focus	Domain	Budget
7F-07940	JOR UNHCR Cash Assist. Syrian Refugee	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	BSL	430'000
7F-08097	JOR MOE/SDC Sch. rehab. Syrian refuge	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	BSL	1'035'000
7F-08370	UNICEF Programmbeiträge HH	Jay Edouard	E/MM	Regional	BSL	800'000
7F-08404	SYR FAO Emergency Response	Schranz Björn	E/MM	Syria	BSL	792'000
7F-08518	LEB UNICEF Back to School Campaign	Coord.Office Beirut	SCPO Beirut	Lebanon	BSL	300'000
7F-08519	SYR HI Emerg response injured in N.Syria	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	403'745
7F-08555	SYR JRS NFI for IDPs	Von Däniken Beat	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	300'000
7F-08556	SYR SIF NFI for IDPs	Von Däniken Beat	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	100'000
7F-08619	SYR-Etana Press-Support IDP families	Von Däniken Beat	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	182'800
7F-08627	SYR - UNHCR - Winter Assistance NFI	Von Däniken Beat	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	1'400'000
7F-08651	UNHCR - Reg. - add. contr. Syrian ref.	Coord.Office Amman	E/MM	Regional	BSL	1'700'000
7F-08689	Crossboarder Assist. SYR Civil Society	SCO Amman	SCO Amman	Syria	BSL	4'000'000
7F-08690	UNRWA Syria Crisis Response Jan-Jun 2013	SCPO Beirut	SCPO Beirut	Lebanon	BSL	285'000
7F-08712	JOR SRC Cash Assistance Syr Refugees	SCO Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	BSL	600'000
7F-08897	JOR Medair Assistance to Syrian Ref.	SCO Amman	E/MM	Jordan	BSL	600'000
7F-08898	Reg UNRWA Cash Assistance to PalRef.	SCO Amman	E/MM	Regional	BSL	2'000'000
7F-08899	UNHCR Sammel KRA	SCO Amman	SCO Amman	Regional	BSL	2'000'000
7F-08903	LEB UNFPA Gender Based Violence	SCO Amman	SCPO Beirut	Lebanon	BSL	500'000
7F-01556	UNHCR – NothilfeProgram	Kiener Eliane	E/MM	Regional	Protection	9'820'000
7F-07936	LEB DirA Support Fam hosting Syrians	SCPO Beirut	SCPO Beirut	Lebanon	Protection	8'330'000
7F-07939	JOR UNICEF protect displ Syrian children	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	Protection	500'000
7F-08436	SYR UNOCHA	Schranz Björn	SCO Amman	Mashreq	Protection	273'000
7F-08538	UNHCR Experts	Schranz Björn	SCO Amman	Jordan	Protection	500'000
7F-08557	UNICEF - Reg - Protection-Watsan	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Mashreq	Protection	1'000'000
7F-08558	JOR IOM Border transit assistance	Coord.Office Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	Protection	300'000
7F-08760	LEB Salam Support to Syrian IDPs & refug	SCPO Beirut	SCPO Beirut	Syria	Protection	199'747
7F-08764	OCHA Programmbeiträge HH	Veillard Reynald	E/MM	Regional	Protection	700'000
7F-08864	Irg DRC Emergency Asst. for Syrian Ref.	SCO Amman	E/MM	Iraq	Protection	600'000
7F-08892	JOR UNICEF PRO Syr Chidren Host Com.	SCO Amman	E/MM	Jordan	Protection	500'000
7F-08904	UN Secondments 20 Mio	SCO Amman	SCO Amman	Jordan	Protection	900'000
Total						41'051'292

Appendix 6: All Projects and their Duration


It is to be noted that the indication about project's duration often are comprised of several phases, each of which was prepared by a separate Credit Proposal.


Project	Description	Domain	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Basic Services & Livelihoods							
7F-01608	SYRIEN Institution Building GAPAR	BSL					
7F-02837	IKRK - Programmbeiträge/Nothilfe	BSL					
7F-03297	PALÄSTINA/JEMEN/SYRIEN WFP Beiträge	BSL					
7F-03539	JORDANIEN Dep. of Palestinian Affairs	BSL					
7F-04341	UNRWA, Secondment F. Fröhlich	BSL					
7F-05396	Global - TdHL - HH Programmbeiträge	BSL					
7F-05779	IRAK Ref UNHCR Secondment Shelter	BSL					
7F-05879	LIBANON UNRWA Secondment M & E	BSL					
7F-06036	Leb. UNRWA Secondment Infrastructure	BSL					
7F-06108	Mashreq REG Small Studies+Consultancies	BSL					
7F-06147	SYRIA UNRWA Camps for Pal Ref from Iraq	BSL					
7F-06838	Lebanon UNRWA ILO Employment Center	BSL					
7F-06842	Leb. UNDP HABITAT Building Structures	BSL					
7F-06956	UNRWA Review Educational Program	BSL					
7F-06962	UNRWA:HILFE FUER PALAEST. FLUECHTL.	BSL					
7F-07064	Réseau Entrepr. Solidaires - Milchprodukte	BSL					
7F-07448	MIDDLE EAST UNRWA Secondments	BSL					
7F-07522	Leb, UNRWA Secondm. Environm. Health	BSL					
7F-07533	Middle East Embassy Small Grants	BSL					
7F-07608	UNRWA Survey Living Conditions	BSL					
7F-07663	UNRWA Earmarked OD Projects	BSL					
7F-07666	JORDAN UNRWA School Baqa'a	BSL					
7F-07805	SYRIA UNDP NGO Platform	BSL					
7F-07937	SYR UNRWA Cash assistance	BSL					
7F-07940	JOR UNHCR Cash Assist. Syrian Refugee	BSL					
7F-08017	JORDAN UNRWA Fafo Socio-eco. profile	BSL					
7F-08096	JOR Water Sanitation Jerash	BSL					
7F-08097	JOR MOE/SDC Sch. rehab. Syrian refuge	BSL					
7F-08098	LEB UNRWA Watermanagement Camps	BSL					
7F-08099	LEB Tahaddi Prot./Emp. marginalized comm	BSL					
7F-08175	SYR Cash Assist. UNRWA PalRef Latakia	BSL					
7F-08212	Les Sarments de Lavaux - Milchprodukte	BSL					
7F-08300	SYRIA UNICEF Psycho-Social Rehab	BSL					
7F-08347	UNRWA technical backstopping selfhelp	BSL					
7F-08370	UNICEF Programmbeiträge HH	BSL					
7F-08404	SYR FAO Emergency Response	BSL					
7F-08518	LEB UNICEF Back to School Campaign	BSL					
7F-08519	SYR HI Emerg. response injured in N.Syria	BSL					
7F-08555	SYR JRS NFI for IDPs	BSL					
7F-08556	SYR SIF NFI for IDPs	BSL					
7F-08567	REG ILO UNRWA TVET expert	BSL					
7F-08619	SYR-Etana Press-Support IDP families	BSL					
7F-08627	SYR - UNHCR - Winter Assistance NFI	BSL					
7F-08651	UNHCR - Reg. - add. contr. Syrian ref.	BSL					
7F-08689	Crossborder Assist. SYR Civil Society	BSL					
7F-08690	UNRWA Syria Crisis Response Jan-Jun 2013	BSL					
7F-08707	JOR Care/Save Vuln. youth employment	BSL					
7F-08712	JOR SRC Cash Assistance Syr Refugees	BSL					
7F-08881	SYR WFP Emergency Food Assist. SHARP	BSL					
7F-08889	JOR UNDP Mitigating Impact Host Com.	BSL					
7F-08897	JOR Medair Assistance to Syrian Ref.	BSL					
7F-08898	Reg UNRWA Cash Assistance to PalRef.	BSL					
7F-08899	UNHCR Sammel KRA	BSL					
7F-08903	LEB UNFPA Gender Based Violence	BSL					

7F-00627	Syrien UNRWA Projekte Camprehabilitation	BSL					
Disaster Risk Reduction							
7F-02503	JORDANIEN RSS Seismic Hazard Mitigation	DRR					
7F-02680	IRAK NCCI Capacity Building	DRR					
7F-03540	JORDANIEN Ministry of Civil Defense	DRR					
7F-05395	JORDAN Seismic Design of Buildings JEA	DRR					
7F-05460	JORDAN UNDP Risk Assessment Aqaba	DRR					
7F-05693	LEBANON LRCS Emergency Services	DRR					
7F-06831	Leb. Awareness Earthquake Risk School	DRR					
7F-06837	JORDAN Earthquake Awareness Campaign	DRR					
7F-06840	SYRIA DRR Bachmann Broschüre	DRR					
7F-06841	REG LEB/JOR UNICEF DRR Edu Schools	DRR					
7F-06843	LEBANON School Rehabilitation	DRR					
7F-06846	LEBANON Seismic Design of Buildings	DRR			???		
7F-07130	SYRIA FAO Early Warning System Drought	DRR					
7F-07206	Syria UNDP DRR Risk Management	DRR					
7F-07212	SYRIA, SARC, Community based DRR	DRR					
7F-07566	Libanon, LRC, Emerg. Medical Services	DRR					
7F-07574	JORDAN UNDP Secondment DRM	DRR					
7F-07586	LEBANON UNICEF WASH Expert	DRR					
7F-07718	JORDAN GAM Strengthening Capacities	DRR					
7F-08572	LRCS: MCI - first responder capacities	DRR					
Protection							
7F-01556	UNHCR – NothilfeProgram	Protection					
7F-06310	LEBANON Caritas, Migrants Center	Protection					
7F-06430	LEBANON ILO Palestinian Women	Protection					
7F-06830	SYRIA UNICEF SGBV Prevention Iraq Refug	Protection					
7F-06844	LEBANON UNDP Support to LPDC	Protection					
7F-07651	SYRIA ACF Learning Skills Iraqi Refugees	Protection					
7F-07657	LEBANON ILO Secondment M & E Officer	Protection					
7F-07664	IRAQ OXFAM Social Protection Women	Protection					
7F-07665	LEBANON Roumieh Prison Rehabilitation	Protection					
7F-07667	IRAK Caritas Protection of Women	Protection					
7F-07668	Middle East UNICEF Child Protection	Protection					
7F-07669	LEB DRC Empowerment of women at risk	Protection					
7F-07670	SYR UNHCR Secondmt. Community Officer	Protection					
7F-07936	LEB DirA Support Fam hosting Syrians	Protection					
7F-07938	SYRIA DRC Protection Womens Rights	Protection					
7F-07939	JOR UNICEF protect displ Syrian children	Protection					
7F-08080	Emergency response to Syrian Refugees	Protection					
7F-08436	SYR UNOCHA	Protection					
7F-08492	LEB FSD Explosive Remnants War Clearance	Protection					
7F-08538	UNHCR Experts	Protection					
7F-08547	LEB INSAN Social Pro through Educ Empwt	Protection					
7F-08557	UNICEF - Reg - Protection-Watsan	Protection					
7F-08558	JOR IOM Border transit assistance	Protection					
7F-08708	IRQ Women/Children/Civil Society	Protection					
7F-08760	LEB Salam Support to Syrian IDPs & refug	Protection					
7F-08764	OCHA Programmbeiträge HH	Protection					
7F-08864	Iraq DRC Emergency Asst. for Syrian Ref.	Protection					
7F-08882	Project Bleu / Pipeline Middle East	Protection					
7F-08888	Iraq WC PRO Children in Contact with Law	Protection					
7F-08892	JOR UNICEF PRO Syr Chidren Host Com.	Protection					
7F-08904	UN Secondments 20 Mio	Protection					
Non-Domain Projects („other“)							
7F-05685	IRAK MDM Formation Médicale						
7F-06829	IRAQ Handicap Int. Assistance Disabled						
7F-01035	Progr. de relève -niveau I – Humanitaire						
7F-01688	Post Conflict Development Assistance						
7F-02694	SYRIE/JORDANIE: HAZARD						
7F-02760	CICP: Juvenile Justice System Lebanon		???				

7F-03118	Eco-Tourism in the Mashreq Region						
7F-05177	SYRIA Hiking Trails - Forgotten Cities						
7F-05187	Syr: Combat Human Trafficking		???				
7F-05617	LIBANON SOS Futures Mamans						
7F-05946	LEB: UNODC Support to Penal Reform			???			
7F-07632	Program der Sektion E+C ab 2010						
7F-08349	DRR Conference in Aqaba						
7F-08754	Secondment OCHA CMCoord Officer (TBC)						
Global Programs							
7F-07691	JPO Volée Bereich GZ	Migration					
7F-07086	Water Security in the Middle East	Water					
7F-07689	Water Security in the Middle East	Water					
7F-03572	LEB: UNODC Combat Human Trafficking	Migration					
7F-07151	Syria: DRC Prot. Iraqi Refugee Women	Migration					
7F-07732	Improving Labour Migration Middle East	Migration					
7F-07887	Open. Activities Labour Migr Middle East	Migration					
Offices and Small Projects							
7F-06833	Middle East Small Grants Sub-Regional						
7F-00010	Büro Amman						
7F-04400	Program Office Damascus						
7F-04635	Middle East Regional Small Grants & Cons		???				
7F-04895	Small Pilot Projects SDC Damascus						
7F-07011	LEBANON Program Office Beirut						
7F-07533	Middle East Embassy Small Grants						


Appendix 7: Structure of the Regional Program's Portfolio






Appendix 8: Intervention Logics

In brief discussions, the staff of the SDC Office in Amman confirmed the intervention logic as foreseen in the CS.





Appendix 9: Basic Statistical Data (2012, unless indicated otherwise)

	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria
Population	35.28 million	6.318 million	4.425 million	22.40 million
Life expectancy at birth	69 (2007)	74 (2011)	80 (2011)	75 (2011)
Life expectance at birth women	73	75	75	78
Life expectance at birth men	68	72	71	74
Area in km2	438,317	89,342	10,425	186,475
GDP	\$ 210.3 billion	\$31.24 billion	\$ 42.95 billion	\$ 73.67 billion
GNI per capita	\$ 5,870	\$ 4,720	\$ 9,190	\$ 2,610
Poverty headcount ratio	22.9%	13.3%		
Human Development Index Rank	131	100	72	116
C02 emission (t ³ per capita)	3.7 (2010)	3.4 (2010)	4.7 (2010)	2.9 (2010)

Sources: World Bank, UNDP

Appendix 10: Results Framework (from the CS 2010-2014)

Regional Cooperation Office Amman 2010-2014			
Hierarchy of objectives Strategy of Intervention	Fields of Observation	Data Sources Means of Verification	External Factors (Assumptions and Risks)
<p>Overall Goal</p> <p>Switzerland contributes to safe, viable and peaceful living conditions for refugees, IDPs, vulnerable groups and vulnerable migrants as well as communities at risk of disasters in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria</p>	<p>Strategic objectives</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Inclusive and more cohesive societies are fostered ▪ Delivery of key state functions is improved ▪ Sustainable socio-economic development is catalysed 	<p>Government legislation and reports</p> <p>Partner annual reports</p> <p>Relevant publications</p> <p>Evaluation of Cooperation Strategy 2015</p>	<p>Political stability prevails in the region</p> <p>Global financial crisis could affect country economic and social priorities</p> <p>Accountability of government institutions towards its population</p> <p>Willingness to engage in reform and adhere to international standards</p> <p>Adaptation of legal framework</p> <p>Change of attitude towards the recognition of basic rights</p>
<p>Domain 1:</p> <p>Basic services and livelihoods</p> <p>Living conditions are improved for refugees, IDPs, vulnerable groups, vulnerable migrants and communities at risk of disasters</p>	<p>Fields of Observation (Impact)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Target beneficiaries receiving adequate basic services (health, education, relief and social assistance) ▪ Performance of service providers in delivering quality and cost-effective services ▪ Access to employment and income ▪ Livelihood opportunities 	<p>Government legislation</p> <p>Partner annual reports</p> <p>Relevant UN publications</p> <p>2012 Mid-term review of CS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Funding capacities of service providers remain sufficient ▪ Ability and willingness of Governments to ensure adequate provision of services ▪ Continuous global financial crisis impact on regional and country economic development
<p>Outcomes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Capacity of service providers in delivering basic services is improved through institutional development and policy dialogue 2. Access to quality basic services is improved through efficient delivery 	<p>Outcome Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Households benefiting from adequate access to social and health services ▪ PalRef students completing their secondary degree education ▪ Implementation status of UNRWA programmes reforms (as a result of 	<p>UNRWA reports, audits and statistics</p> <p>UN reports (OCHA, UNHCR)</p> <p>ICRC reports</p> <p>Partner reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political settlement re PalRef increases UNRWA funding prospects ▪ Budget constraints (Governments, UN) ▪ Security issues

Hierarchy of objectives Strategy of Intervention	Fields of Observation	Data Sources Means of Verification	External Factors (Assumptions and Risks)
<p>and multi-stakeholder partnerships</p> <p>3. Access to employment and income, in particular for women and youths, is improved through adequate education and skill-development training programmes</p>	<p>Organisational Development process)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coordination mechanisms streamlining more efficient aid and services ▪ Disaggregated data on youths and women entering the labour market ▪ Number of youths receiving market tailor-made vocational training 	<p>Monitoring visits and surveys</p> <p>Government statistics and laws</p> <p>Activity reports (LPDC, DPA-Jordan, GAPAR)</p> <p>Media reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Changes in political priorities
<p>Domain 2: Protection</p> <p>Capacity and conditions to exercise rights are improved for refugees, IDPs, vulnerable groups and vulnerable migrants</p>	<p>Fields of Observation (Impact)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Status of human-rights-related legislation (incl. refugee/asylum law and IHL) ▪ Enforcement of the rule of law ▪ Amendment of labour legislation 	<p>Government legislation</p> <p>Relevant UN reports</p> <p>HR related publications</p> <p>Civil society</p> <p>Public media</p> <p>2012 Mid-term review of CS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Governments' willingness/readiness to address human rights and protection issues pertaining to refugees and/or migrants ▪ Identification and protection of target beneficiaries is made easier thanks to a more protective environment
<p>Outcomes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government capacity to address refugee and migration issues is strengthened (Protection in the Region-PIR Syria) 2. Legal status of refugees, IDPs and vulnerable migrants, in particular women and children, is improved and their basic rights protected (Lebanon, Syria and Iraq) 3. Access to job market is improved through amended labour legislation and regulatory environment 	<p>Outcome Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of a National legal framework for the protection of refugees (Syria) ▪ Adoption of anti-human trafficking laws (Syria and Lebanon) ▪ Elaboration of reliable and comprehensive data on migrant workers (Syria) ▪ Implementation of legislation on PalRef right to work (Lebanon) ▪ Implementation of "Decent Work Program" ▪ Advocacy campaigns targeting relevant bodies (governments and civil society) to improve access to job market, create new job opportunities and amend legislation 	<p>UN reports (UNRWA, UNHCR, IOM, UNODC, ILO)</p> <p>ICRC reports</p> <p>Civil society publications</p> <p>Human rights organizations reports</p> <p>Public media</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Cautious approach towards protection issues from partners (ex: UNRWA) ▪ Sincere commitment from Governments in implementing new HR/asylum laws ▪ Political constraints in implementing newly amended labour law (re PalRef in Lebanon)

Hierarchy of objectives Strategy of Intervention	Fields of Observation	Data Sources Means of Verification	External Factors (Assumptions and Risks)
<p>Domain 3: Disaster Risk Reduction</p> <p>Coping mechanisms to address human-made, natural and technological crises (including water scarcity) are enhanced</p>	<p>Fields of Observation (Impact)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Level of government and public awareness on DRR issues ▪ Government institutions as well as civil society capacities on prevention and preparedness ▪ Status of DRR-related national legislation 	<p>Government legislation Hyogo Framework for Action (review) National and regional agreements 2012 Mid-term review of CS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political stability ▪ No major natural disaster occurring during the project period (switch from DRR to early recovery) ▪ Economic situation does not jeopardize resource mobilization ▪ Sustained cooperation from policy-makers ▪ Changes in country priorities (security, war)
<p>Outcomes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional policy dialogue on disaster risk reduction and water scarcity is enhanced 2. Institutional capacities and mechanisms to address disaster management and water scarcity are developed 3. Governmental and public awareness on risk of natural and technological disasters is enhanced 	<p>Outcome Indicators</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development of vulnerability and risk assessments, water resource management plans, hazard monitoring and forecasting systems ▪ Establishment of DRR national legal framework ▪ Emergency response planning and warning systems ▪ Establishment of certified rescue and emergency capacity ▪ Development of rehabilitation and recovery plans 	<p>Crisis management plans Multi-hazard risk maps Academic and research institutions Government data Beneficiary perspective surveys UN reports (ISDR, UNDP) INSARAG certification</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Ownership of objectives by stakeholders ▪ Security situation prevents implementation (Lebanon) ▪ Lack of awareness (DRR) among community and decision-makers

Imprint

Publisher:
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
3003 Bern
www.sdc.admin.ch

Picture:
SDC, Samer Mohdad

Orders:
E-mail: deza@eda.admin.ch

Contact:
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Evaluation and Corporate Controlling Division
Freiburgstrasse 130, 3003 Bern
sektion.evaluation-controlling@eda.admin.ch

This publication can be downloaded from the website
www.deza.admin.ch/en/Home/Effectiveness/Evaluations

Bern, December 2014