Evaluation 2012/1

Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts
Evaluation of

Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

Commissioned by the Corporate Controlling Section of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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Bern, May 2012
Evaluation Process

Evaluations commissioned by SDC Senior Management were introduced in SDC in 2002 with the aim of providing a more critical and independent assessment of SDC activities. These Evaluations are conducted according to the OECD DAC Evaluation Standards and are part of SDC’s concept for implementing Article 170 of the Swiss Constitution which requires Swiss Federal Offices to analyse the effectiveness of their activities. SDC’s Senior Management (consisting of the Director General and the heads of SDC’s departments) approves the Evaluation Program. The Corporate Controlling Section, which is outside of line management and reports directly to the Director General, commissions the evaluation, taking care to recruit evaluators with a critical distance from SDC.

The Corporate Controlling Section identifies the primary intended users of the evaluation and invites them to participate in a Core Learning Partnership (CLP). The CLP actively accompanies the evaluation process. It comments on the evaluation design (Approach Paper). It provides feedback to the evaluation team on their preliminary findings and on the draft report. During a one day Synthesis Workshop, the CLP validated the evaluation findings and conclusions and, with the facilitation of the SDC Evaluation Officer and a representative of the Evaluation Team, elaborated recommendations and lessons learned for SDC from their perspective. These are noted in the Agreement at Completion Point (ACP).

Based on the Final Evaluator’s Report and the ACP involved members of the middle management of SDC drafted the Senior Management Response (SMR). The SMR was subsequently approved by SDC’s Senior Management. The SMR lays out specific, time-bound measures and those for executing them.

The ACP and the SMR are published together with the Final Evaluators’ Report. For further details regarding the evaluation process see the Approach Paper in the annex and on the CD attached.

Timetable

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I Long Evaluation Abstract

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Subject Description

This report is an independent evaluation of SDC’s work in fragile and conflict affected states. The evaluation considers in particular the performance of instruments; analysis, flexibility and adaptability; complementary of SDC and Swiss instruments and SDC’s role in the wider system. It does not directly address the performance of non-SDC elements of the Swiss government engagement in fragile states, but does look at how well SDC works with these other entities. The scope is multi-sector, addressing all of the instruments being used by SDC.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation is based on seven case studies (Tajikistan, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Nepal, OPT, Hindu Kush), 78 documents were formally reviewed, although the evaluation team drew on considerable personal experience both practically and academically. Interviewees included 60 SDC managers at HQ and field level, 30 NGOs / Red Cross partners, 15 from UN agencies, 10 donors and 20 national governments and local authorities. There were four formal workshops with SDC staff as part of the process, as well as lots of other participatory interactions and the nature of developmental evaluation meant the team sought opportunities at every level to validate and anchor findings.

Major findings and conclusions

The evaluation found that SDC is well positioned to work in fragile states. It has the right mixture of approaches, good instincts operationally, and can play an important and valuable role in the wider international system. To achieve this potential, SDC needs to become more flexible and needs to compliment its technical efforts with political understanding and positioning.

SDC has a range of instruments which work in fragile contexts. While the individual performance of these instruments is good, there is considerable potential for better performance, by bringing the different instruments together to address root causes of fragility and conflict.
Analysis needs to be improved across the board. While there is scope for some flexibility and adaptability, this is not routinely used to the extent possible.

SDC complementarity is steadily improving, with numerous instances of strategic cooperation between humanitarian, regional and Eastern Europe cooperation. However, there are some potential future fault-lines which need to be addressed with the new emphasis and growth of global cooperation. With the other parts of the Swiss government, the consistent message was that ‘the niche in fragile states was Switzerland’, but this is unevenly applied in-country.

Working with the rest of the system is the area that saw the greatest diversity. In all contexts, SDC works to strengthen local civil society and Swiss NGOs, as well as frequently working with local governance. It also makes un-earmarked contributions to the multilateral system. However, its direct and attributable work with multilaterals varies considerably. Its engagement with other donors is also variable – in some contexts, it is an active and appreciated facilitator, and in others, it is not especially well-engaged.

Priorities for Change and lessons learned

There are five clear priorities for change within SDC:

- Concentrate and focus based on its comparative advantage, credible resource levels, innovative approaches
- Put in place coherent strategy of how to achieve transformational change
- Be more aware of and proactive about being part of a larger system
- Strike a balance between being pragmatic and policy-oriented, between having a long-term strategy and facilitating innovation. Develop a better mixture of modalities and instruments in more seamless ways
- Adapt delivery and support mechanisms for work in fragile contexts
II  Senior Management Response

Evaluation of
the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

SDC Senior Management welcomes the final report of the Evaluation of SDC’s Performance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts. This Senior Management Response takes position with regards to the evaluation report and the Agreement at Completion Point of the Core Learning Partnership.

A. General Appreciation

The evaluation was well timed. Its findings are available just as SDC is positioning itself to implement the Federal Dispatch 2013 – 2016 on International Cooperation which is guiding SDC towards increasing its presence in fragile contexts.

The evaluation team has understood the architecture and *modus operandi* of the Swiss system of foreign policy making, SDC’s institutional culture and the implementation of ODA remarkably well.

Its judgments and recommendations are based on fair consideration of the pro's and con's of particular approaches and give credit to the countless positive achievements of SDC staff already working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Senior Management complements the evaluation team for a job very well done, especially given the complex subject matter and the time and resource constraints.

Senior Management also welcomes how the evaluation was managed internally. The early inclusion of SDC staff from all domains not only prepared the ground for the productive work of the evaluation team, but also for the implementation of the recommendations.

Approach to the Senior Management Response

The shift to more involvement in fragile and conflict-affected contexts outlined in the Federal Dispatch 2013-2016 requires the adaptation of the *political, operational and human resources management* within SDC and other units of the Swiss administration involved these contexts.

By and large, SDC Management endorses the arguments and recommendations put forward by the Core Learning Group in its Agreement at Completion Point. They are a key input for the enhancement of the way SDC works in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The processes which will lead to this will build on the work done by the Core Learning Group. It will take particular care to build and expand on existing institutional experience and on capitalizing on complementarities of different instruments already used by different SDC domains.

However, rather than addressing point by point the issues raised by the evaluation team and the Core Learning Group in the Agreement at Completion Point, SDC Senior Management focuses in its response on *overarching measures* under the following headings: 1) Actions to spur institutional adaptation at the level of SDC and FDFA, 2) Transformational Change in partner countries, 3) Considerations on Portfolio Risk Management, 4) Delivery, 5) Staff Policies and 6) Security Management.
B. Measures

1. Actions to spur adaptation at the institutional level of SDC
   (part of implementation of the Federal Dispatch 2013 – 2016 on International Cooperation)

   Given the magnitude and scope of the challenges ahead, Senior Management mandates
   the responsible person for the theme “Conflict and Human rights” to organize a process
   to support the responsible line units to adapt their policies to the new challenges.

   As a first step, a work plan shall be developed which is to be submitted for discussion to
   the Senior Management Meeting (DIRKO).

   The improvement of knowledge and the revision of SDC principles for working in fragile
   context is best achieved by progressive implementation in future country strategy discussions
   and in Core Contribution Management (CCM) revisions for the collaboration with multilateral institutions. Therefore emphasis is placed contributing to
   these processes. The network “Conflicts and Human Rights” is the key instrument to be
   used for in-house consultations on methodological issues.

   Senior Management views increased coordination within the Federal Department of
   Foreign Affairs (FDFA) as particularly important and will identify appropriate ways of
   communication and coordination with regards to:

   - Increased coordination and cooperation among FDFA units and especially in
     Eastern Europe with SECO, to define joint strategies.
   - Increased need for political coordination,
   - The need to assign Development Cooperation the lead for the coordination
     in countries where it is the most important instrument of Swiss Foreign Policy
   - Maximize the use of the potential for multilateral cooperation,
   - Adjustment of staff policies and
   - Adjustments in security management.

2. Transformational Change

   The evaluation team concluded that SDC has considerable potential to improve its actions by
   aiming more consequently at actually changing a fragile situation for the better (i.e.,
   transformational change). As by now, it appears to be too often concentrating just on
   contributing to the alleviation of living conditions of vulnerable target groups. SDC staff is
   seen as not political enough and as not being in the position to clearly explain the change to
   be fostered.

   The evaluation team considers concentration of resources (more resources in fewer places)
   as a prerequisite for success. They point out that Switzerland has more influence in countries
   where it is among the 10 largest donors.

   Senior Management is aware of the challenge to find the balance between concentrating its
   resources and exercising the critical level of influence. It is convinced however, that SDC has
   accumulated valuable experience in all areas touched upon and staff generally is politically
   sensitive. Senior Management particularly agrees with the statement made by the evaluation
team which refers to Switzerland, and not SDC alone, as having the comparative advantage (e.g., impartiality).

The most important next steps are:

1. More on the ground coordination of action in fragile and conflict affected contexts between FDFA entities as well as with other departments of the federal administration, notably SECO and the DDPS and clear support by HQ for this;
2. Putting peace building and state building goals at the center of the strategy without putting in question the right of populations in need to immediate assistance;
3. Developing a clear, common understanding of the transformation to be supported (explicit change hypothesis, understanding of causal chains, etc.) as the basis for discussions and the reference point for developing objectives;
4. Making Conflict Sensitive Program Management mandatory for fragile and conflict affected contexts (training for staff, assure support capacity);
5. Ensuring continuity of SDC presence even when the situation becomes more difficult;
6. Employing an adequate mix of intervention instruments and, in particular, increasing the pro-active involvement of Switzerland in multilateral initiatives;
7. Aiming for the right balance between achieving fast impact on vulnerable groups and contributing to long term, transformational change.

With regard to concentration, in accordance with the Federal Dispatch 2013-2016 and the increase of the overall budget, SDC will have more substantial presence in most countries or regions. Hence SDC responds to the concentration argument not by reducing the number of contexts where it is present, but by increasing the budgets for most of them. In its statement at the 4th High Level Forum (HLF-4) Busan in late 2011, SDC Management committed itself to increasing SDC investments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts by approximately 15% (baseline 2011).

Concrete actions:

- The upcoming discussions on “Pre-concept Notes of Swiss cooperation strategies” in fragile contexts (e.g. Horn of Africa, Myanmar, Nepal, North Africa) in the Senior Management Meeting (DIRKO) shall focus on the above issues. The Focal Point of the Network Conflicts and Human Rights shall be invited to the meetings when these pre-concept notes are discussed. By doing so, SDC Management will deepen its understanding of what is at stake and what the management options are.
- SDC shall actively contribute to the implementation of the principles outlined in the New Deal for engagement in fragile contexts agreed upon at the HLF-4. At the country level, the immediate focus will primarily be in Haiti, Afghanistan, South Sudan and in North Africa; at the policy level mainly through enhanced multilateral action and policy dialogue with a wide range of multilateral partners including OECD/INCAF. It is understood that the Humanitarian Principles (humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality) must be respected.
- The Focal Point “Conflict and Human Rights” will be commissioned to revise the policy for fragility and peace building dated 2003.
3. Considerations on Portfolio Risk Management

The evaluation team considers that SDC has deficiencies in employing systematic approaches for analyzing the various risks in its portfolios (security related risks, risk of program failure, reputational risk, etc.). They recommend that SDC take a portfolio approach to manage the program risk by combining some technical, more easily measurable and less risky programs with more difficult, harder to measure, riskier but potentially more transformative initiatives.

This conclusion is fair and well received. Nevertheless, SDC Management feels that the report is somewhat overstating the issue of risk taking and flexibility. It is felt that one could easily find examples to state the opposite. However, the call upon SDC to more conscientiously conduct portfolio risk analysis and achieve an appropriate balance between more and less risky programs is very relevant.

Concrete actions:

- Similarly as with regard to transformational change, this issue will be addressed in the discussions of the upcoming strategies for fragile contexts and especially with regard to relatively stable country programs such as Nepal and Chad, where the size of the SDC portfolio allows for a meaningful application of portfolio analysis.
- Quality Assurance is requested to propose a method on how to integrate portfolio risk analysis in the monitoring system of country strategies by September 2012. The working hypothesis of SDC Management is that a single proxy indicator could be identified and tracked. Table 6 in the report (Types of Results by Context) is considered a solid basis for more detailed analysis. SDC Management recommends using it when SDC strategies are defined.
- An important part of this work will be done at field level. Communication and workshops shall be offered targeting implementation of risk analysis.

4. Delivery

Under delivery, the evaluation team reformulates and strengthens its arguments on transformational change with well selected examples. They illustrate how Switzerland can succeed in contributing to transformational change (e.g. Nepal), but also point out that in many instances the other development partners and, in particular, other donors are not aware of the contribution by Switzerland. Sometimes SDC is perceived as not flexible enough to respond to rapidly changing contexts. Staff is seen as key to how SDC is perceived and how it acts.

Senior Management emphasizes that achieving transformational change requires a sound understanding and informed use of the different instruments available within the FDFA and SECO. SDC Management is committed to mainstream the understanding of development work as essentially a “whole of government undertaking” especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Achieving complementarities between bilateral and multilateral instruments and cooperation with larger donors is even more important in fragile contexts than in other development situations. With regard to multilateral partners, Senior Management supports the recommendation for SDC to be a strongly engaged stakeholder rather than an (often critical) observer. These considerations should be taken into account when building a portfolio and managing portfolio risk. It is also very important to recognize humanitarian aid as a strategic partner with specific characteristics at all stages of collaboration as long as fragility prevails.
In particular, Senior Management is supportive of the commitment of resources, if possible jointly with other donors, for **analytical work and the use of accessible intelligence channels** to obtain more accurate and timely information especially in conflict driven situations. It is aware that together with security information gathering, **analysis may cost 10% or more** of program spending. The crucial step however is the ability to translate the results of analysis into action. This requires management skills and in-depth context knowledge.

SDC will therefore pay particular attention to assure that field offices have enough time for direct contacts with beneficiaries and partners. For these contacts a critical comparative advantage of Swiss presence is necessary. This will imply flexible applications of some administrative rules.

With regard to flexibility, Senior Management thinks there is more potential in making **better use of existing and already planned avenues of flexibility** rather than investing in huge efforts to increase flexibility through a formal cross-institutional approach.

5. **Staff Resources**

   The evaluation team is very explicit about the relatively low incentives and protection provided by SDC for staff willing to apply for postings in fragile contexts. Financial and career incentives are low in comparison with similar agencies and support structures are also weak. This is seen as an obstacle to attracting qualified staff for such postings and providing them with career perspectives.

   Senior Management has already commissioned Human Resources of the FDFA to establish policies for staff working in fragile situation on some issues (non-family station policies and Rest and Relief). This work is valuable and well under way. Indeed, Senior Management considers a comprehensive overhaul of these policies (incentives, protection, support, career perspectives) an urgent must.

   Staff policy is the most central aspect to carry out good work both in the field and at headquarter. Senior Management insists that such a process must not jeopardize the use of existing and successful staff instruments such as the Swiss Humanitarian Aid unit (SHA) contracting policy. Such policies may be essential to continue to fulfill the humanitarian mandate of SDC but also for other functions in fragile situations.

   **Concrete action:**
   
   - SDC Management will work with Human Resources to develop in close interaction with the responsible person for the theme “Conflict and Human rights” a **comprehensive set of staff management policies for fragile contexts**.
   - Positions in fragile contexts will be considered priority positions to be filled in the staff rotation process.

6. **Security Management.**

   The evaluation comes to the conclusion that security management at SDC is not up to the level needed for increasing work in fragile contexts. It has identified a number of weaknesses in the definition of responsibilities (e.g. between Embassies and SDC coordination offices) and the flow of information across FDFA.
Senior Management takes the issue of security very seriously and appreciates the frankness of the evaluation in stating problems in this area. However it insists in the very substantial progress made in the last ten years in response to an environment in constant and very rapid change. However, further action is urgent.

**Concrete action:**
Among others Senior Management will clarify with FDFA Security and other FDFA entities the following priority issues:

- SDC considers the deployment of resources for security management in the FDFA as low and the use of existing resources sub-optimal. An exchange with FDFA Security will identify problem areas and resolve issues.
- The different roles and responsibilities of FDFA security, the crisis management centre, as well as the security specialists assigned to SDC and the SHA need to be clarified.
- The lines of responsibility for security management related decisions need to be clear and without duplication. A broad general policy paper about security management should leave room and calls for context-specific case-to-case decisions in the field.
- Crisis management simulation training will be done also at the management levels in Berne on a regular basis, simulating a wide range of possible situations focusing on testing lines of communication, responsibility, coordination with other countries, etc.
Agreement at Completion Point of the Core Learning Partnership and Management Reference Group

1. Process

Evaluation research shows that involvement of those responsible for implementation ingenerating recommendations leads to a higher rate of implementation. Therefore, to ensure recommendations that are well targeted, ambitious and achievable, this evaluation engaged the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) and members of the Management Reference Group (MRG) in the development of the recommendations. During a 1 ½ day Synthesis Workshop, the CLP/MRG validated the evaluation findings and conclusions and with the facilitation of the Evaluation Officer from Corporate Controlling and the Evaluation Team, elaborated the recommendations for SDC noted in this Agreement at Completion Point (ACP). The ACP will be forwarded to a group of SDC Directors who will draft a Senior Management Response which will be tabled with the Directorate.

2. Overall Appreciation of the CLP and MRG

The CLP/MRG welcomes the independent evaluation on SDC’s performance in fragile and conflict affected states as an impressive and useful piece of work. The CLP/MRG notes that the evaluation team has understood the SDC and Swiss way of working well, and reflected this in a way that does justice both to the strengths and weaknesses of SDC. The CLP/MRG finds the analysis in the report to be accurate and sharp, making challenging points in a clear, constructive and diplomatic fashion.

The evaluation findings have an immediate relevance in a number of areas – for the new Bill to parliament, for SDC’s work in operational contexts, for the reformulation of country strategies, and for the proposed increase in spending in fragile contexts. There are a number of external opportunities which the evaluation can help with, in particular the Busan commitments including the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States supported by g7+ and INCAF members, including Switzerland.

The CLP/MRG also found the evaluation process useful and facilitated to maximise learning. Members of the CLP working on fragile states now feel that they have a ‘support network’ across the organisation which did not exist to the same extent beforehand. The participatory, ‘developmental’ process employed is seen as contributing both to evaluation quality, learning of the CLP members, and beneficial in terms of ensuring value for money from the investment in this evaluation.

The CLP/MRG find that the timing of the evaluation is excellent, and feel implementation of the evaluation recommendations will allow SDC to strengthen its strategic, organisational and operational efforts in fragile and conflict affected states. The findings of the evaluation should be used in a process of organisational change, with leadership from the Directorate, supported by a reference group, ideally formed from the CLP and Management Reference Group. The emphasis should be on a strategic re-orientation of SDC to work better in this area of vital and increasing importance.

1 Members of the CLP/MRG who attended the Synthesis Workshop: Christoph Graf, Véronique Hulmann, Bernhard Huwiler, Barbara Jgushia, Burgi Roos, Elisabeth von Capeller, Gerhard Siegfried, Ségolène Adam, Véronique Bourquin, Sophie Delessert, Evelin Stettler, Markus Heiniger, Edouard Jay, Antoine Laham, Milena Mhajlovic, Armin Ullmann.
3. **Recommendations of the CLP/MRG**

The CLP/MRG found the priorities for change suggested by the evaluation team to be well-founded and challenging. The needs identified by the evaluation team set out a broad space for potential improvements, which the CLP/MRG group worked on to develop specific priorities. By bringing together the evaluators independent perspectives and the CLP/MRG knowledge of the organisation, a set of recommendations for all of SDC (Regional Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, Regional Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe and CIS) were developed in each of the five priority areas. Together, these represent the beginnings of a strategic roadmap for SDC.

**Achieving transformational change**

1) **The SDC Board of Directors should develop a clear and coherent vision for why SDC is working in fragile states and what it aims to achieve. In particular:**
   - The Board of Directors should mandate a task force, including representatives of all divisions to develop this vision.
   - Work on this should start as soon as possible, with a view to being approved by October 2012.
   - Engaging in fragile States is a long term commitment and the vision shall extend beyond 2016.

2) **The Heads of Division need to ensure that country strategies in fragile states include clear outcomes that address the causes of fragility and conflict. In particular:**
   - Cooperation Strategies being renewed in 2012 should be viewed as a priority.
   - Multilateral and whole of government elements should be incorporated into the new strategies.
   - The new cooperation strategies should include context analysis that addresses political and social dimensions of fragility and conflict.

**Innovation**

3) **SDC programmes in fragile states need to routinely address state building and peace building objectives. In particular:**
   - SDC should ensure its programme portfolio in fragile contexts is aligned with the priorities of the New Deal (i.e. legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services).
   - SDC should broaden and balance better the mix of instruments used in fragile contexts (from bilateral projects to budget support as appropriate to the context and including strengthening the State to take charge of the development agenda).
   - Align SDC priority fragile states cooperation choices with g7+ members (i.e. potentially in New Deal pilot countries such as Afghanistan, South Sudan, DRC and Liberia and with New Deal signatories such as Burundi and Chad)
   - There should be an implementation strategy for the New Deal decision paper to be adopted by the directorate.
4) **SDC should invest more in applied research in fragile states, and to create better linkages between evidence, policy and practice. In particular:**

- SDC should strengthen the advisory role of the networks based on the needs of operational programmes in fragile states. This may eventually include the establishment of annual written service agreements.
- Research areas should be related to the New Deal, and could be addressed in a collaborative fashion with other donors to explore what works well and what doesn’t work in different contexts.
- SDC should invest in appropriate capacities and mechanisms internally to help translate research findings into actions.

**Risk Management**

5) **SDC needs to give managers and programme staff wider scope for strategic and operational flexibility in fragile contexts. In particular:**

- SDC should increase decentralised authority for Cooperation Office managers.
- SDC should promote flexibility as part of the organisation culture in fragile contexts, enabling “course corrections” as context changes.
- Programme management tools (e.g. Conflict Sensitive Program Management CSPM) and results frameworks need to take better account of the risks of working in fragile states, while simultaneously taking a longer-term view of SDC’s contribution.
- Cooperation strategies must contain a diversified “risk portfolio”, with riskier/ high impact projects as well as safer/ more reliable ones.
- Results frameworks should routinely acknowledge longer term goals related to State building and peace building.
- The long term goals relating to State and peace building shall continue over several strategies;
- SDC also needs to have a set of institutionally agreed risk management protocols, including for the sharing and transfer of different kinds of risks (i.e., contextual, institutional and programmatic).

6) **SDC needs to improve the reliability of its analysis, and the links to decision making. In particular:**

- SDC country directors should lead analytical exercises in fragile contexts and develop appropriate mechanisms to ensure use in programme and strategic decision-making (based on SDC’s corporate CSPM methodology).
- Analysis should involve the full range of SDC staff, including NPOs, as well as partners and other donors.
- Programme steering committees and advisory boards need to be engaged in a more strategic fashion, internally within SDC, within the Swiss government, as well as in partner countries through multi-donor / govt. coordination fora.
Working Together
7) SDC should increase its work and strategic engagement with other donors and the multilateral system in addition to national and Swiss civil society. In particular:
   • SDC should be an active player in the international donor community, wherever possible taking on chairing and facilitation roles in aid of harmonisation and delivery against the New Deal objectives.
   • SDC should engage systematically with multilaterals – especially the World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women, WFP, UNHCR and UNOCHA as well as the regional development banks - using its core contributions as an entry point for a more sustained strategic conversation about shared objectives.
   • SDC should establish better policy level engagement with other donors, both globally and in-country, on shared issues such as analysis, risk and coordination.
   • SDC should develop better policy capabilities on the issue of fragile states, with a designated fragile states hub, reporting to a directorate-level coordinator. The network should become part of this hub.

8) Where possible and feasible, the Swiss government as a whole needs to establish genuine joint strategies in-country with shared goals and outcomes. In particular:
   • SDC should promote common analysis in fragile states with other agencies of the Swiss government and better systems for routinely sharing information in order to accordingly adjust its operational response.
   • SDC should encourage the idea of leading entities within the Swiss system to develop and manage joint country strategies, and seek to fill this role where it has clear comparative advantage. This leadership should include responsibility for ensuring a proper process, shared analysis, setting overall goals related to fragility and conflict (state- and peace-building goals), and appropriate approaches respecting the CSPM methodology.
   • SDC should engage with other aspects of Swiss international policy that impacts on fragile states, such as defence, trade, international legal instruments and finance.
   • Acknowledge the fact that coordination and harmonisation with other Swiss actors requires additional resources and time.

9) Within SDC, SDC should move towards development and implementation of shared cooperation strategies in fragile and conflict-affected states, with assigned leads within SDC. In particular:
   • Strategies should set overall goals related to fragility and conflict, and involve shared responsibilities for process, analysis, and reporting to ensure truly comprehensive strategies.
Delivery

10) SDC senior management should mandate Human Resources to develop and implement staffing rules and conditions for assignment in fragile states. *In particular:*

- The policy should consider issues such as appropriate competency frameworks for fragile states and how to attract a mix of senior and junior professionals.
- The policy should consider how to improve incentives for taking on assignments in fragile states, including career development, promotion opportunities, family protocols; professional and personal preparation of and support to individuals relating to working in such contexts.
- SDC should seek to make the rotation system more aligned with institutional needs, and reflect on how to better implement rotations across FDFA to ensure the appropriate skills mix.
- Experienced hires should be brought in from outside the organisation, with better use made of the existing expert pools, and efforts made to expand them.
- Secondments should be made a visible part of career development strategies, where the assignments result in better profile and skills for working in fragile states.
- The new policy should be in place by mid-2013.

11) SDC must urgently address security management, with a process for immediately clarifying roles and responsibilities across FDFA in country contexts, and for strengthening security management in the near term. *In particular:*

- The clarification of roles and responsibilities should be a high priority for all countries, and will need to involve both field and HQ level staff.
- Staff competencies and skills to analyse security risks and to integrate them in programme management should be improved.
- Security management should be an explicit part of the TORs of managers/ country directors/ programme manager. Security management should address issues for national and local staff and partners.

12) SDC must communicate the rationale for engaging in fragile states with internal and external stakeholders. *In particular:*

- Improved analysis needs to feed into communication strategies, especially of risks and benefits of Swiss engagement in fragile states.
- Evidence needs to play a role in a more constructive communication on aid efforts in fragile states, including on failure, unanticipated consequences and corruption.
- SDC should put in place a strategy for communicating this evaluation.

In addition to the recommendations outlined above, the CLP/MRG recommended that a clear process should be put in place to carry forward the recommendations of this evaluation. A task force should be convened to oversee an implementation plan under the coordinating authority of a member of the Board of Directors. Progress should be reviewed by the Board of Directors at the end of the first year.
III Evaluators’ Final Report

Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

Commissioned by the Corporate Controlling Section of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)

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Finally the evaluation team would like to thank Anne Bichsel and her colleagues in the Corporate Controlling Section of SDC who managed this exercise so competently.
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### Abbreviations and acronyms

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLP</td>
<td>Core Learning Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPIA</td>
<td>Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (of the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSPM</td>
<td>Conflict Sensitive Programme Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG</td>
<td>UN Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD-DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee of the OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td>The Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDFA</td>
<td>Federal Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7+</td>
<td>Grouping of fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HA</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>INCAF</td>
<td>International Network on Conflict and Fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LICUS</td>
<td>Low Income Countries Under Stress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>MERV</td>
<td>Ref. pending</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medecins sans Frontiers</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHCR</td>
<td>UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDII</td>
<td>Political Division II of the FDFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDIV</td>
<td>Political Division IV of the FDFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGs</td>
<td>Peace building and state building goals (of the G7+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REO2</td>
<td>Reorganisation 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECO</td>
<td>State Secretariat for Economic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAps</td>
<td>Sector Wide Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss TPH</td>
<td>Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>World Development Report (of the World Bank)</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>UN World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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Executive summary

Fragile states have become of increasing concern to international aid donors with the realisation that few, if any, will achieve a single Millennium Development Goal in 2015. Fragile states are home to many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable, and are often sources of instability in their region and internationally.

Switzerland and its main development agency the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is in the process of increasing its aid in fragile states as a result of these issues. SDC has also found many of its regular cooperation countries become more fragile over time.

This evaluation has been commissioned as part of the process of considering how to work better in fragile and conflict-affected states. It is set against the backdrop of a new Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft), which is the main legal and financial instrument governing Swiss foreign aid. The new dispatch proposes an increase in fragile states expenditure to the parliament and the Federal Council.

The evaluation is a strategic exercise looking at how SDC can achieve impact in fragile contexts, and how it can best configure its aid instruments. It has been conducted according to the latest OECD guidance on such exercises, setting a small number of broad, strategically relevant questions to be explored in different contexts. The design was highly participatory, aimed primarily at engaging managers and practitioners within the organisation on the major issues, and on how change might be best achieved. The evaluation has also sought to fulfil an accountability function. This has meant establishing a credible evidence base on which SDC performance could be assessed, through the use of case studies and an extensive review of secondary data. A more detailed summary of objectives, methods and the evidence is set out in the introduction section of this report.

Performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

This evaluation has found that SDC is well positioned to work in fragile states. It has the right mixture of approaches, good instincts operationally, and can play an important and valuable role in the wider international system.

To achieve this potential, SDC needs to become more flexible and needs to compliment its technical efforts with political understanding and positioning. Whilst individual projects and programmes can perform well, and achieve clear results – that is to say make a real difference to the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable – there is little evidence that they make a difference to the root causes of fragility.

There is an emerging consensus on the types of assistance that is needed to help fragile states, and countries emerging from conflict to get on the path to development. Priorities include providing security, helping establish legitimate institutions that are transparently managed, providing jobs and getting the economy going. There is a need for – most often – building peace and trust within fractured communities and national politics. This requires concerted diplomatic, defence and development action.

SDC has many of the skills needed to work effectively in such contexts. It is good at being ‘hands on’ – identified as most useful in the early stages of rebuilding – and it is good at technical programming. It stays for the long term. However, SDC also focuses too much on
the service provision end of the spectrum, giving less emphasis to tougher but arguably more important areas such as security, justice and jobs.

Partly this is because some of the necessary skills and approaches are held in other parts of the Swiss aid bureaucracy (in the ministry of economic affairs or other parts of the foreign ministry). Partly, however, it is because SDC has a conservative approach to risk and an overly technocratic approach. Fragile contexts need political awareness and policy skills as well as the technical excellence SDC can bring. Working on health or water programmes is easier to show results and may be more acceptable domestically than messier and more difficult – and risky – work such as state-building.

Working differently will require new types of people to be brought into SDC, and will require new ways of supporting existing staff, including a more rigorous approach to security. Fragile and post-conflict states are costlier, more dangerous and more stressful to work in than regular development postings, and people will have to be rewarded appropriately for working in such conditions.

Analysis, flexibility and adaptation
Analysis is seen as key to effective strategic positioning by SDC. It is the starting point for all programme design.

Despite this, there is a wide variance in the culture of analysis and information within cooperation offices. The best prioritise and invest in regular analysis linked to decision making, led from the top. More routinely however, the tools available for analysis are seen as either too broad, or too heavy and tend to be complied with rather than valued.

SDC does have a wide range of information sources and networks, and this can be a major strength, especially where national sources are included. National staff are a major strength in this regard. The impartial status of Switzerland often means SDC is more realistic about the prospects for development, and political change.

This does not always translate into better programming however. The majority of SDC staff interviewed for this evaluation felt the organisation was not flexible enough in its approach in fragile states. In fragile states the operating environment can change quite suddenly, with opportunities or risks needing to be addressed quickly. SDC programmes take too long to both commission and to change, however, and there is a culture of “predictability and predefined outcomes”.

Whilst SDC is not nimble enough in its fragile states work, it is good at adapting to context within the confines of existing programmes. Humanitarian aid is seen as a more flexible instrument, but is often too short term for use as a strategic intervention.

Complementarity
Respondents to this evaluation were clear that in fragile contexts, it is difficult to achieve structural development without political dialogue. This means there is a need for Switzerland to engage as a single entity, not as SDC or any of the individual aid instruments.

SDC has made progress in joining up its development and humanitarian work, and with other aspects of Swiss assistance such as the State Economic Cooperation Office (SECO) and the peace-building department of the Foreign Ministry (PDIV).
Whilst this progress has been steady for the last few years, there are few examples of a genuinely common vision for the Swiss “offer” in fragile contexts. Joint strategies tend to be a combination of individual mandates rather than genuine joint intent.

The barriers to genuine joint working across instruments are also considerable, with separate budgets, bureaucracies and supporting political constituencies. This is exacerbated by incompatible systems. This has meant that joint working has been more time-consuming and difficult than anticipated.

Where genuinely joint programming has been achieved there is clear evidence of greater influence and impact, and there are clear advantages visible within the Swiss aid system. This suggests there is a need to create more mechanisms to encourage such working, and to promote more joint working as a way of breaking down cultural and institutional barriers.

Role in the wider system
There is a wide degree of variance across SDC programmes in fragile states in its engagement and role in the wider system.

Where SDC and Switzerland are actively engaged, they can play an excellent and constructive role in the international system, convening other donors and promoting neglected issues.

There are several factors that determine whether Switzerland occupies this type of meaningful role in the system. Being one of the top ten donors is a major factor, as is good in-country leadership. Credible programming is another factor.

Switzerland can also play a positive role as a ‘network enabler’, strengthening essential parts of the system such as civil society and the multi-lateral system. Despite this, the links between bilateral and multilateral programming are weaker than they should, or could be. More than half of SDC assistance is spent multilaterally, both in development and humanitarian aid, and yet this aspect of work is not always visible in cooperation offices.

SDC is perceived positively by its multilateral and NGO partners. The trust fund to improve collaboration between the UN and World Bank in fragile states is an excellent example of the potential Swiss role globally. Switzerland’s balanced and mutually respectful approach is also much appreciated by multilaterals.

Priorities for change
The evidence of this evaluation suggests that SDC will have to change the level of its ambition in fragile states if it is to contribute to transformative change, which must be the ultimate goal in such contexts. There is a need for a more coherent vision, and for better adapted ways of working. In particular, SDC should:

1. **Concentrate and focus** its aid in fragile states. In contexts where Switzerland can establish a meaningful niche, based on its comparative advantage, credible resource levels and innovative approaches, it can aim to achieve transformative change, rather than transient results.
2. Put in place a **coherent strategy** of how to achieve transformative change in fragile states. Theories of change must underpin long term strategies, with flexible approaches and sophisticated methods of measurement.

3. Be **more aware of and proactive about being part of the larger system**. Where Switzerland is well regarded it can play an important role in bringing donors together. SDC must also get better at creating coherence between actions in the global arena and bilateral cooperation work. This will demand new ways of working together (within SDC, inter-agency, and whole-of-government).

4. **Strike a balance between being pragmatic and policy-oriented**; and between having a long-term strategy and facilitating innovation. There is a need for better tools for managing risk, and for more innovative programme work, based increasingly on evidence. SDC and Switzerland must develop a better **mixture of modalities and instruments** in more seamless ways.

5. **Adapt its delivery and support mechanisms** for work in fragile contexts. This encompasses areas from project cycle management to staff support.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Fragile and conflict-affected states currently contain more than twenty percent of the world’s population and a significant proportion of the poorest and most vulnerable (see figure 1). It is increasingly acknowledged that reaching the Millennium Development Goals will not be possible without greater and more sustained international engagement in these countries. Against this backdrop, SDC is one of a number of bilateral donors that has made a corporate commitment to increase its engagement in such contexts.

![Figure 1: Share of world’s poor living in fragile states](http://www.ode.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/ode-brief-fragile-states.pdf)

Doing more in fragile and conflict-affected states will require a change in both the what and how of donor engagement. Aid agencies have acknowledged the need to improve their strategy and impact in these states. This means, among other things, better and more systematic, evidence-based learning. The learning gap in fragile states is reflected both in terms of weak programme design and in a lack of sound evaluations.

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is presently developing its new Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft). As part of the new strategic direction envisaged in the dispatch, the organisation’s leadership is committed to increasing engagement in fragile states. A significant part of SDC’s work already takes place in countries and contexts that might be described as fragile and conflict-affected. Currently the proposal is that it increases from 28% of its budget (currently) to 40-50% to be more in line with the international donor “average”.

As a result, in 2011 the SDC Directorate mandated the Corporate Controlling Section to commission an evaluation of the performance of SDC’s instruments in these settings. SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section commissions a range of evaluations each year. These are intended to assess the relevance and effectiveness of SDC’s work and contribute to lesson learning. These evaluations are also an important part of SDC’s corporate accountability.

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7. This evaluation uses the terms ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’ and ‘fragile and conflict-affected contexts’ interchangeably. The term fragile contexts allows for the inclusion of regions or districts of countries as well as the countries themselves, but to spare the reader a certain monotony of over-use, we have decided to use both terms.
1.2 Objectives of the evaluation

During the inception process, it was agreed that the evaluation would focus on the ‘Performance of SDC Instruments in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts’. The specific objectives were as follows:

1. Assess SDC performance in its present engagement in selected fragile and conflict-affected contexts;
2. Provide a solid evidence base of where SDC stands and an analysis of where it needs to improve;
3. Through a process of reflective inquiry, develop a shared understanding of how to engage in fragile contexts;
4. Develop “priorities for change” for SDC in the form of clear, targeted and actionable recommendations for future engagement in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

1.3 Methodology

All SDC evaluations are a balance between learning and accountability, and between retrospective assessment and forward looking recommendations.

This was designed as a formative process evaluation, with the focus on contributing to improvements in SDC’s performance in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. The overwhelming feedback from SDC staff at all levels and across the organisation was that this evaluation should emphasise learning and future improvements. As such the evaluation has been developed with the intention of maximising utility for decision makers and practitioners.

Lessons from previous fragile states evaluations compiled by the OECD-DAC Evaluation network have also been taken on board. These suggest that a detailed, top-down methodology is simply not practical in fragile contexts. Instead the key for successful evaluations is to select a number of priority questions and be as flexible as possible in the selection of specific methods and approaches.

The formative and developmental focus of the present evaluation, together with the fragile and conflict-affected contexts which are the focus of the evaluation, have a number of implications for the emphasis of the evaluation process and the final product.

Specifically, this has meant that:

- a significant amount of attention has been paid to the process elements of this evaluation – interviews have been semi-structured and ‘reflexive’, workshops have been participatory, the objectives of the evaluation have been adjusted and adapted following feedback and interactions
- The robustness of the evidence base has been strengthened through the developmental approach, as information gathered has been subjected to triangulation through a number of different methods, and participatory techniques have been chosen to facilitate group-based validation, testing and prioritisation
- The evaluation team has spent time to understand the current state of the organisation, the culture, how staff interact, how they learn, and has worked to position the key findings and evidence in such a way that will promote the potential for utilisation.

8http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en_21571361_34047972_35263575_1_1_1_1,00.html
While accountability is still an objective for this evaluation, it needs to be framed in a way that relates to the formative focus of the evaluation. The evaluation team suggests that the most important form of accountability is whether SDC is accountable for effective learning in fragile contexts.

1.3.1 Areas of enquiry

The evaluation was undertaken against four key areas of enquiry. These were developed from the original approach paper (annex 1), and subsequent conversations during the inception phase. The areas of enquiry provided an over-arching evaluation framework, against which specific questions and possible sources of information could be correlated.

Each of the four areas of enquiry were verified through the inception mission as appropriate for the needs of the different stakeholders across SDC. The specific questions (see annex 2 for the full inception report) were refined based on feedback through the inception process, with each focusing on an area of significant relevance to SDC performance.

1.3.2 Evidence

The evaluation used the standard range of evaluation methods, including document review, key informant interviews, group interviews and workshops and a series of desk-based and field-visit case studies. The data gathered from this was triangulated and forms the basis for any conclusions reached.

The evaluation did not collect primary evidence of the outcomes and impacts of SDC programmes. It relied primarily on secondary data where it existed and key informant interviews. That said, the evaluation team did visit 12 projects in 11 regions of 4 countries directly and so has been able to bring together head office, country office and field perspectives.

The case studies formed the core of the evidence gathered for the evaluation, although were by no means the sole source. Interviews were also conducted with as wide a range of informants within the Swiss system as time allowed, and with a selected cross-section of multilateral and donor agency experts. In total 150 people were interviewed including for the case studies. In addition there were a number of focus group interviews in all locations, involving over 50 people (see table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SDC</th>
<th>FDFA/SECO</th>
<th>Multilateral/ICRC</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>NGO/partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>30</td>
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Table 1: Interviewees by institution type

Interviews within SDC covered a wide cross-section, from the whole of the directorate to national programme officers. Interviews and discussions with other key stakeholders included numerous Ambassadors, the State Secretary for the FDFA, as well as field based programme staff in PDIV, PD II and SECO. There were also 6 workshops in Bern and Dushanbe, and feedback sessions following all country visits.
The case studies consisted of three categories; countries that were visited by the evaluation team and were studied in depth; countries where several key informants were interviewed forming desk reviews and countries or areas of interest that provided extra material for the evaluation. The countries and the rationale for their inclusion is set out in table 2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-country case studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo).</td>
<td>Ongoing conflict across the region, extreme poverty, regional instability, huge humanitarian caseload. DR Congo, Rwanda and Burundi all seen as fragile in different ways, although conflicts in all three inter-connected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Transition from relief to development post-cold war and post-conflict. Proximity to areas of major conflict, in particular Afghanistan. Seen as fragile but not failed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Desk reviews</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu Kush</td>
<td>Includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, archetypal ‘fragile states’. New programme for SDC with potentially interesting new approaches, but with some serious internal debates about rationale and execution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Existing flagship programme that is held up as an important model for the organisation as a whole, with more integration than almost anywhere else globally, more of a claim to be a truly ‘Swiss programme’ and extensive documentation available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/OPT</td>
<td>This is important both for review work already undertaken, the new merged organisation structure (the Europe and Mediterranean Division, EMM) and SDC programme in the OPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Areas of focus</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Complex mixture of natural disaster, extreme poverty and insecurity. UN peacekeeping mission. Weak state institutions, lack of skilled human resources (brain-drain and losses during earthquake). Political interventions by USA, France, Canada and Brazil as well as MINUSTAH. Swiss representation merges different structures in an “integrated Embassy” with focus on programs and projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict and human rights thematic network</td>
<td>The thematic network most closely associated with work in fragile states and a way of understanding the work of thematic networks more generally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global cooperation</td>
<td>Has an important role in SDC work in fragile states through multilateral relationships and work with other global donors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Case study countries and rationale for inclusion
The evaluation also undertook an extensive document review. This included SDC internal documents (project proposals, reports, analysis) as well as the majority of other donor and academic literature relating to the subject.

1.3.3 Process
The evaluation placed a special emphasis on the learning nature of the exercise for the organisation. A highly participatory approach was adopted to help gather and test the key findings with the hope that this will lead to evidence which will be of most benefit to decision makers. This involved setting up a Core Learning Partnership (CLP) who met the evaluation four times over the course of the exercise formally, as well as being highly involved in case studies. A Management Reference Group was also convened to provide overall direction, and to ensure the management response was well conceived.

An inception phase helped to refine the terms of reference and to adapt an original approach paper. As a result the original purpose of the evaluation was slightly refined to broaden the scope somewhat. The evaluation team presented initial findings to the CLP following the end of the data gathering phase, and the draft report following its submission. The recommendations were developed through a final workshop, following the submission of the final report.

1.3.4 Evaluation team and management

There were five core members of the evaluation team with substantial experience of working in fragile and conflict-affected states, evaluation and academia. Ross Mountain and William Frej were the senior practitioners in the team, respectively former DSRSG in Congo (current director at DARA) and USAID mission director in Afghanistan. Lewis Sida led the team and Ben Ramalingam, former head of research and development at ALNAP and Frauke de Weijer, expert author on the World Bank WDR 2011 on fragile states provided expert input. James Darcy, author of the OECD INCAF report on risk management in fragile states also provided advice to the evaluation team.

The evaluation was managed by Anne Bichsel of the corporate controlling section of SDC, who facilitated the process and protected the independence of the findings.

1.3.5 Constraints

Whilst there was excellent access provided by SDC, both to all levels of the organisation and to documentation, there were also several constraints. Chief amongst these was the availability of people for interview, with busy workloads meaning that a significant proportion of interviews were often cancelled or rescheduled at the last minute. The timing for the country case studies was also a constraint as the busiest reporting period coincided with the original schedule, meaning there was less time than would have been ideal at the end of the evaluation process. Finally, there was not always as much data as the evaluation team required, something noted in the analysis sections of this report.
1.3.6 Structure of the report.

The report is structured in three key sections. Chapters one to three set out the background, purpose and methods used in the evaluation, a summary of the latest international efforts on fragile and conflict-affected states and the role of SDC to date. Chapter four presents the main findings of the evaluation against the four lines of enquiry. Chapter five sets out the priority areas for change as a potential road map for future fragile and conflict-affected states work for SDC and its partner agencies within the Swiss government.

9 As with the terms fragile states and context, the evaluation has used ‘fragile’ as short hand for ‘fragile and conflict affected’ on occasions. Again, whilst not quite as rigorous it helps the flow of the report and spares the reader a certain repetitiveness.
2. Fragile and conflict affected states

2.1 Understanding fragility

The idea of failed states, the most obvious antecedent of fragile states, emerges in academic literature following the end of the cold war, and was given greater impetus by the events of 9/11. A 2002 defence review in the US identified failing states as a potentially greater global security threat than conventional war.

The concept of fragile states appears in mainstream literature in 2005 with the production of ‘fragile states’ strategies by both USAID and DFID. A 2004 World Bank report looked at case studies of aid effectiveness in fragile states, which may be the first time the term appears in an evaluation. This classification builds on the World Bank’s previous category of Low Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).

The concept of fragile states is not a straightforward one. It is subject to much debate and contestation, politically, practically and academically. Some have disputed its usefulness and question its neo-colonial overtones. The idea of failed states certainly has resonance in the 19th century European colonial period with interventions (and often later territorial expansions), justified on this basis. The concept of fragile states is also unclear with various organisations and entities using different definitions. Several definitions are set out below (see Box 1). They range between defining fragility as purely conflict related, to wider issues of legitimacy and service entitlements.

It is becoming increasingly common for donor agencies to conceptualize fragility in relation to its opposite – resilience. ‘Resilient states are able to maintain order and stability, keep societal expectations and capacity in equilibrium, and survive and ameliorate the negative effects of external and internal shocks.’

The term has seen some evolution in recent years, moving from a stat-specific definition to consider ‘fragile situations’ that might exist in pockets in otherwise stable states.

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12 DFID (2005), Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states; and USAID (2005), Fragile States Strategy.
14 And in turn work done by Paul Collier whilst at the bank and subsequently.
16 And in fact dates back through Max Weber to Thomas Hobbes, who argued in Leviathan that without government the life of man would be, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”.
Whilst there is much argument about the concept of fragile states, there is little dispute that a number of fragile and conflict-affected countries are falling far behind in development terms. Most fragile states indices identify the same countries in this regard, as the two graphics below demonstrate (figure 2 and 3), although the specific positions will vary.

**Box 1: Definitions of fragility**

Fragility and fragile situations—Periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relate to violence. *WDR 2011.*

A fragile situation is defined as periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relating to violence. *WDR 2011.*

DFID defines fragile states as occurring where ‘the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’, where core functions include service entitlements, justice and security *DFID 2005.*

‘[fragile states are those] unable to meet [their] population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process’ - OECD, 2008

Fragile states are thus to be defined as states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy. *Stewart, F & Brown, G. Centre for research on inequality, human security and ethnicity, Oxford.*

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**Figure 2: The 2009 State Fragility Index, Mapped Geographically**
Figure 3: Life expectancy and GDP in fragile and conflict-affected states
As indicated in the map above, fragility may be seen as a spectrum ranging from extreme fragility to little or no fragility. Building on this, there have been a number of different ways to think about and categorise states. For example, DFID uses the ideas of strength combined with political will as an indicator of fragility. The OECD DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)\(^{18}\) uses a fourfold classification of fragile states: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. While such typologies are of course useful, it is also acknowledged that ‘in order to work effectively with fragile states, however, there can be no shortcut to detailed analysis of the historical evolution and specific characteristics of individual situations.'\(^{19}\)

2.2 Implications of fragility for the international community

The specific challenges for international aid delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts include\(^{20}\):

- **Lack of clear, accepted and legitimate leadership.** Many actors are often involved and leadership often weak or contested.
- **Multiple and significant priorities to be addressed.** Fragile and conflict-affected countries face a multitude of critical priorities with a limited capacity to respond. The overwhelming number of competing choices can stagnate leadership processes, and confuse donors.
- **Lack of shared perspectives.** Particularly in conflict-affected situations, there are highly different perspectives on what is needed, which approaches will work best, and who is prepared to and can be trusted to take the lead.
- **Weak state-society relations.** The infrastructure of state and society is often severely compromised in fragile and conflict-affected countries, governed by patrimonial and military culture rather than the liberal democratic culture that the international community and some leaders aim to create.
- **Culture of mistrust.** Particularly in conflict-affected situations, years of war often create a culture of mistrust and secrecy, and decades of poverty have created a culture of insufficiency, where individuals and groups are often intensely focused on their own interests and needs, not on the collective needs of society. This inhibits both leaders and society from finding and implementing solutions to collective problems, and donors from supporting it.

International experience clearly shows that assistance to Fragile States is subject to special conditions:

- the interventions are often more high risk and results more difficult to achieve,
- there are many problems to address and actors involved, and responsibilities among actors are not always clear,
- sometimes it requires engaging with groups considered “illegitimate” but who are instrumental to achieving the final stability objective,
- the political dimension of cooperation is often much more challenging and also even more critically important than in “traditional” aid relationships.

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\(^{18}\) [http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42113657_1_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42113657_1_1_1_1,00.html).

\(^{19}\) [http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON86.pdf](http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON86.pdf).

As a recent study by the Danish government argues:\textsuperscript{21} “…Fragility takes many forms and hence assistance can have a wide range of different objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously. In some cases assistance aims at establishment of central state institutions whose legitimacy is being challenged through on going violent conflict. In other cases the state is regarded as relatively legitimate but also weak, both at central and regional levels. And, Somalia for example represents a state, which has collapsed but has relatively stable structures of government at sub-regional level despite continued conflict in other parts of the country. Often there is a lack of social infrastructure and inadequate provision for basic social needs…”

A significant challenge with fragile and conflict-affected contexts is that they do not remain confined, and so cannot be easily ignored for long. Fragility or conflict in one setting quickly starts to affect development gains elsewhere. Robert Zoellick, in his foreword to the WDR 2011 states that, “not one low-income country coping with these problems has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. And the problems of fragile states spread easily: They drag down neighbours with violence that overflows borders, because conflicts feed on narcotics, piracy, and gender violence, and leave refugees and broken infrastructure in their wake.”\textsuperscript{22}

Another major challenge relates to discrimination, which often underpins fragility and conflict.\textsuperscript{23} In many settings, specific groups legitimise violence and other abuses as a consequence of discrimination. After conflict ceases, lingering discrimination can impede the shaping of inclusive and stable societies. Discrimination based on gender creates increased vulnerabilities of women and men which are often not accurately addressed and which further reduce the chances for stability.

The problem of fragility and fragile states has been steadily moving up the international policy agenda. At the 4\textsuperscript{th} international conference on aid effectiveness in Busan in late 2011, fragility was one of the major themes for aid donors. The same meeting saw a significant development in terms of how fragile states engage with such fora.\textsuperscript{24} A relatively new grouping of 19 fragile states called the G7\textsuperscript{+}\textsuperscript{25} put forward a set of propositions as to how donors might work in their countries. This ‘new deal’ sets out five peace-building and state-building goals.

- **Legitimate Politics** - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
- **Security** - Establish and strengthen people’s security
- **Justice** - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice
- **Economic Foundations** - Generate employment and improve livelihoods
- **Revenues & Services** - Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} There is some health academic debate on this issue, see for instance Keen (2008), Complex Emergencies pg 25 - 49, where he critiques Colliers earlier approach to “Greed vs Grievance”.
\textsuperscript{24} http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3746,en_21571361_43407692_49151766_1_1_1,00.html.
\textsuperscript{25} http://www.g7plus.org/.
Table 3 illustrates how thinking about what is important in fragile states has evolved and how there is increasing consensus about the way forward.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhance stability</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Preparatory</td>
<td>Legitimate politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improve Security</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage reform</td>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Economic foundations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop capacity of institutions</td>
<td>Human and social development</td>
<td></td>
<td>Revenues and services</td>
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Table 3: Evolution of the fragile states agenda

The most widely accepted set of principles as to how one should work in fragile states are those adopted by the OECD26. The OECD network on conflict and fragility (INCAF) has also undertaken a number of studies looking at how donors have implemented the principles, finding that whilst some of them are broadly or partly on track (non-discrimination and alignment with local priorities), the majority are either partly or completely off track27.

This also reflects the reality that donor assistance to fragile states has historically been highly volatile, fragmented and highly concentrated. The OECD reports that in 2011 only eight countries received half of the total ODA for fragile states. Figure 4 demonstrates the extreme volatility of aid to 4 fragile states over a 12 year period, with some seeing their allocation changing by as much as 30% year on year.

The same is true in terms of the fragmentation of aid instruments. Increasingly there is consensus that results in fragile states can only be achieved through concerted action on security, political legitimacy, development and humanitarian aid simultaneously. Despite significant moves toward these goals – integrated UN missions, “whole of government” approaches – there is still a tendency for these instruments of international engagement to operate largely independently from each other.

While this work is useful, it can sometimes seem rather high-level, especially for relatively smaller donors and agencies. Work by the World Bank has identified a number of practical principles for successful delivery of programmes in fragile states, a number of which

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26. [http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42113676_1_1_1_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_42113676_1_1_1_1,00.html)
are presented below. These might inform delivery strategies within specific fragile states contexts, and are especially relevant for the strategies across SDC, and Swiss government agencies more generally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 2: Key principles for success in fragile states</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Defining key terms</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2. Analysing initial conditions</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3. Ensuring flexibility and feedback</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4. Ensuring community driven development</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5. Starting small or large scale</strong></td>
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<td><strong>6. Focusing constructive potential at the local level</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td><strong>Linking constructive potential to democratic decentralisation</strong></td>
<td>One key way for addressing the roots causes of fragility is to institutionalise the processes by which local preferences can influence wider issues and trends. Such elected bodies or councils need resources and mechanisms so as to ensure mutual accountability to and with citizens. Gains within local areas need to be extended horizontally to other localities and vertically to higher level localities that can integrate localities with each other.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td><strong>Enhancing government capacity at higher levels</strong></td>
<td>Capacity building is essential for fragile state governments that might exert only tenuous authority over the territory they oversee. Capacities for delivery of goods and services and for enabling constructive local level engagement are crucial. Achieving both of these are crucial to legitimacy and moves a fragile state towards being a developmental one. Donor agencies like SDC need to work in concert with governments, even those with troubling records, to help them achieve these tasks. The ability to change attitudes in government is one of the main virtues of successful fragile states programmes. This is especially important for programmes that eventually transition from donor action to government action.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td><strong>Encouraging a sense of ownership</strong></td>
<td>Government and popular ownership of programmes is essential to enabling that learning takes place in appropriate ways. This is especially important in those areas where state sovereignty is in doubt. In many cases popular ownership is easier to achieve but it is a complement to and not a substitute for government ownership.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td><strong>Engendering Spill-overs</strong></td>
<td>Achievements in one sector or geographic area may influence actors in other sectors or areas to adopt the approaches that led to these successes. Such positive spill-overs can occur between or across donor bodies, government agencies, civil society or within society. Multi-stakeholder engagement - within the international community and with national actors - is one way of allowing such spill-overs to happen naturally. In many cases, these spill-overs will be modest, but where programmes are demand-driven, there is a higher likelihood that such positive cascades will happen as a matter of course.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td><strong>Scaling up</strong></td>
<td>This refers to the dissemination of ideas, approaches and methods across different levels and regions of a country. This requires engagement, influencing and capacity strengthening of government and civil society. Scaling up is both a technical and a political challenge, and needs to be dealt with as such.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Swiss aid to fragile and conflict-affected states

Switzerland has four main aid instruments\textsuperscript{29} that it deploys in fragile and conflict-affected states. This can roughly be described as development cooperation, humanitarian aid, economic cooperation and human rights and peace building work.

The first two instruments (development and humanitarian aid) are managed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), housed within the federal department for foreign affairs (FDFA). Economic cooperation is managed by the State Secretariat for Economic Cooperation (SECO) within the Federal Department of Economic Affairs. The human rights and peace building assistance is managed by the political division IV (PDIV) of the FDFA.

Out of the four instruments, ‘development cooperation’ is the largest by volume of financial flows. This is the case globally, although in fragile contexts this switches to humanitarian aid. Globally development cooperation (including cooperation with eastern European states and CIS) represents approximately 49% of ODA. The comparable figure for humanitarian aid is 13%. Conflict transformation and human rights through the FDFA is about 3%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total ODA</th>
<th>2'398</th>
<th>100%</th>
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<tr>
<td>of which</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development cooperation (incl. East)</td>
<td>1'186</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic cooperation (incl. East)</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict transformation and human rights</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td>1'801</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
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Table 4: Breakdown of Swiss ODA (2010)

To get a completely accurate picture of Swiss assistance to fragile and conflict-affected states is almost impossible, not least because just less than half its development assistance is spent multilaterally. As a crude estimate however, of the 112 countries named as receiving bilateral assistance in 2010 those in the top 20 most fragile states category (i.e. extremely fragile)\textsuperscript{30}, received 22% and the top 40 fragile states (considered either practically failed or very vulnerable) received 36%. SDC itself calculates that Switzerland spends 28% of its ODA in fragile states.

\textsuperscript{29}Inevitably, the terminology is not completely precise here as the graphic illustrating the spend from SECO (fig. 7) shows that it classifies its main activities as ‘instruments’. SDC calls ‘humanitarian aid’ an instrument and ‘development cooperation’. For the purposes of simplicity then, the evaluation has chosen this broader classification for ‘instrument’.

\textsuperscript{30}Again, these indexes are contentious and therefore indicative only. This evaluation for convenience has used the Foreign Policy 2011 index. The World Bank classifies any country with a CPIA under 3.2 as being fragile. Ethiopia has a CPIA of 3.4 and therefore would not make it into the top 20 were the World Bank classification to be used.
In terms of expenditure in the top 20 most fragile contexts, the split between humanitarian and development is 47% and 53% respectively. In fragile contexts therefore, SDC (and Switzerland) is spending a much higher proportion of its assistance on humanitarian aid than development than in normal contexts. PD IV spent 2010 about 11 % of its bilateral ODA in the top 20 fragile states.

In terms of activities, SDC bilateral (i.e. not multilateral) development cooperation in fragile contexts tends to mirror the activity in more stable contexts. Health is a significant part of the portfolio, as are other aspects of basic service provision such as potable water. Rural development and agriculture continues to be the single largest sector, especially in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Rural development is often framed as the decentralisation of services. By contrast rule of law and democracy programmes are the largest part of assistance to the east (former Soviet Union and Europe), with nearly half the expenditure in this area.

Humanitarian aid expenditure is split roughly in three ways, with a third spent through the ICRC, a third through the UN and a third between direct implementation and Swiss NGOs. A third of the UN contributions are in direct food aid. Humanitarian aid is fairly evenly distributed across sectors, with food aid constituting the largest expenditure.

| Swiss bilateral ODA in top 20 fragile states (mio CHF) |
|-------------------------------|---------|
| 1 Somalie                     | 9.2     |
| 2 Tchad                       | 14.1    |
| 3 Soudan                      | 16.4    |
| 4 DR Congo                    | 5.1     |
| 5 Haïti                       | 23.0    |
| 6 Zimbabwe                    | 6.8     |
| 7 Afghanistan                 | 17.6    |
| 8 République centrafricaine   | 21.8    |
| 12 Pakistan                   | 24.6    |
| 13 Yémen                      | 4.3     |
| 15 Niger                      | 18.6    |
| 17 Burundi                    | 12.1    |
| 18 Myanmar                    | 5.5     |
| 20 Éthiopie                   | 4.3     |
| TOTAL                         | 183.4   |

Table 5: Swiss aid in top fragile states
Economic cooperation through SECO is mostly macroeconomic support, with private sector development and trade the other large areas. In sub-Saharan Africa two thirds of SECO assistance is macroeconomic support.
Swiss aid in fragile and conflict contexts is not generally linked to the degree of fragility or conflict. Whilst the overall expenditure in fragile contexts is quite high, and likely set to rise, the linkage between degree of fragility and expenditure is not strong. Figure 8 shows SDC expenditure in fragile states against the same ranking used above.

![Bilateral ODA 2010 in fragile states (mio CHF)](image)

**Figure 8: SDC spend in fragile states**

There is some debate in certain contexts about the classification of countries as fragile or conflict-affected. This highlights the importance of a coherent strategy based on shared understanding and shared terms (see principle 1 in Box 2 ‘key principles for success’ in previous section). Importantly, while this may be relatively easy to achieve within SDC, there is a need to get a shared Swiss perspective on fragile and conflict-affected contexts which may prove more challenging.
4. Findings

4.1 Performance of instruments

The evidence from the case studies for this evaluation, and previous evaluative material, suggests that the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected states is mixed.

In some cases, SDC can point to clear results. Health indicators in SDC development programmes improve; agriculture programmes result in higher yields and local services are delivered through decentralisation initiatives. In Burundi, in a province where SDC supports the health system, the number of maternal deaths dropped from 531 deaths in a year to just 38 after SDC supplied three ambulances. In Khujand, Tajikistan’s second city, the joint cooperation office rehabilitated the town water supply improving flow by 30% for over 40,000 people and improving payment rates from 60 – 90%.

The same is true for humanitarian aid. A recent evaluation of SDC humanitarian aid concluded that “Swiss HA was highly relevant in most instances”\(^{31}\). Swiss humanitarian assistance provides life saving support to displaced populations in fragile contexts through highly respected partners such as the ICRC or the World Food Programme (WFP). In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo or Sudan, Swiss humanitarian support is part of an international effort that acts as a safety net of last resort for some of the world’s most vulnerable people.

Whilst it is possible to see improvements in people’s lives at a local level, or in a particular area of intervention, this is generally against a background of either stagnation or deterioration. As is set out clearly in the preceding section of this report, many of the countries where SDC works have become more, not less fragile, despite a long history of development cooperation. Whilst this is clearly not Switzerland’s fault, it does indicate the need for a re-think of development and humanitarian cooperation in fragile states. In general, traditional development and humanitarian approaches seem out of step with the scale of the challenges and the chaos of the context.

In some cases, it is possible to see how a more ambitious type of Swiss aid can have a greater impact, not just at a localised level but also on fragility as a whole. In Nepal, the combination of diplomatic, development and humanitarian aid, combined with a proactive role in the wider aid system has contributed to stabilising that country’s internal conflict.

The case of Burundi highlighted at the beginning of this section demonstrates the challenge. The assumption is that by helping in the health care sector, through the provision of neo-natal equipment for example, maternal mortality will decrease. The short term results can be dramatic, but without SDC organisational support to ensure that the ambulances run; that the provincial health ministry has fuel, spares, drivers and doctors, the impact could easily be reversed. SDC is well aware of this, and is working to bolster technical capacities within the system, both at provincial and national levels.

There are three issues that need to be addressed for this sensible approach to work effectively. The first is that the general context in Burundi, and indeed in all fragile states, affects the likelihood of success. If the real problem is civil war, a lack of functioning

government, and minimal public funds then at the very least there is a need to engage with - if not directly work on – these myriad political issues. Critically for SDC, it may be necessary to address political issues, before technical work on health systems improvement can be effective.

The second is that it is necessary to measure impact on longer term but arguably more important issues, as well as on relatively simple ‘results’ such as the dramatic improvement in maternal mortality the provision of ambulances can provide.

The third issue is that SDC needs to work differently to take account of the challenges of fragility institutionally – how it conceptualises its work, how such work is supported, how well it shares good practice and how it can overcome problems and shortcomings.

The first of these challenges relates to programming priorities, focus and positioning. The second is about results and measurement. The third is about the effective institutionalisation of the overall fragile states effort. Findings in relation to each of these areas are set out below.

4.1.1 Programming priorities, focus and positioning

In the case studies for this evaluation, SDC works mostly in the areas of service delivery, and to a lesser extent in income generation, rule of law and governance. The greatest emphasis by far is on service delivery. These programmes have components of systems strengthening as well as direct provision of infrastructure and supplies. Many of the programmes reviewed showed good progress – health system reforms in both Tajikistan and Rwanda showed promise over the longer term as well as the short term. Across the case studies however, there was a tendency to focus on the ‘micro’ and ‘meso’ levels. SDC appeared to be less confident intervening at the ‘macro’ level.

In the majority of programmes reviewed for this evaluation there was a clear tendency to be ‘hands on’ and ‘on the ground’. SDC deploys the standard range of aid modalities – from very limited budget support to direct programme implementation. It is at the direct end of the scale that SDC seems to be most comfortable. Whilst this is somewhat at odds with the prevailing ‘Paris’ orthodoxy, it is not necessarily a bad instinct. The lessons from World Bank experience suggests that direct engagement should be at the heart effective fragile states programming, as a means of achieving transformative change.

Such contextual considerations of transformative change informed the SDC position in different countries, but not consistently so. As in other donor agencies, SDC work is also shaped by the prevailing institutional culture, more as a matter of default than design. Again, consistent with similar organisations, this is the result of a number of reinforcing factors – institutional history, the preferences of staff members and the expectations of external stakeholders. This culture is often justified with reference to particular interpretations of Swiss impartiality which suggest that direct, on-the-ground delivery is a more principled and impartial way of working. Lessons from SDC itself suggest, however, that impartiality needn’t stand in the way of serious and sustained political engagement.

The two most commonly used aid modalities in fragile contexts are partner-based programming and direct implementation. In the Great Lakes region of Africa and Tajikistan the health programmes were implemented by Swiss TPH, in support of the health system. This can be thought of as a hybrid technical assistance programme, as Swiss TPH is a state entity in Switzerland, contracted by SDC to provide expertise and manage finance. There are
also small direct contributions to government managed pooled funds in the health sector, usually focused on human resource capacity. In Burundi the land reform programme is implemented directly by SDC, as is the health programme in Rwanda (this has changed recently from Swiss TPH).

In all of these countries SDC also works with national non-government organisations (NGOs), often justified as a way of counter-balancing the work other donors do with the State, as well as involving civil society in national decision making. This works very effectively in Burundi where civil society is intimately involved with prioritising development inputs. As a result of this pioneering approach by SDC a number of other donors have asked Switzerland to effectively manage their funds in this area. This kind of work at the interface of civil society and government is also thought to be a highly effective way of working in fragile contexts\textsuperscript{32}.

Evidence also suggests that countries emerging from conflict need more technical assistance than financial resources in the initial stages\textsuperscript{33}. Later this changes as their absorptive capacity grows. As already noted, Switzerland does reasonably well in the areas of technical assistance. The 2008 DAC peer review found, "in the two countries visited by the peer review team, Switzerland’s context-specific approach to building capacity was described positively by partners as respectful and unobtrusive, yet firmly oriented toward outcomes. Switzerland also coordinates its technical cooperation well, and uses local expertise in order to build national capacity."

Both SDC and SECO second staff into government and Humanitarian Aid do the same into UN agencies. In Nepal, Switzerland's expertise has helped with a variety of government and donor policies and implementation, from forestry to decentralisation to building trail bridges. In Nepal this position has been gained through use of and participation in the full range of aid modalities. SDC contributes to sector-based budget support (SWAps) in areas like micro-infrastructure whilst at the same contributing Swiss technical expertise. In Tajikistan SECO has seconded much needed expertise in public finance management to the central government.

More generally, SDC has some good examples of innovative programme work. Switzerland was one of the early pioneers of the use of cash based approaches in humanitarian assistance. SDC has recently helped establish a trust fund held jointly between the UN and the World Bank to improve their cooperation in fragile states globally. The trust fund has helped fund an exchange of people and a number of small studies and joint initiatives that increase understanding and collaboration. Whilst it is early days, this type of initiative has the potential to impact aid effectiveness in fragile states at an order of magnitude greater than SDC individual work.

These types of innovative interventions working at scale still remain the exception rather than the rule however. As already noted, SDC appears most comfortable operating at the ‘micro’ and ‘meso’ levels in its country cooperation programmes, and does so through the deployment of one of a number of recognisable ‘standard operating procedures’. Usually there is the aspiration to influence national policy, but too often this does not materialise in any substantial way. This is even more the case with work at the global level, or with


\textsuperscript{33} Collier, Paul (2007) The Bottom Billion. Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done About it. Oxford University Press.
multilateral institutions at the country level. SDC / Switzerland does not always see itself as a ‘shareholder’ in these organisations, which changes its engagement accordingly. Usually this is linked to the level of resources given to these organisations (see section 4.4 for more on this).

The evaluation team identified clear opportunities for SDC to engage more in national or international policy dialogue. At the moment, programmes in fragile states tend to be in ‘softer’ issues such as social services or rural development. They are also, much the same as the things SDC does in stable contexts. Such programmes are not contentious with either parliamentarians or the public and often – as highlighted above - offer easily digestible results. SDC does not as a matter of course engage in ‘harder’ areas such as security sector reform, or (apart from a few cases such as the OPT or Nepal) in state-building.

Both SECO and PDIV were outside the scope of this evaluation in terms of conclusions about their performance in fragile states. Nevertheless, it was clear to the evaluation team that they had critical inputs to offer and that some of their competencies may be as relevant, if not more relevant than SDC. In Burundi, the conflict mediation work (peace-building) of PDIV helped bring (together with others) some of the critical rebel groups to the negotiating table when the Arusha process looked stalled. In Tajikistan SECO’s programme has helped to simplify both taxation policy and business procedure – critical building blocks for sustainable governance and growth (state-building).

These types of interventions can have considerable impacts at a macro level. A Dutch supported intervention in Burundi to raise taxes has tripled state income over a five year period to nearly a third of their annual budget. In a country that currently relies on international handouts to fund over half its annual expenditure this is of great significance, especially when economists now agree that over about 15% of GDP the impact of aid diminishes rapidly and can become negative.

The conservative risk profile of SDC often leads the organisation into supply driven programming rather than programmes based solely on the context and needs of the situation. Nearly all of the country cooperation strategies examined in this study had a rural development programme (often linked to decentralisation). Whilst there is no questioning rural poverty in most fragile contexts, the question of whether actions in this sector will prove to be transformative does not often seem to be asked. While such efforts can work in a context such as Tanzania where the political environment is both stable and relatively progressive, they are far more challenging to implement in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

In summary then, whilst the evaluation could point to many localised results, there was little clear evidence of the impact that SDC and other aspects of Swiss assistance are having on fragility and conflict as a whole. SDC programmes in fragile contexts tend to be focused on the symptoms of fragility rather than the root causes. There is too much focus on delivery of pre-defined programmes and on demonstrating short term results; Swiss aid is too fragmented and too thinly spread. The ‘whole’ is not generally greater than the sum of the parts.

At the heart of this issue is the strategic “theory of change” that SDC has underpinning its work in fragile contexts. A theory of change sets out what the causes of a problem are, and how an agency will work to address these. A robust theory of change will address why a country is fragile, what the solutions might be, and what SDC will contribute (and how). This
requires clear, context-specific goals, indicators for progress and success, and actions that are appropriate and relevant. It also demands clarity in underlying assumptions, which can be tested in different contexts.

This is not easy in fragile states. Fragility is poorly understood, and requires engaging with uncertainty and unpredictability. The roots of fragility are predominately political, although they might manifest in various technical gaps. Engaging with this reality and bringing the necessary thought processes and practical approaches into a traditional aid bureaucracy is far from straightforward.

This may be why the evaluation team did not find explicit theories of change underpinning either country or regional strategies. Rather, there is a tendency to identify ‘solvable problems’ (i.e. maternal mortality, or water supply) and work on these through the adaptation of a number of well-established programme interventions.

The lack of theories of change specifically targeted at fragility may also be because there is no fragile states policy within the organisation. Whilst there is clear direction from the top to become more involved in fragile states, and to understand better what is needed, there is not yet a clear vision as to what SDC should be doing differently in such contexts.

4.1.2 Measurement and results

SDC has a system of results based management. It is required by the parliament (rightly) to demonstrate the results it has achieved with public funds.

The annual reporting system asks country cooperation offices to self-assess their programmes in one of four categories ranging from ‘very satisfactory’ to ‘unsatisfactory’. The evaluation found the vast majority of the programmes were ranked either ‘very satisfactory’, or ‘satisfactory’. In the country case studies for the evaluation there were no programmes ranked ‘unsatisfactory’ and only three ranked ‘less satisfactory’. The basis on which these overarching judgements were made often seemed rather subjective and narrow.

In particular, for SDC, as for other development agencies, it has proved more straightforward to measure simple outputs through one-off interventions, than to measure the outcomes of longer-term, complex interventions. For a start, it is not clear what kinds of metrics are needed to track outcomes. There is also a longstanding issue of how to attribute such results to the work of SDC and its partners.

The annual reports cite various national and regional statistics that indicate progress and success. However, the link between programme outputs and these results was at times rather tenuous. In addition, they did not appear to add up to a summary of progress toward higher level goals, especially over the longer term. The evaluators conclude that the causal connections between SDC programmes and these results need to be thought through in more detail (as suggested in relation to the theory of change argument earlier) in order for these results to be meaningful for the institution.

In fragile states, as already noted, contexts are dynamic and unpredictable, and change is slow, often taking a number of years. These factors make the development of a systematic and coherent results framework a particular challenge. The evaluation team found that longer term outcome-oriented results do exist in some cases, but that these are not always captured in the formal results system. For example, in Rwanda, the national health insurance system is based on a pilot scheme that SDC supported Swiss TPH to implement in two western
provinces. The government saw the results and decided to roll it out nationally as a way of sustaining health finance over the long term. The scheme also includes a provision for free access for the very poor. While the impact of this intervention is far more complicated to measure, it may be that it has saved as many lives as the provision of neo-natal equipment to hospitals in those same regions (or perhaps many more).

One of the most common issues raised by SDC staff in relation to the results-based management agenda was that it is poorly suited, in its current form, to work in fragile contexts. One of the reasons for this perception may be a lack of clarity managerially around what constitutes good results in fragile contexts. It may also be that people are not used to using evidence as the basis for long term programming. This is changing, with the introduction of the annual reporting system, and new guidance on monitoring medium term cooperation strategies.

SDC’s system for routinely documenting results is relatively new, and given this, there is a reasonable amount of attention paid to the particularities of fragile states in the relevant guidance and documentation. However, this guidance is very new, and has not yet been fully absorbed by country offices.

Perhaps more fundamentally, the ambiguity towards results may be related to the perception in the wider aid system that the drive for results reduces the space for creativity innovation, and truly meaningful programming. The key point is that results-based management makes a good servant but a poor master. A strong focus on results can be supportive of coherent programme strategies, but should not dictate them, especially in fragile contexts. The most constructive approach would be to take a portfolio approach (implied in the new SDC guidance), with more rigid, pre-defined approaches to results used in stable and identical contexts and more flexible and creative approaches in fragile contexts.

Table 6 below, drawn from the new SDC guidance material, is a useful starting point for what this kind of approach might look like in practice. It shows the kinds of results that might be expected in different contexts (from fragile to stable). SDC’s work in fragile states would benefit greatly were this preliminary work to be actively followed up with practical guidance and documented case studies on how the results framework might be implemented in fragile contexts.

4.1.3 Institutional learning and staffing

There is considerable scope for SDC’s work on fragility to be more explicitly addressed within the organisation. In particular, there is a need for such work to be given a solid institutional footing and ownership. The evaluation has found there is a lack of any such ‘home’. Moreover, the organisational commitment to working in fragile contexts needs to be accompanied by adjustments and reforms to existing processes and systems. The evaluation team found little evidence of either of these aspects being addressed in SDC at the present time.

It is increasingly acknowledged that a rigorous learning approach is essential for dealing with the inherent uncertainty and complexity of fragile contexts. Ideally, this would happen at both strategic and operational levels,

There are numerous examples of good SDC work in fragile states. The OPT and Nepal experiences are good case studies of effective work in fragile states, with varying levels of documentation. However, the lessons from these initiatives have seen low levels of take up at an institution-wide level.

The new thematic network approach is one theoretically good way to disseminate this knowledge. The closest network thematically is the conflict and human rights network. Naturally however, the network has a tendency to see fragility purely through the lens of conflict. Whilst many fragile contexts have clearly come about because of conflict, this is not the case for all. Another danger is that the approaches generated through the network – the knowledge – will be necessarily focused on conflict and how to mediate, mitigate and prevent conflict.

Nevertheless, the networks are a new initiative, and the related reorganisation (REO2) is still ongoing. One reason why SDC’s linkages from local, to national to global may be ad hoc, is that fragile states learning and experience is somewhat scattered across the organisation,
and within the divisions. Fragility is not one of the four or five global themes, nor is it explicitly part of one of the 13 knowledge networks. More generally SDC does not have a significant in-house research or policy function, preferring to see itself as more pragmatic than policy oriented. While this may be justifiable, it has resulted in SDC building its fragile states portfolio piecemeal, based on practice, precedent and relationships rather than an overarching policy.

One of the most significant organisational issues which shapes how well SDC learns and performs in fragile contexts was staffing. Getting the right people in place was seen as essential to programme success.

The prevailing consensus amongst people interviewed within the organisation for this evaluation however, was that SDC was not able to do this well. Respondents felt that there was a need for people with the right combination of political and practical skills, but these people were not always easy to find. National staff were key, and having the right calibre and numbers of national staff extremely important. And yet on both counts – international and national – the SDC (and by implication the FDFA system) was not seen as flexible or responsive enough. National staff were recruited too slowly, and often the packages offered were not sufficient to attract the right calibre of staff (who might get paid up to twice as much working for another donor organisation). Two years after the earthquake, the Haiti programme continues to run without a single national programme officer, despite it being one of the most complex situations in which to operate. DR Congo is still in the process of building its national capacity two years after its inception as a development cooperation office.

On the whole, the evaluation team found that international staff are neither encouraged nor rewarded to work in fragile contexts. In some respects having this experience is almost a disadvantage as people are seen as having a particular profile and then never get ‘nice’ country postings. Terms and conditions for staff joining do not specify that SDC staff must work in fragile or difficult places, and the 4 year rotation system specifically dis-incentivises people to apply for fragile contexts. As a contrast donors such as USAID and DFID – working in difficult places like Afghanistan that are of national importance – offer people willing to be deployed multiples of their salaries and automatic promotion.

Perhaps the most serious implication of the lack of an explicit staffing strategy for fragile states is the lack of robust security management. There is a reluctance to acknowledge that Swiss nationals might be a target (despite lots of evidence to the contrary), and an over reliance on the ‘acceptance’\(^{35}\) model of security management. In reality this may be a combination of wishful thinking and budgetary constraints. However, in contexts such as the Hindu Kush it is unacceptable to expose Swiss government employees to levels of threat that are not well understood. It was not even clear to the evaluation team that there was an effective crisis management plan in place within SDC in the event that someone was kidnapped. Nor was it clear to staff working in this area who was in charge of security management – the Pakistan embassy or the Pakistan cooperation office. This will have to change – responsibilities must be made clearer, procedures well understood and risk exposure based on clear and objective threat analysis.

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\(^{35}\) The acceptance model of security management relies on being looked after by the local community, where the agency is seen as welcome. The deterrence model of security management relies on ‘harder’ measures, typically ranging from secure fencing to armed guards.
Summary

1. Some SDC instruments perform well when measured against their objectives in fragile contexts, although overall the picture is mixed.
2. SDC cooperation programmes are not having an impact on fragility as a whole, although there are some notable exceptions.
3. There are few explicit theories of change. As a result, it is unclear how SDC sees the root causes of fragility and what it thinks are the priority interventions to address these.
4. Results measurement is often short term and narrow, but there is potential for improvement in the new system.
5. Fragile states work is scattered across the organisation. The lack of an institutional ‘home’ means it is harder to share experience and learn from others practice.
6. There is innovative work in fragile states at a practical and global level. This type of work has the potential for greater impact than doing what others do already.
7. SDC has a conservative risk profile and an overly technocratic approach that diminishes the opportunity for impact and influence.
8. There is a need for a fragile states staffing strategy, and for an overhaul of security management.

4.2 Analysis, flexibility and adaptation

In all of the case study countries, analysis was found to be an important part of programme design and implementation. Good analysis is seen to underpin the effectiveness of SDC’s strategic positioning: it is at the heart of the process of identifying in-country needs and the range of priorities that might inform future development interventions. It also helps to highlight potential niches where SDC can play a role, enables identification of potential partners, and helps SDC staff question assumptions upon which their work rests.

On a more tactical and day-to-day basis, effective analysis enables monitoring both of contextual factors and the implementation process, providing information to make decisions and guide actions. Done right, this analysis provides a foundation for the results orientation of the organisation in country programmes.

Given this ideal, how does SDC’s organisational analysis work in practice? What are the sources of information, how are they synthesised and analysed, and how does this inform decision-making?

The evaluation team found that across the country offices a wide range of information sources were employed, and were utilised in both strategic and tactical analysis. The relative importance of each element varied across offices, and also over time within particular offices. The evaluation found there were four broad categories of information sources:

- Internal staff networks, of programme managers, programme officers, desk officers in Bern, senior managers, and national staff. Special emphasis was placed on the importance of national staff knowledge and inputs, although sometimes this cadre is not always actively involved in context analysis.

- Engagement with partners – both Swiss NGO and national and local NGOs are integral to SDC programme delivery. The relationships between SDC and these actors are generally sound, and consciously use principles of mutual accountability. This necessitates a degree of trust, openness and information sharing, and is key for programme-related
context analysis. Sometimes partners were used to undertake all context analysis on a subcontracting basis, but this was seen by many as simply not good enough. Such efforts tend to result in findings for which there is no SDC ownership and engagement, and reports that ‘gather dust’.

- **External Swiss networks** – in those countries where the different components of the Swiss government were present, engagement was seen as a useful means by which to gather information. The distinctive roles and focus of the different Swiss agencies meant that while such exchanges were often felt to be useful, they also served to highlight the distinctive nature of different agencies, and the different opinions that they might hold on a given event or situation.

- **External international agency networks** – in many fragile contexts, the extensive international presence means that there is a considerable pool of knowledgeable individuals with whom to interact. This can happen formally, for example, in coordination meetings, but also informally at social events and occasions. Other agencies data and reports were also cited as a useful information resource. This was seen as especially useful for getting the ‘big picture’ of what was happening in a given country.

This combination of multiple sources was seen as important, given the inherent complexity of fragile contexts. In some settings, such as in Nepal, information gathering was systematic and written into specific responsibilities of staff members. In others, it appeared to be rather more *ad hoc*. This variance was striking, especially given the importance of such analysis in anticipating contextual changes. Despite what might be said in some country offices, it is also not a trivial matter: one can predict with some degree of accuracy the extent to which the country office programme acts in a reactive or proactive manner to changing contexts depending on the ‘information culture’ observed. It is clear from SDC’s work that, consistent with lessons from elsewhere, the strategic use of information and analysis is a key requirement for working effectively in fragile contexts.

What was also striking to the evaluation team was the degree to which these information networks were largely made up of people ‘external’ to the context, with national staff and national partners as notable exceptions. Whilst SDC prides itself on being close to the ground, in reality much of its analysis falls within a narrow band of received wisdom. Diverse and accurate intelligence about what is happening – from national institutions to communities of focus - appears patchy. Whilst SDC is hardly alone in this regard, it is clear that analysis can be key to informed programme choices, and the broader the sources, the more likely SDC is to get it right.

This is especially important in fragile contexts because the variance in ‘narratives’ is so wide. In all of the countries reviewed for this evaluation it was possible to hear diametrically opposed opinions on the prospects for development, sometimes within the SDC office itself. Countries could be simultaneously on a downward spiral, about to emerge from decades of stagnation or unlikely to change for a decade. This variance was also found with regard to a particular political situation, or in a particular national or international actor, or in relation to the value of a particular approach or idea

Such variance could partly be explained by lack of good data and information. Partly it is also a symptom of politically biased analysis. Depending on whether a regime is viewed as an ally or an enemy, on whether a particular leader or clique is hostile or hospitable, donors (and their partners and analysts) can be overly positive or overly negative.
Institutional battles can also colour analysis. Whether a context is “humanitarian” or “development” will determine what types of agencies operate and the budget lines they are funded from, and what the overarching strategy looks like. Switzerland is no more or less immune to such battles than others. For example, SDC and SECO have spent a year debating whether Tajikistan is a fragile context. This is a time consuming and distracting debate, underpinned by sensitive questions about which agencies lead and what types of approaches should be used.

Common shared analysis is seen as a starting point for work in fragile states by both the OECD and the new G7+ grouping. It must also be the starting point for Switzerland - and a mechanism for achieving this is needed to make this a practical reality. For instance, agreement on a common set of criteria for judging fragility might be one starting point.

In terms of the tools and process for synthesising information, by far the most commonly used approach is the MERV. Additionally there is the suite of tools called Conflict Sensitive Programme Management (CSPM), and there are often bespoke pieces of analysis commissioned when strategies are being written. New programmes typically start with a feasibility study, which is another, narrower type of analysis.

Generally then there are three categories of analysis – short, medium and long term. Short term analysis tends to be tactical – used for security management and practical decisions about implementing projects. MERV most closely represents this type of analysis. Medium term analysis is typically over a few years, and is used for “course corrections” – closing some programmes, starting others, adapting the shape of the portfolio, informing aid modality choices. The bespoke analysis and CSPM fit into this category. The longer term, “horizon scanning” type of analysis is typically associated with strategy and is often done through scenario planning. SDC does not do this routinely, although it is using such tools more and more in certain country offices.

The MERV system enables information to be gathered according to a number of specific themes, and is then incorporated into the annual reporting cycle. In a number of countries, the MERV system and process was adapted to suit the context. The speed at which fragile contexts changed was consistently given as a rationale for these adaptations.

These changes included:

- Increasing the frequency of analyses, to 3-4 monthly assessments in some cases
- Broadening and deepening the forms of information gathered, to include detail on specific activities or certain contexts – for example, the MERV might look at political contexts, partner activities, donor engagement, the status of vulnerable and marginalised groups, the security context, and so on.
- Linking the information gathering and synthesis to specific decision making windows, for example, quarterly or annual programme review

Again, Nepal was an example of good practice in this regard. Elsewhere, such as in OPT, the CSPM framework seemed to play a key role in synthesising information.

In the very best cases, analysis of this information is done regularly, involves key staff members, is focused on identifying not just the contextual changes but also the implications for SDC in terms of risks or opportunities, and is clearly and tangibly linked to programmatic decision making.
In the majority of cases however, these frameworks – with or without adaptations - were not found to be used. In some settings this was attributed to the flaws in the particular approach – for example, the MERV mechanism was described as ‘too broad’, and CSPM as ‘too heavy’. In some countries, the MERV was only done once a year as part of annual reports, CSPM was not being employed, but there was no readily identified alternative mechanism for information gathering. Even when the tools were being used, there was a “so what” issue because of the difficulty of linking analysis to decision making.

In some cases, analysis was outsourced, and performed as a tick-box exercise, done because of head office demands for a MERV analysis to accompany annual reports. These outsourced reports, at their worst, not only fail to tap into the wealth of information networks that are at SDC’s disposal in-country, but fail to have any material influence on decision making.

At the present time, the evaluation team would conclude that analysis is done, but unevenly across country offices, in different ways, using different frameworks, and with highly variable use of information. There appear to be no shared norms of when such analysis should be done, how and why. As alluded to earlier, in some settings, the evaluation team discerned a resistance to such analysis, sometimes from senior levels in the SDC system.

While some attributed this to an issue of time and resources, it was noted that this was a rather shallow argument. Instead, the effective use of information and analysis related to the underlying priorities which determined how time was allocated. Because of the relatively weak institutional position on this issue, it appears that it is as much down to the culture and attitudes of staff working in a given office. Leadership is especially critical. Where analysis plays a rightfully central role in programme delivery and implementation, it was also found that senior leaders (whether Country Directors, Ambassadors, or ‘double-hatted’) played an active role in championing and convening the process, and setting expectations for a certain quality of evidence on which to base decisions.

Given the vital importance of good analysis for informing and shaping programming in fragile states, this issue needs to be looked at urgently. In the worst case, this represents a failure of SDC to engage institutionally with the dynamic nature of the contexts in which it increasingly works.

Analysis is closely connected to issues of flexibility and adaptability. The OECD fragile states principles suggest donors should “act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance”. For the OECD this means being flexible enough to seize windows of opportunity, whilst at the same time being prepared to wait longer for transformative change (20 – 30 years).

SDC is generally not seen by its staff as being flexible enough for working in fragile contexts. One country office case study workshop listed the reasons for this as: funds were already committed; projects were already outsourced and contracts could not be broken; the project assessment and design process was too long and cumbersome; the SDC bureaucracy was too rigid and slow in responding to external changes, both in the country offices and at headquarters. In desk review interviews respondents repeatedly cited organisational culture as a barrier to flexibility. The culture is one of “predictability and predefined outcomes”.

Whilst there is certainly cultural inertia that inhibits flexibility – and a low level of decentralisation (the head of office typically only has signing power for 200,000 CHF), there
were good examples of programme adaptation. Partly this has to do with the above cited rigidity – country offices and programme delivery staff are forced to make adaptations to programmes to make sense of them. The Hindu Kush programme is a good example of this.

One of the programmes in the new Hindu Kush operation is in governance, essentially helping local authorities deliver services. This was conceived in head office and essentially fits the template that SDC deploys in many other contexts. However, the Fatah region is particularly lawless and effectively had no local government, making implementation tricky. When the President of Pakistan announced a series of political reforms to the governance systems and the judiciary system, this provided a new entry point for the SDC project. This triggered a series of discussions with partners with a view to developing new activities focusing on the proposed reforms and their implementation.

This reinforces the OECD guidance that ‘context should be the starting point’ for fragile states interventions. It also illustrates how a high degree of both flexibility and adaptability needs to be built into programmes in fragile states, not least because new opportunities often arise. There are a number of scenarios that can be envisaged:

- Changes to make programmes more relevant and appropriate to the context (Hindu Kush governance, project mentioned above)
- Changes to do something that wasn’t part of the strategy (unplanned collaboration with PD2 / PD4 in various contexts, collaboration between humanitarian and regional cooperation in Pakistan post-floods)
- Start doing something that hadn’t been anticipated as necessary (humanitarian aid in Gaza, humanitarian advocacy in Gaza at the time of the 2009 war)
- Stop something that is found to be irrelevant, or causing unforeseen problems (brick kiln programmes which were found to be potentially doing harm)

While there are some useful examples of each of these, it must also be said that those involved were firmly of the opinion that such changes are not easy to bring about. They can involve numerous levels of decision making to be mobilised, they can face resistance both from head office and implementing partners who stand to lose resources if programmes change, and in some cases they can go against the grain of the organisational culture.

One example that was highlighted was of a programme that was identified to be doing harm in the context, because intended beneficiaries were actually being exploited. While the decision to close the programme was made at the country office level, this meant changing an eight year programme, and met with resistance at the head office level and also politically within Switzerland. In this specific example, the country office stood its ground. But the prospect of having to fight down a head office reluctant to change its commitments means there are possibly many more examples of programmes that should be adapted, or even stopped, but are not because of the political implications. When working in fragile states, even the best, most intelligent, creative and operationally able staff members find themselves having to carefully ‘pick their battles’.

Humanitarian aid was seen by respondents to the evaluation as a more flexible instrument, although here too there were challenges. Whilst the humanitarian programmes were not typically locked into three, or nine year cycles, the budgets were allocated at the beginning of the financial year and aside from “emergencies” there was little opportunity for mid-course corrections. Equally, the lack of longer term perspective also, counter-intuitively, made humanitarian aid an inflexible tool. Staff typically turnover very quickly and therefore
programmes designed at the outset of a crisis remain the main thrust of ongoing plans. Bern tends to manage humanitarian aid programmes from a distance, rather than it being devolved to the country office completely.

Where SDC works best, it is because it brings together anticipatory techniques with adaptive management, and displays a kind of ‘structured flexibility’. In general, however, the evaluation team found that the fusion of good context analysis with nimble decision making and flexibility of programming has happened *despite* the system and not because of it. There are considerable pressures toward conservatism and to deliver what was promised. This was especially noted by those other Swiss government entities working in a given country who were asked to reflect on SDC’s efforts.

One way in which this has been dealt with in SDC has been to bring more scenario thinking approaches into programme design. Some programmes now routinely use scenarios as part of country strategies, for example in Nepal. The idea is that such future projections can help map out different contextual situations, with a range of alternative programme logics which might be appropriate and which can be taken on with ease.

However, these scenario mechanisms also reflect the tendency towards conservatism, and there is a sense even in these exercises that SDC is reluctant to look at emerging issues until it is too late. In a number of instances, this meant that the potential for genuine strategic reorientation is lost, and instead there are last-minute tactical adjustments that can often fail to serve the broader strategic goals of the organisation. For example, developing Nepali human rights capacities has been ongoing for a number of years, but needed to go through a radical change because of the recent expulsion of OCHCR. While this was predictable in many ways, the entire donor community – SDC included – was left scrambling when it happened.

In some cases, of course, conservatism might be a good thing. Some respondents warned against the tendency towards reactive decision making which means many changes are made, followed blindly, and lead to an overall weakening of programme coherence. Other country office staff involved in programme design raised the importance of ‘designing for robustness’. The rationale is that with the right selection of partners, the right anticipatory mechanisms, and the right amounts of institutional flexibility, SDC will be able to deliver programmes that are crisis-proof. This was how the OPT programme was framed, with the specific example of the Gaza crisis in 2009. While this necessitated humanitarian relief and advocacy, the core programme also needed to continue working. The evaluation team finds this argument convincing up to a point – but notes there may be other instances where ‘design for robustness’ can be conservatism in disguise.

The view from external actors was interesting in this regard. The most critical perspective was that SDC was naïve in its analysis, and overly rigid in its programming. Even in those contexts where SDC was viewed favourably, there was a sense that SDC lacked ‘political antennae’ necessary to sense and respond to changing circumstances.

**Summary**

1. Analysis is seen as key to effective strategic positioning by SDC, and as underpinning programme design.
2. SDC has a wide range of information sources and networks, although sometimes these can be biased and narrow and can leave out national perspectives.
3. There is a wide variance in the culture of analysis and information within cooperation offices. The best prioritise and invest in regular analysis linked to decision making, led from the top.

4. Shared analysis of fragile states can often be difficult between agencies and instruments because of vested institutional interest.

5. SDC is not seen as sufficiently flexible by either its staff or its partners within the Swiss system. A culture of predictable and predefined outcomes is seen as the root cause of this issue.

6. SDC is good at adaptation to context within development programmes, partly because of the lack of overall flexibility. Humanitarian aid is seen as a more flexible instrument, but is too short term for use as a strategic intervention in fragile contexts.

4.3 Complementarity

The issue of coherence of aid instruments in fragile states has been recognised by most donors as an important one in recent years. Switzerland too has recognised this as a major issue, partly as a result of its complex and rather fragmented aid bureaucracy and partly as a result of external feedback such as the OECD DAC peer reviews.36

This evaluation has found that SDC has made significant efforts in this area. More widely within the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the Swiss government as a whole there have been several concerted attempts to get a more joined up way of working.

Despite this, there is still some way to go before there is a genuinely coherent approach to fragile states by all Swiss actors. This is true at a strategic level, at an operational level, and at a bureaucratic level.

Whilst there is still much work to do, collaboration is definitely improving. In the case studies for this review there were several examples of really good joint working. In Tajikistan, the cooperation office has all four instruments of Swiss assistance co-located, and it is connected with other aspects of global cooperation such as the Executive Director position at the World Bank. In the Great Lakes there is a joint strategy between all of the major Swiss actors, and the head of regional cooperation controls some humanitarian funding. In Nepal the Ambassador is also the head of cooperation leading to a genuine blend of political and development action. In Haiti, the cooperation office has also been established in this way (with humanitarian and development aid equally balanced), although it is still early days. In the case of the OPT, there is a joint desk at HQ for regional cooperation and humanitarian aid, the first of its kind. In addition, the cooperation strategy builds on the principles of comprehensive aid, with different instruments contributing in a complementary way to common objectives.

All of these examples demonstrate a genuine willingness of the various Swiss agencies and instruments at some level to cooperate, driven by an acknowledgement that this is necessary. This evaluation has already made the point in several places that it is difficult to achieve structural development without political dialogue, especially in fragile contexts. Respondents routinely concluded that the “niche” for Switzerland in fragile states was as Switzerland, not as SDC, or SECO, or humanitarian aid. Myriad examples exist of where Swiss action is more effective in combination – from negotiating humanitarian access in Gaza, to facilitating peace negotiations in Nepal – than single instruments acting alone. Switzerland the nation had more

36http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,3343,en_2649_34603_44020118_1_1_1_1,00.html.
to offer partner national governments, and as a result the political representation of Switzerland was always present at the highest level of political dialogue, even when development cooperation was the major Swiss presence in the country.

This combination of political and technical action is key to effective work in fragile states. Countries are fragile precisely because they do not have the political consensus nor the technical capabilities to implement a coherent development agenda. In moments of opportunity – Liberia emerging from civil war for instance – this political consensus can be forged and simultaneously the technical capacity can be put in place to build on political gains and translate these into tangible improvements in living standards for the population. This requires luck, consensus on the part of those nations supporting financially, and it requires the skills and resources to make it happen.

In a context like the Democratic Republic of Congo (a case study for the evaluation), there is a need for all types of assistance simultaneously. There continues to be a grave humanitarian situation, with over 2 million people still displaced by war. There is a need to stabilise the country, especially in the east that has many small armed groups preying on the population. And there is an urgent need for structural development – to rebuild everything from the roads to the state itself. Without progress on stability and state-building the humanitarian situation cannot improve. Without humanitarian assistance whilst the state is being stabilised and rebuilt, many millions will suffer unacceptable deprivation.

Switzerland has many of the skills needed for this type of work. It has good technical cooperation skills, good political and diplomatic skills and good macro-economic and private sector development skills.

The example of DR Congo also calls for a coherent vision by the international community, neighbours, the government and by individual donors. This is of course, far from easy in practice. Within government in fragile states there are often competing factions, and the civil service is often weak or broken. Neighbours are often part of the problem rather than the solution. This is where international donors can make a huge difference. With concerted effort – a unity of purpose and will, issues such as regional peace negotiations, internal peace negotiations, stabilisation missions, and the promotion of clear national development strategies can be achieved.

For a small nation like Switzerland it is especially important to understand what its national and international perspectives are in this regard – its stance, if you like, with regard to fragile states. Switzerland is not a permanent member of the UN security council, nor is it a member of the European Union. This necessarily places Switzerland’s international role in a certain context – less shaper of international policy, more contributor (see the next section 4.4 for more on Switzerland’s role in the system). It would seem logical that concentrating on certain “niche” areas is a sensible strategy, as suggested by all respondents to the evaluation.

The evaluation team had difficulty discerning, however, what this “niche” meant in reality. This is one of the most pressing issues for both SDC and Switzerland more widely in its work in fragile contexts. It is clear that across the range of instruments Switzerland can deploy there are many areas of expertise, and modalities of working that are highly relevant to these contexts (see section 4.1 on performance). The combination of skills and approaches produces the most effective outcomes (humanitarian impartiality aside). To combine these instruments effectively however, there is a need for a common strategy – a common vision of the type of role Switzerland can and will play in fragile states.
Clearly, the impartial status of Switzerland is of importance here. While much was made of this in interviews, the evaluation team was not able to find sufficient substantive evidence to make the case either way for how such a position might help in fragile states. What is clear is that the strategic and operational implications of impartiality do not simply transfer over from humanitarian contexts into fragile ones – and that impartiality itself may need to be rethought. At a minimum, the evaluation team concludes that this issue should be part of a continuing cross-agency strategic dialogue on Swiss engagement with fragility.

This common strategy needs to be elaborated at the “global” level – what types of interventions Switzerland can offer, where, and when. It then needs to be articulated in each individual context – as context should always be the starting point.

As already touched on above, there are several examples of where this has been done at a country or a regional level. These examples illustrate both the desire of the various agencies to work together, and the practical difficulties of doing so. In the Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo), the strategy process is led by the FDFA, with SDC regional cooperation and humanitarian aid part of the process, as is the political division responsible for human rights and peace building (PDIV). Every year there is a meeting in the region to review progress and refine approaches. This is seen as both highly effective and considerable progress.

Nevertheless, the strategy itself remains more a combination of organisational mandates than a single expression of Swiss intent. Nominally there are two strategic themes – health and peace & governance. In reality, humanitarian aid mostly concentrates on food aid and the political division IV has four separate strategic aims under the heading ‘peace’ that are different to the SDC strategic aims. The effect is to spread Switzerland thinly, such that individual programmes show good results against their objectives, but do not add up to a whole that is greater than the sum of parts. This is changing, and the current strategy will be more coherent again. But it has taken time to get to this point.

In Nepal the strategy is more coherent. The aim is to consolidate peace in part by providing a tangible ‘peace dividend’ to the population, and in part by working with state actors both to increase their capacity and to hold them to commitments. Given Switzerland cannot achieve this alone, it engages heavily in donor coordination and seeks opportunities to leverage other donor funds.

The lessons from both of these examples are that there is a willingness for common strategic approaches, that there are real challenges to achieving this even when the will is clearly there, and that the more focused the strategy becomes, the more Switzerland achieves influence and arguably impact.

Probably the greatest conceptual challenge to common strategy is the fear of instrumentalisation of the development and humanitarian agencies. There is a healthy literature on this subject37, and it is clear that in contexts like Afghanistan and Iraq aid has been an explicit part of the strategy of war and regime change. Many have argued (including ICRC) the need for a clear ‘humanitarian space’ in such complex and contested

environments. Switzerland has a good reputation in this regard (scoring well for instance on commitment to humanitarian principles in the DARA index).38

The fear of ‘ politicisation’ gets in the way often of using more political approaches to development. In the Swiss context, ‘ politicisation’ means development aid being used to advance Swiss national interests, rather than the interests of the nation in which development cooperation is being targeted. The evaluation did not, however, find egregious examples of this.

Mostly then, the problems to genuinely strategic joint working, are operational and bureaucratic rather than political. As has already been established earlier in this section, at an operational level there are many examples of good collaboration. In nearly all the case studies for this evaluation staff from the various agencies and instruments were co-located, and all had interesting examples of shared resources. In most however, this model prevailed rather than a genuinely integrated model such as the OPT or Nepal.

The example of the Division Europe and Mediterranean Region (EMM) is worth some specific consideration. It is one structure (housed within the humanitarian department) combining development and humanitarian. It manages the humanitarian and regional cooperation budgets for the Middle East and North Africa and has staff with development and humanitarian experience and backgrounds. There is an overarching strategic framework for the Middle East (SDC framework for the Middle East) focusing on peace-building, state-building and economic development. Within this framework, the cooperation strategy for the OPT as well as the regional cooperation strategy for Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria apply a comprehensive aid approach. There is one OPT desk managing both SDC humanitarian and development programmes.

An external review of the EMM Division (which is a pilot)39 found that whilst it was still early in the merging process to make definite judgements, there were already many positive outcomes. External interlocutors within the Swiss system found it much easier to have only “one voice” within SDC. The SDC response to the Gaza “cast lead” operation was made easier by the presence of a cooperation office that could facilitate the entry of humanitarian rapid response staff and the identification of needs and partners (the external evaluation of humanitarian aid conducted more recently40 slightly contradicts this view, finding that there were tensions between the rapid response staff coming from HQ and the cooperation office staff on the ground and that deployed surge did not have the requisite context sensitivity). In addition, local development partners were involved in the design and delivery of the humanitarian response thus ensuring from the onset the longer term perspective.

This highlights one of the major issues to concrete operational (and strategic) collaboration in fragile contexts for SDC. Historically there have been serious divisions between the humanitarian aid and development arms of the organisation. This has somewhat eased with a change of personnel at the top, but the legacy remains with the two instruments acting as effectively different organisations. They are housed in separate buildings, have separate accountability to parliament and separate procedures. More than one respondent in this evaluation postulated that one of the reasons why SDC finds it difficult to coordinate with other Swiss entities is because the process of forming internal consensus is so exhausting.

38 www.daraint.org
This historical situation is slowly changing, with the Europe and Mediterranean Division (EMM Division) as an excellent example of this change. Nevertheless, the same 2010 review found that the process of merging was not without pain: it took more time and resources than people anticipated and continued to throw up challenges. The experience in Haiti suggests that there is a need for conscious and open management practices. Leaders need to work to create a culture of transparent dialogue and mutual information exchange, with the space for different parties to voice concerns and shape strategies. This led the review to conclude that whilst merging in fragile contexts was desirable, SDC should proceed cautiously because of the time and effort involved, and only merge when conditions were right.

Nor is this institutional power struggle restricted to SDC internally. As already noted, SDC and SECO (in Bern) have been locked in a conversation for over a year about whether Tajikistan is ‘fragile’, despite working together on the ground perfectly well. Many Swiss Ambassadors paint a picture of SDC as hopelessly naïve and ineffective (or overly bureaucratic), whilst simultaneously acknowledging that SDC resources buy them the influence to operate politically more effectively. This has also led to a shifting of influence within the FDFA as to who sets the development agenda. This suggests the role of the Ambassador in an ‘integrated embassy’ is critical—needing the experience to merge different agendas, able to navigate the realpolitik of a fragile context, and to put in place flexible yet farsighted development strategies.

Partly, these institutional battles are also cultural—strong organisational cultures in each of the entities means misunderstandings are often amplified. These cultural impediments to collaborate exist in all bureaucracies and are often overlooked. When the US embarked on its fragile states strategy, it sought to create a joint entity between the state department, defence and USAID. The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation (S/CRS) spent its first year simply trying to define common language, as so many terms meant different things in the respective departments. The EMM Division in SDC went through its own version of this.

There are also bureaucratic impediments. Regional cooperation and humanitarian aid have different credit proposals, different ways of budgeting and planning and different terms and conditions for their staff. Between SDC and PDIV the procedures are even more distinctive; in one of the case studies for the evaluation a jointly funded project between the two took over twice as long to achieve than if either agency had tried to do it alone. Whilst the evaluation did not examine the compatibility of systems between SECO and SDC, it is safe to assume that these would also be complicated to harmonise.

Nor is merging necessarily the answer. Much of the ‘back office’ for SDC has been moved into the main FDFA, slimming down duplicative functions. Unfortunately for SDC, this means that staff policy towards fragile states is now dealt with in the same frame as regular postings for diplomats—arguably a retrograde step making it more rather than less difficult to get specialist skills deployed in a timely fashion in difficult places.

But when integration, or genuine complementarity works, it is clear that it offers more than fragmentation. It offers the chance of a single, focused strategy in a context such as Nepal (which has also integrated back office functions), or the OPT—creating far better opportunity for influence and ultimately lasting impact. It offers the combination of political and technical so necessary for transformative change; and potentially the macro and micro-economic too. It offers the flexibility of a humanitarian type instrument, combined with the longevity of a development cooperation type instrument, as set out in the INCAF principles and as is obviously needed from even a cursory analysis.
It is equally clear from the evaluation findings however, that there is no standard model for better joint working. Where the circumstances are favourable, genuine integration is possible. In other situations a looser model of collaboration can be just as appropriate. Above all the key is unity of purpose and vision, and this requires more common working to break down the barriers of mistrust and build up the practice base of common analysis, common systems, shared personnel and ultimately common strategy. This has been tried in other countries and donor agencies. Common funds and common human resource pools are a good practical way in addition to those already in place.

Summary

1. SDC has made considerable progress in collaborative working between its development and humanitarian arms, and with the rest of the foreign ministry and the finance ministry.
2. In fragile contexts, it is difficult to achieve structural development without political dialogue. This means the niche is Switzerland, not SDC or any of the individual aid instruments.
3. There are few examples of a genuinely common vision for the Swiss “offer” in fragile contexts. Joint strategies tend to be a combination of individual mandates rather than genuine joint intent.
4. The barriers to genuine joint working across instruments are considerable, with separate budgets, bureaucracies and supporting political constituencies.
5. The combining of the humanitarian and development desk for the OPT has been a positive experience, although it has required more energy and resource than was anticipated. Once achieved however, joint strategy is easier, as is collaboration with other parts of the Swiss system.
6. The practicalities of joint working across instruments are exacerbated by incompatible systems. Making a ‘one size fits all’ system may not be the answer however, as fragile states work is very different to regular development or diplomacy.
7. Overcoming cultural barriers to joint working can only be achieved by doing more of it, building trust and a body of practice.

4.4 Role in the wider system

No aid agency, however well-resourced, can work as a solo operator in a given context. The literature on fragile states highlights the importance of coordination and harmonisation in such contexts, citing the potential benefits as greater impact and coverage. At a more fundamental level, the complex nature of fragile states means that a more holistic approach is key for dealing with root causes rather than merely addressing the symptoms.

While in some fragile states the international community can be said to work reasonably well, far too often individual agency interests dominate, resulting in competition. Fragmentation at a donor level tends to be reflected throughout the aid system in a given country, running the risk of duplication at an operational level and posing high transaction costs on national government counterparts. In fragile contexts where capacities are already weak, this creates a further burden.

Understanding SDC’s role in this wider system is critical for a rounded assessment of its performance in fragile contexts. The evaluation team found this to be the area of inquiry where there was the greatest variance across the country case studies.
In some countries such as Tajikistan, Burundi and especially Nepal, SDC and the Swiss government is able to play an active role in the international system. This includes:

- In Tajikistan, proactive sponsoring of donor coordination by Switzerland has turned what was a dysfunctional international effort into an increasingly coordinated one, creating potential to target key policy changes.
- Playing an active role in leading and facilitating coordination efforts (for example, advocating for greater donor coordination in variety of contexts)
- Chairing joint donor initiatives (such as the Nepal Peace Trust Fund)
- Using programmes to leverage additional donor support (such as Burundi decentralisation)
- Making the argument for key issues to be addressed that wouldn’t otherwise be on the agenda (for example, humanitarian advocacy, national civil society strengthening, working with local government, engagement with all parties to a conflict – found across the board)

While a wide range of factors and actors play a role in SDC taking on such a position, the evaluation team was able to identify some critical indicators which seem to have an important bearing.

The first of these was about the relative SDC / Swiss presence, in terms of aid volumes. In general, when Switzerland is one of the top ten donors in a country, it is able to leverage its position as an honest broker, and be a facilitator / chair, and have influence. This is consistent across the board. Globally, it is interesting to note that SDC is the 16th largest provider of aid to fragile states (see figure 9).

![Figure 9: Aid to fragile states by donor. Source: OECD Data](image)

However, this hides considerable variability. In some specific countries, it ranks in the top 10, and in others it ranks lower than its global position. In Nepal, Tajikistan and Burundi for example, Switzerland is in to the top ten of all donors when looking at 5 year average ODA flows. In the other case study countries - DRC, Haiti, Rwanda, Hindu Kush - Switzerland ranks lower than tenth. This should not be seen as a rigid formulation, but it is a useful rule of thumb for understanding the limits and possibilities of the SDC contribution to system-wide efforts.
While resources are not the be-all and end-all of in-country presence, it does say something about the visibility of SDC. This may be an internal issue, where SDC staff might feel that where they are low down the donor lists, they have less to say about the state of the country as a whole. However, with relatively small changes to country budgets, one can envisage SDC being able to turn its small donor position to wield more influence than it currently does.

![Diagram of donor positions in Nepal, Tajikistan, and Burundi](0)

**Figure 10: Switzerland in the Top 10 Donors (Bilateral Aid, 5 year Averages)**

The second issue relates to leadership. With an effective individual at the helm of SDC's programming, the system-wide contribution has a much greater chance of working. This individual needs to command a degree of respect within and without the organisation, and understand the importance of the ‘whole of system’ approach. In some countries, there was clear and strong leadership visible. In some others, this desirable level and quality of leadership was noticeable by its absence. This may be one of the reasons SDC is so often compared to an NGO.

Better engagement with national policy dialogue should not be seen as a trade-off with SDC's avowed impartial, neutral, apolitical stance. The evaluation teams findings suggests that in a number of settings, SDC can engage as a powerful and conscientious actor, using its stated position as a way to build policy credibility. Not doing so in all possible contexts suggests that the label of impartiality is being used as an excuse not to engage.

The third point is about credibility of in-country programming. Without a programme that is working effectively and delivering results, the Swiss presence becomes a little more than an empty promise. An effective programme is the foundation of effective SDC leverage and influence. The knowledge on the ground, the in-country staff presence (at a time when most other donors are scaling back their headcount), the partner relations all matter a great deal. Where SDC rhetoric about their niche matches the reality in the field, it makes for an inspiring mix. And other donors also think so – in some cases, SDC can use this to leverage additional funds to invest in and scale up their programmes. There were examples in the Great Lakes and Nepal of this kind of leverage being successfully exerted. In some cases, this can generate up to 4 additional Swiss francs for every 1 invested by SDC.

This is an example of the kinds of virtuous circles that can build up across an SDC country programme. These positive feedback loops between programme effectiveness, donor credibility and national influence are vital for small donor - this is precisely how SDC leverages a small amount of resources so as to ‘punch above its weight’.

As well as this ‘network enabler’ work, SDC also plays an important role in ‘strengthening network nodes’. For example, it provides support to local and national civil society organisations, to key multilateral bodies – whether through grants and assistance (different UN agencies in various contexts), secondments (World Bank in Pakistan) or active
engagement in governance issues (UNRWA in the OPT). It also routinely supports international humanitarian agencies such as the ICRC, MSF and Swiss NGOs such as Helvetas-Intercooperation and Swiss Peace.

Partnership agreements with these actors are built on principles of mutual accountability and in many cases, core support. They tend to be valued highly by the organisations in question. In particular the humility and sense of mutual accountability with which the SDC staff approach these partnerships was particularly well received. So too was the focus on long term relationships. It is also of considerable value for capacity strengthening of national organisations – for example, in OPT, SDC was working with some national organisations for almost a decade continually, and provides not just project finance but also core grants. In an era where fad-driven and erratic donor behaviours leads to considerable institutional uncertainty among partners, this way of working is commendable.

The above illustrates the positive face of SDC’s work in the wider system and indicates clearly the potential for SDC to make a tangible and marked contribution to the workings of the aid system. At their best, SDC presents a picture of Switzerland that is one to be proud of: engaged, active, operational, influential, connected, conscientious facilitators. However, as noted earlier, the picture is very uneven. For every SDC country programme that has a presence and is recognised, there are others that barely register with other donors and national actors. This may be because of the amounts of resources made available – consider SDC spend in DRC compared to UK, for example – but may also be because SDC’s various internal stars are not in alignment.

This can play out in a number of ways. Other donors are not aware of what SDC is doing. Partners do not engage effectively. Multilaterals are not on the scene – and the SDC regional programme can find itself blindsided by work by Global Cooperation. In some cases, where this more limited system role was observed, some made a virtue out of it: ‘we are small, operational and Swiss, we are different, we are appreciated’. But the evaluation team did not find enough evidence to substantiate this position, beyond the organisation itself. In some cases, this attitude might be a defensive mechanism which inhibits system-wide engagement. This may be an issue of confidence for the staff members concerned. In such settings, what is clear is SDC punches below its weight, resulting in considerable missed opportunities.

It was interesting to note that system-wide influencing was less obvious at a global level. That is to say, while the SDC micro-meso presence was found to have a positive bearing on national policy agendas, there was very little sense that national issues were being turned into effective global policy dialogue.

There are some areas where this is happening thanks to the relationships with particular multilateral institutions - for example, SDC helped set up and supports the UN-World Bank Trust Fund to enhance cross organisational learning and collaboration in fragile contexts. In the Middle East, SDC is working with PDIV, the Swedish government and an independent group of Indian experts to strengthen regional dialogue on issues of water and security. These relatively small investments can yield considerable dividends down the road.

Switzerland has also made international commitments to reduce discrimination and inequality. It has started establishing instruments for abolishing discrimination, for example the National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the related reporting system.
These examples suggest there is scope for much more global policy work in the future, especially with the new priorities and new departmental structure for global cooperation. There are ongoing efforts on a number of global issues - water, climate change, migration, food security and health – building on the work being done in country and on Swiss experience in these areas.

Practically, SDC can boost its multilateral effectiveness in three broad areas. The first of these would stem from closer collaboration between global cooperation (covering both the global themes and multilateral) and country level programming. Country office staff were not in some cases aware of what was being done by global cooperation, and in many other cases they were insufficiently engaged. The evaluation team noted the beginning of some tensions between regional and global cooperation, that if not addressed might turn into a more serious issue in the future. Given the scope for multilaterals like UNDP and the World Bank to work with government structures, there are mutual benefits that would accrue from a more strategic position being developed.

The second relates to SDC taking a more strategic position in relation to multilaterals in fragile states (as with the trust fund work). For some multilaterals, while SDC support in fragile states was appreciated, it was not seen as catalytic in terms of changing the way things were done. There is acknowledged space in the multilateral sphere for donors like SDC, who are supportive of innovative work and not tied to particular political agendas. Switzerland needs to capitalise on this space, and ensure that its niche in fragile states includes consideration of its contribution to the multilateral system in country and globally. SDC can (and often does) use its existing positions in intelligent and creative ways – for example, the Executive Director role at the World Bank, which currently represents a number of countries. Again, this requires close engagement between global cooperation and regional, humanitarian and other elements of the Swiss government. A good starting point would be to develop strategies which are more integrated with the ambitions of external actors, with the World Bank and UNDP being obvious candidates.

The third area relates to SDC’s policy capabilities. The evaluation has found that in some areas SDC is ‘policy light’ with a preference for on the ground programming, and a view that policy is ‘abstract and theoretical’. While this may be reasonable given institutional history, this becomes a gap when considering SDC’s work in fragile states. Effective policy capability brings together ideas and practice, it ensures learning takes place, and it strengthens the local-national-global dialogue.

One obvious entry point for such an enhanced engagement is the post-Busan New Deal on fragile states. While it has signed up to the G7+, SDC presence in a number of the core countries could be leveraged, and it might also consider providing support to the group in the future. SDC should consider positioning itself as being in the vanguard of this important new agenda, both at a global level and in terms of how it is implemented in specific countries. This provides specific opportunities that SDC is well positioned to capitalise upon. For example, the G7+ statement calls for common assessments of fragility, and more harmonised approaches to policy and programme delivery. In a number of areas, SDC is working towards this kind of model, and in others, such a model would greatly benefit its ambition to ‘punch above its weight’. It should actively seek out opportunities to take this agenda and process forward in country. This may provide the window of opportunity for a strategic shift toward better engagement with the state in fragile contexts.
Summary

1. There is a wide degree of variance across SDC programmes in fragile states in its engagement and role in the wider system.
2. There are several examples where SDC and Switzerland play an excellent and constructive role in the international system, convening other donors and promoting neglected issues.
3. There are several factors that determine whether Switzerland occupies this type of meaningful role in the system. Being one of the top ten donors is a major factor, as is good in-country leadership. Credible programming is another factor.
4. Switzerland can also play a positive role as a ‘network enabler’, strengthening essential parts of the system such as civil society and the multi-lateral system.
5. The links between bilateral and multilateral programming are weaker than they should, or could be. More than half of SDC assistance is spent multilaterally, both in development and humanitarian aid, and yet this aspect of work is not always visible in cooperation offices.
6. SDC is perceived positively by its multilateral and NGO partners. The trust fund to improve collaboration between the UN and World Bank in fragile states is an excellent example of the potential Swiss role globally.
5. Priorities for change

The evidence regarding poverty and vulnerability in fragile states is unequivocal. The majority of the very worst off in the world live in such places, and currently no fragile state is likely to achieve a single MDG. Switzerland has a commendable ambition to work more in fragile states, and has been making the necessary adjustments to its aid programme for some time. This evaluation has found that there is much to commend about Switzerland’s, and SDC’s approach to working in fragile contexts. There is a clear policy directive to increase and enhance this work, and a clear set of international commitments such as the early adoption of the G7+ “new agenda” at the Busan conference on aid effectiveness. There is a good mixture of expertise that is highly relevant to fragile contexts across the four instruments most regularly deployed. There are some good approaches too – aid modalities that are well adapted to difficult contexts.

Nevertheless, this evaluation has also found some systemic weaknesses and a culture of working that is neither flexible nor agile enough to achieve transformative change in fragile states.

As a result of changes already made and numerous efforts to work differently, there is an emerging body of practice within SDC that helps the organisation identify how to become better adapted to this type of work. There is a need to be clearer about the over-arching strategy and the general theory for change that SDC subscribes to in its fragile states work. There is a need to adapt existing instruments to make them more flexible and adaptive and to create common ways of working – or common work – across instruments. There is a need to rethink what and where Switzerland can contribute, and there is a need to be both bolder and more realistic in ambition.

The evaluation highlights five priority areas for change, emerging from the analysis in the findings section of the report.

5.1 Achieving transformational change

Whilst the SDC commitment to work in fragile states is clear, how to work in fragile states and what to do is less so. This needs to be addressed before the organisation can scale up its activity.

There are several elements to this observation, but the first and most compelling issue is the degree of SDC ambition in this area. This evaluation has concluded that SDC needs a step change in its level of ambition if it is to achieve lasting impact in any of the fragile contexts where it is working. Implementing a series of projects and programmes in areas of concern to the Swiss public will not achieve transformative change, and without transformation fragile states will remain trapped in their cycle of poverty, conflict and stagnation.

However, a step change in ambition – aiming for transformation rather than transient assistance – will also require significant changes to the way SDC works. First amongst these changes will be making some hard choices. The 2010 annual report of SDC and SECO lists 53 countries receiving some form of bilateral assistance. This is twice as many as the UK with a budget ten times higher, and four times as many as the Dutch with a budget four times higher. When SDC is one of the top contributors in a country it changes the way it works – it becomes more active in donor coordination, the different parts of Swiss assistance are more
coherent, it is innovative, political and ambitious. Where it is not in the top league of donors SDC behaves more like a Swiss NGO, implementing projects with little reference to the national or global policy dialogue.

SDC cannot hope to achieve transformative change in a single fragile state alone. There is fine line between hubris and legitimate ambition. But as a part of a coordinated aid system, aligned with national and multilateral priorities, burden sharing and using all of the diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal, Switzerland can contribute significantly to transformative change. This is most likely to happen where Switzerland has a genuine added advantage, through trade, or political ties or its impartial status.

Secondly, achieving transformative change will also require SDC to be clearer about the what and the how. The default instinct of SDC has been to do in fragile states what it does in regular development and humanitarian contexts. Emergencies are responded to with food aid in protracted crises, and teams of Swiss experts in rapid onsets; development means devolution of services, health care and rural income generation. But this doesn’t work in fragile states where there is a need for long term ‘humanitarian’ type work and development work focused on building the capacity of the state, resolving conflicts and keeping the peace.

Generally however (with a few notable exceptions), SDC has not been able to achieve the required mix of approaches. It is overly technocratic, neglecting or ignoring the political aspects of fragile contexts, and tends to shy away from working directly with the state as it is seen as too risky. Although SDC staff recognise that there can be no structural development without political (policy) dialogue, at an institutional level there is too much focus on being ‘pragmatic’ to the detriment of policy (and politics).

SDC also seems to be unclear about whether it is a ‘wholesaler’ or a ‘retailer’ of aid. Whether it is a provider of funding or whether it is an agency that implements and manages projects directly. Partly this may explain the behaviour noted in the previous section of this report, with SDC moving into the role of ‘wholesaler’, or classic donor behaviour, when it has larger volumes of aid. This may also explain its ambivalence about engagement with the multilateral system (although history is also important in this regard). When SDC does engage thoughtfully with the multilateral system, it is an excellent partner. However, in many cooperation offices there is a lack of engagement with multilaterals and with the global cooperation division.

The G7+ group of fragile states set out five peace-building and state-building goals in their new agenda. For fragile states themselves building the peace, and building the state are their top objectives. Within Switzerland’s aid portfolio, the political division IV of the FDFA has the most experience of peace-building, although with a much smaller volume of aid than SDC it is a junior partner.

However, when it comes to state-building, this does not fall to any one particular instrument or agency. SDC does some of this, mostly by default, recognising that it needs a functioning health ministry to make health care sustainable, or a functioning local government to deliver local services. But their engagement is tentative and peripheral most often. SECO also does work that is core to building an effective state — introducing transparent public finance management, or robust taxation policies for example.

\[41 \text{http://www.g7plus.org/}\]
Perhaps the over-riding issue in all of this is the conclusion of the WDR that "institutional legitimacy is the key to stability". SDC has a good track record in one important element of building institutional legitimacy: the connection between civil society and the state, and strengthening this interface for democratic accountability.

Viewed in the wider sense, SDC and SECO make vital contributions to building civil society and private enterprise. Table 7 shows the competencies that Switzerland has in these areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G7+ Peace-building and State-building goals.</th>
<th>Swiss competencies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimate Politics</strong> - Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution</td>
<td>SDC – civil society. Decentralisation. PD4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong> - Establish and strengthen people’s security</td>
<td>Small defence contributions to UN missions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice</strong> - Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice</td>
<td>PD4 – transitional justice SDC – rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues &amp; Services</strong> - Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery</td>
<td>SECO – public finance. SDC – health, education, water. HH – basic service provision.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 7: G7+ priorities and Swiss competencies*

What table 7 illustrates is that SDC already has some of the competencies that fragile states themselves identify as needed, although it has not necessarily framed them in this way. What table 7 also illustrates is that across the four instruments Switzerland is well placed to work in fragile contexts.

In many of these programme areas the question is as much about the how as the what. The OECD states that, “strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty”.

Doing this requires, first and foremost, investing in those structures and institutions of government, civil society and private enterprise that enable these key elements. Only when the states and the societies of these countries become less fragile – more resilient – will living conditions for the poorest improve (and security for the nations and their neighbours). SDC and Switzerland have to work towards strengthening states, and civil institutions in those states if they are to achieve transformative change.

Given Swiss impartiality, there also seems scope for SDC to build on the G7+ agenda to ensure the promotion of non-discrimination (including on the basis of gender) in fragile
contexts, something not strongly reflected in the New Deal. In order for SDC to do this effectively, the issue needs to be reflected more actively across the SDC fragile states portfolio.

SDC has aid modalities that are well adapted to working in fragile contexts. Technical assistance and various types of direct implementation are highly effective when properly aligned and rooted in genuine partnership. Working with civil society at the interface of governance is another genuine need and SDC specialism. This means combining traditional forms of assistance with new ways of working. Above all, it requires that SDC has a coherent vision of what it is trying to achieve, beyond simple transitory results.

The G7+ new deal also sets out core principles around which it believes aid to fragile states should be organised. These include a common assessment, a common vision and plan and the use of compacts between donors and recipients to clarify commitments. Modalities need to strengthen country systems and capacities, whilst at the same time supporting political dialogue and leadership. These principles can also provide a good basis for future SDC fragile states programming.

5.2 Risk

One of the main factors limiting donor activity in fragile states historically has been risk. There are a series of well understood risks to working in some of the most chaotic places on earth – there are fiduciary risks, reputational risks and risks to personnel. Almost the greatest risk for donor agencies is the risk that they will not have anything to show for their money – the risk that aid is “wasted”, against the backdrop of a well establish lobby of aid sceptics in most western nations.

SDC is also constrained by the risks of working in fragile contexts. Over the last decade the work of SDC has been subject to a high degree of scrutiny by parliament, and by a demand for demonstrating results. This too is part of the new aid orthodoxy, that donor agencies should be able to demonstrate to taxpayers what has happened with their money.

Unfortunately the results agenda can be at odds with the way donor agencies need to behave in fragile contexts. It is inherently risky working in such places, but as a new OECD report sets out\textsuperscript{42}, the risks of doing nothing are actually worse. Switzerland has seen this first hand in recent years with much increased migration flows, predominantly from countries in crisis.

What is needed then, is a balance between the various demands. Taxpayers should know what their donor agency is trying to achieve, and how well it is doing. Donor agencies need the flexibility to invest in areas that might not show immediate results, and where even in the long term it will be difficult to show how their precise contribution made a difference.

This will require political backing within Switzerland for SDC’s new agenda in fragile contexts. In return for political backing to take risks, to engage more concretely with the state, to spend money in areas where results will be tenuous at best, SDC will also have to get smarter at how it approaches risk, and results.

The clearest change that is required is to talk about results in the longer term as well as the short term. Having a mixture of results is almost certainly the compromise that will work for both needs. Some results can be very obvious and immediate – ambulances in Burundi that reduce maternal deaths. But other results will have to be much longer term, and progress

\textsuperscript{42} OECD INCAF (2011). Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: The Price of Success?
towards them assessed more qualitatively. Increasing the percentage of government expenditure financed from revenue over a ten year period; increasing the equity of public resource use, or perhaps even more simply an increase in a countries World Bank CPIA or UNDP HDI ranking.

In terms of risk a portfolio approach is also the most logical. Just as having a few projects that can show results can counter-balance the longer term less quantifiable work, having a basket of high, medium and low risk projects will create space for innovative working without being too exposed. This will require a much more systematic approach to risk. High risk projects and programmes will be expected to yield higher results, and be expected to have a much higher failure rate. Low risk projects will yield modest results but be much less likely to fail. Cooperation offices should be expected to have both, clearly identified.

Sharing risk is another way to mitigate the potential downside, by pooling funds with other donors or outsourcing management. Ultimately however, a new approach to risk – especially embracing some of the riskier, less immediately rewarding areas of work like institution building – will inevitably involve failure as well as success.

Programmes failure needs to be better tolerated – with the individuals who commissioned and managed them not stigmatised – or people will not be willing to take risks.

5.3 Innovation
Achieving transformative change in fragile states is not simply a question of spending more money. Pakistan is one of the most heavily aid-supported countries globally and yet still remains close to the top of most fragile states indexes. Increasingly aid commentators are finding that aid dependency can be harmful.

Switzerland should be ideally placed to play the role of the smart donor. Switzerland’s economy depends on its science and innovation, and as a donor SDC sees itself as primarily technocratic – small, but expert. SDC will never be one of the largest global donors by volume, which means an obvious strategy is to specialise, to develop several “niches”. Being an innovator has several advantages – it allows an agency or company to be an intellectual leader rather than a financial one, and there is evidence from this evaluation that it can also leverage other donors funds. There is a particular need in fragile states to try new ways of working and experiment with new methods. SDC has the right profile, and some good experience as an innovator.

To be a consistent innovator however, SDC will have to become more flexible in its approach, and be better configured to take risks.

At a minimum, this calls for the menu of programmatic options to be broadened. There was some evidence of a narrow institutional repertoire and a suggestion of a lack of imagination in SDC’s programming strategies. This is evidenced by how the same types of interventions (for example, support to brick kilns) are positioned in different ways in different contexts (climate change mitigation, job creation, etc) with little difference in what is actually done or how it is done.

In order to get a better menu of options, SDC will have to invest more in applied research and develop its internal and external policy capabilities.

Applied research matters because it is at the heart of how new approaches get tested, improved, scaled up. SDC has a track record in supporting new innovations through R&D –
for example, cash interventions in humanitarian aid would not be where they are today without sustained SDC support over many years. More recently SDC has announced a partnership with Swiss universities investing millions of Swiss francs in development research. And of course, evaluations are a mainstay of SDC’s performance system. However, these examples are lacking in strategic direction and are not sufficiently oriented to what the organisation itself could do differently and better in operational contexts.

For a donor agency innovation means not only testing approaches in a particular context (as described earlier) but also using the evidence generated to influence internal and external policy.

Currently SDC is a very practice based, pragmatic donor agency. This is not bad, but it does seem to make it suspicious of centralised policy work. This may stem from a history of hundreds of policy papers but no policy direction or priorities. There is a risk however that the organisation has swung too far in the opposite direction.

In the restructuring of SDC the division that was nominally supposed to play this function was disbanded and the functions placed in geographical teams, as it was felt they were too separate from the ‘real work’ of the organisation. Thematic policy specialists would engage in policy discussions distant from the realities of the country offices, and the country offices would do their work without reference to international debates. Networks were to replace the former thematic department (F department), led by experts based in the geographic departments and including a wide range of practitioners.

These are still very new, but it is clear that they too are facing challenges. The first challenge is that the model on which the networks will work is not yet settled. This has implications for resources. In the current model the experts leading the networks act as a de facto secretariat, but have too little time dedicated to this function and arguably not enough budget. There is still no shared strategic framework for these networks to use to develop their priorities, and not enough appreciation of the lessons of running such networks from elsewhere in the aid system. As a result, SDC still seems unclear as an organisation whether it wants these networks to be practice based knowledge networks (“has anyone encountered problem X?”), or a substitute policy department (“we need a position paper on Y”) or both.

The reorganisation of the former technical advice into networks is a work in progress, but what does seem apparent is that it has left a policy gap at the heart of the organisation. Policy work is now located in ‘pockets’, and despite the relatively small size of the organisation it is difficult to join these up coherently.

This makes it much harder to have an external policy stance on longstanding or emerging issues, at whatever level of engagement.

Where such positions are taken by SDC, most often this was in relation to specific national – or more commonly, sub-national policies in the countries where the agency is working. In some instances, SDC also engages in global policy dialogue. In agencies that are more firmly policy oriented, there are clear pathways through the organisation to achieve these local – national – regional - global linkages. They are also feeding debates at an international, or regional level, to their country offices for their input. SDC does this too, but it lacks a ‘central nervous system’ to coordinate and process the thinking and to ensure it is taken up in policy and practice.
5.4 Working together

There are a number of fault lines in the international peace, security and aid architecture that are most cruelly exposed in fragile states. International politics, both intentional and unintentional are mostly to blame, with donor agencies (as the financiers of this system) both sustaining the fault lines and being defined by them.

Broadly these fault lines are twofold. There is a well documented schism between the peace and security architecture on the one hand, and aid on the other. Attempts to unify these various aspects of international action have included integrated UN missions and the ‘3Ds’ (defence, diplomacy, development) approaches of NATO.

The second of these fault lines lies within SDC itself and is between humanitarian and development work. Humanitarian and development work have become separate areas of work with little or no connection internationally. Partly this is due to the suspicion with which humanitarian work is viewed by some states, and partly because over the years separate funding streams and legal frameworks have led to separate bureaucracies with their own institutional momentum.

In fragile states these splits are most obvious and acute, as there is a need for all types of assistance simultaneously. The overlap and confusion caused by three separate systems working simultaneously exacerbates the fragmentation of aid, and adds to dysfunctional governance.

SDC is split in the same way. For many years its humanitarian and development arms have worked as effectively separate agencies. International diplomacy and peace enforcement were so separate they simply did not exist in the same sphere, and even conventional macro-economic development of the type that predominates in many development agencies was split out into the economic affairs ministry (SECO).

With the increasing realisation by governments that the security, conflict, economic and social problems in fragile states are inter-connected, the need for a joined up approach has become ever more obvious. But the challenge of unifying ‘instruments’ that have spent years defining themselves in opposition to each other remains enormous.

This evaluation has found many positive examples within the Swiss system of cooperation between these various entities. There are joint offices, joint strategic plans and in one case a merged humanitarian and development team. Not surprisingly however, the institutional divides largely persist – the examples cited in this evaluation are the exception rather than the rule and collaboration is still an enormously time consuming and imperfect endeavour.

SDC humanitarian and development, and counterparts in PDIV and SECO need to move beyond these old divisions. There are key skills across these organisations that are needed for fragile states working, and as this evaluation has tried to demonstrate, the sum of the parts will not make a coherent whole without all of them deployed.

There is a great deal of good will and momentum behind the notion that there are different, more joined up ways of doing things. And there is an emerging practice base to exploit in creating the new structures and ways of working needed. Some of this is obvious and easier to fix – harmonised project approval systems across the instruments, routine knowledge and information sharing. Some is harder to fix but not impossible – joint strategy that is more than an articulation of the separate things each instrument will do, joint and common analysis of
the issue, routine secondments of staff between instruments to build a new cadre of fragile states expertise. Hardest of all will be addressing the cultural and institutional mistrust and difference, resolving turf battles in a way that also includes legal and financial issues.

Finally there is a need for other aspects of Swiss cooperation and international relations to be brought into its fragile states work. This evaluation has concluded that Switzerland as a nation is the niche, rather than any one agency. The entry point to policy dialogue, the opportunity to influence and shape is a Swiss opportunity rather than an SDC one. This means that other parts of the Swiss system are also relevant. Most obviously the other political sections within the FDFA, who are of course already heavily involved in places like the Great Lakes. The defence ministry is another obvious candidate, however culturally challenging this may be. Switzerland routinely has defence advisors in UN missions who do not have an institutional link to SDC or FDFA offices.

Less obviously however, there are often powerful Swiss business interests at play in fragile states. Switzerland is one of the countries least likely to pay bribes in such places\(^3\), making Swiss business a good partner for fragile states trying to improve their governance. In Switzerland itself, initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have a significant effect when adopted. Switzerland is one of the world’s preeminent gold processing centres, making the ramifications for major gold exporters such as DR Congo significant. Joining up these dots – including also the negotiation of international agreements on trade, finance, law – could have significant impact.

### 5.5 Delivery

With the right focused strategy, the right combination of skills from across the Swiss aid instruments and with the right mixture of risk and innovation SDC will still need to address some of the practical obstacles to working optimally in fragile states. Chief amongst these is the need for flexibility while maintaining a long term view. As the WDR 2011 emphasises, institutional transformation is a long-term non-linear process which takes 20-30 years. Few international agencies are set up to take this kind of perspective.

Related issues include staffing, measuring results, decentralising authority, harmonising systems and creating a structure that brings together all of the elements of work currently underway.

The need for greater flexibility is driven by the unpredictable nature of events in fragile contexts. This means that donors, in the words of the OECD fragile states principles need to, “act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance”. The findings section of this evaluation has analysed this issue in some detail, concluding that SDC scores well on long term engagement but takes too long to initiate programmes, too long to change course and has a tendency to be more supply than demand driven.

Typically SDC development programmes are three years in duration, usually with a vision that they will in fact run for nine years in three stages. This long term vision is a particular strength that should be capitalised upon to strengthen SDC’s engagement with fragility. Partners feel they have the security to really try and address issues rather than having to worry about funding every year. But this long term approach can also lead to rigidity – a tendency to stick with it when circumstances have changed, simply because that was the plan. Heads of cooperation offices have delegated authority for up to 200,000 CHF, but even

\(^3\) Transparency international.
this relatively low amount appears not to be used to full advantage. Humanitarian aid is seen as a more flexible instrument, in that it can mobilise fast, but it cannot think long term in the way that regional cooperation does, and once in an annual budget cycle also tends to become inflexible.

The solution appears to be to try and combine the best elements of the current system. Retaining the long term timeframe but creating much greater space within that for changing course, seizing opportunities and slowing down when needed. A potential way of doing this would be higher delegated authority within a long term strategy, and a more flexible way of looking at expenditure over the entire period. It also means developing a structured process for learning and adaptation, and how this feeds back into project and programme planning and budgeting cycles.

This of course has implications for delivery mechanisms, chiefly the system for project and programme cycle management. Like other donor agencies, SDC uses a bureaucratic, engineering mindset when it comes to the design and delivery of programmes. This approach, though useful in many settings, is not necessarily the most useful one in fragile states where even the simplest of interventions is made more complex by the prevailing political contexts. Existing approaches to project cycle management serve to insulate SDC from their context and environment, rather than orienting the organisation better towards it.

New approaches to project cycle management are being explored in a number of other donor agencies, at the crux of which is the attempt to square the circle of accountability and uncertainty. Put simply, how can aid agencies working in highly turbulent settings retain levels of control and accountability which are increasingly being demanded of them? There is a growing literature on ‘wicked problems’ which will be useful here. Indeed, the leading scholars have described fragile states as ‘wicked problems’ and have called for more flexible, adaptive approaches to be used. These arguments are compelling and relevant to SDC’s work. A philosophy of ‘adaptive management’ should be brought firmly into the heart of what SDC and Switzerland does in fragile contexts.

Such a philosophy is to be found in the conflict sensitive programme management approach developed and rolled out across SDC. Swiss Peace, a major SDC partner, is also working on approaches to project cycle management in fragile states. PDIV is seen to engage well with changing, dynamic circumstances, and there may be lessons to be learned from better cross-Swiss dialogue and exchanges. A clearer commitment to using such mindsets and approaches, along with a streamlining of existing project management frameworks to enable their use in turbulent and fast moving settings, is urgently needed.

With a more flexible system of project cycle management in place, SDC will also have to design a more sophisticated way of measuring its results. Currently the annual reports allow a high degree of leeway on this count for cooperation office staff, and it may in fact be practice rather than the system itself that needs to evolve. Explicit theories of change will help tremendously with this measurement – and there should be more focus on these being elaborated at the strategy phase. There is also a need to engage with staff about what results

are required for what purpose, and how to go about investing in the research and evidence that will provide these.

In fact, the more that SDC moves away from trusted old routines of programming, the more important evidence and good data will become. Currently the reporting of results is viewed largely as a chore, rather than providing the basis on which decisions are made. This will have to change, with evidence and data being used to inform key parts of the programme cycle. Qualitative and quantitative data from routine monitoring, built into programme frameworks will allow for more systematic and objective judgements of programme performance and may yield surprising and exciting insights into what works and what doesn’t.

The evaluation found that work on fragile states is currently scattered across SDC. This partly reflects the cross-disciplinary nature of the work; the reality that traditional aid instruments and architecture are increasingly irrelevant to the needs of fragile states. Partly it reflects the organic nature so far of efforts to tackle these problems. Whatever the causes, there is now an urgent need to pull together these disparate elements of expertise and experience, to help put in place new ways of working. This is the case from a policy and an operational perspective.

Within SDC the challenge is how to coherently join up work that is ongoing in regional cooperation (south and east), humanitarian aid, global cooperation and in the networks that are part of, but cut across these divisions. The networks are one way of potentially sharing knowledge in this way, but currently even the network most relevant to fragility (conflict and human rights) is not specifically concerned with this issue. Arguably, many of the other networks also contain useful practice-based knowledge relevant to fragility – for instance on employment generation.

There are several possibilities SDC might consider for better joining up this work. One is a senior champion within the organisation, reaching out to equivalents in other organisations, supported by a dedicated policy unit in SDC perhaps also linked to the networks. Given the success of the merged Europe and Mediterranean Division (EMM Division), there a number of other similar mergers that might be considered, which would increasingly ask the question of where such units might report, and whether eventually this might need readjustments in the directorate.

Staffing has been highlighted several times in the evaluation as a critical issue. The need for a fragile states staffing strategy is clear, as is the need for an urgent and critical overhaul of security arrangements. SDC must think about the mixture of skills it needs for fragile contexts, and where to find such people. Having humanitarian and development experience helps equip staff well for such work, and this may involve rotating staff through departments more systematically. SDC is going to have make the choice as to whether it will increase incentives to the point where they are genuinely motivating for people, or whether it will increasingly go outside the organisation for its fragile states staff. If necessity chooses the latter path for the organisation, it will have to think more systematically about how it manages its new staff, and what expectations it can realistically have of them.

Coupled to the issue of incentives is the issue of terms and conditions (not just financial, but also duration of assignment, rest and relaxation, family duty stations and more). It does not help that the different agencies, and within SDC the different instruments, do this differently. National staff too are widely seen as an asset, but often have salaries that do not compare well to other donors nor are they given high levels of responsibility. Sharing personnel with
PDIV and SECO seems an obvious way of increasing collaboration, although will in reality require careful thought about how this can be practically achieved. Whatever path it chooses, SDC must also think about the short, medium and long term. Finding workable solutions now and simultaneously building its new cadre.

SDC does not currently have a system for supporting people in fragile states. There is an assumption that such postings are like any other with perhaps a few additions required on an ad hoc basis. In fact they are quantifiably different – insecure, stressful, much more labour intensive, logistically complicated and often in short supply of many essentials. This means that supporting people in fragile contexts is costlier, managerially more demanding and much riskier. As with aid modalities, the ideal mix is somewhere between humanitarian and development; people cannot – normally – work in high stress contexts for four years, or even two. Neither is there any practical point in rotating people every three months. The ability to set up functioning offices from scratch is a humanitarian specialism; the ability to patiently build networks of local organisations and linkages to government more a development skill.

Most importantly there is a need for clear, rigorous, security management. It must be clear in the most dangerous environments who is responsible for security at every level without any ambiguity. There must be an effective crisis management system in place for kidnap, injury and death so that within hours of an incident (at 4am on a Sunday), there are plans in place for negotiation, accompanying relatives, media handling and so on. There must be professional assessment of risks in the most dangerous places, and a clear managerial decision about the trade off between potential impact and potential danger to staff.

One of the practical barriers to collaboration within SDC and between SDC and its partners in the Swiss government is that there are different budgeting, planning, reporting and decision-making systems in place. This makes practical – financial collaboration challenging. There is a need to both harmonise the systems to make collaboration more straightforward, and there is a need to create common mechanisms that can underpin the vision of common working. A good model is common funds, jointly managed by several departments, specifically aimed at financing collaborative projects. Common staffing pools are another area to explore.

**Summary**

1. SDC needs to **concentrate and focus** its aid in fragile states. In contexts where Switzerland can establish a meaningful niche, based on its comparative advantage, credible resource levels and innovative approaches, it can aim to achieve transformative change, rather than transient results.

2. SDC and Switzerland needs a **coherent strategy** of how to achieve transformative change in fragile states. Theories of change must underpin long term strategies, with flexible approaches and sophisticated methods of measurement.

3. SDC must be **more aware and proactive about being part of the larger system**. Where Switzerland is well regarded it can play an important role in bringing donors together. SDC must also get better at creating coherence between actions in the global arena and bilateral cooperation work. This will demand new ways of working together (within SDC, inter-agency, and whole-of-government).
4. SDC must **strike a balance between being pragmatic and policy-oriented**; and between having a long-term strategy and facilitating innovation. There is a need for better tools for managing risk, and for more innovative programme work, based increasingly on evidence. SDC and Switzerland must develop a better **mixture of modalities and instruments** in more seamless ways.

5. SDC must **adapt its delivery and support mechanisms** for work in fragile contexts. This encompasses areas from project cycle management to staff support.
Annex 2

Evaluation of the Performance of SDC’s Instruments in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts

Approach Paper

September 22, 2011

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Annex 2 – Approach Paper - Evaluation of the Performance of SDC’s Instruments in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Contexts

**Background**

SDC's Directorate has mandated SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section\(^46\) to commission an Evaluation of the Complementarity of SDC’s Instruments in Fragile and Conflict Affected Contexts\(^47\).

Fragile contexts refer to countries affected by weak capacity, problematic state-society relations, deep social divides and/or the legacy of violent conflict. Over one sixth of the world’s population – or approximately 1.2 billion people – live in countries designated by the international community as Fragile States\(^48\). SDC invests 28% of its budget of CHF 1’453 million in 33 of 43 such countries. In over half of these countries, SDC is engaged simultaneously in Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation or Transition Cooperation. Of SDC’s 19 countries of concentration, 4 (or 21%) are Fragile States: Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan and Chad. Of SDC’s 8 Special Programs, 3 (or 38%) are in fragile contexts: Afghanistan, Great Lakes /Burundi/Ruanda and Palestine. In many of these countries, SDC’s engagement is relatively modest: in 13 of the 33 countries (or 40%) it is under CHF 3 million and in 8 of the countries (25%) even less than CHF 1 million.

Engagement in fragile contexts is a non-linear process with tensions and trade-offs between the need to provide rapid support and life-saving activities while at the same time supporting development of sustainable state structures. This requires a shared space between humanitarian and development (and often security) actors as countries experience humanitarian emergencies, longer-term development programs and peacekeeping efforts simultaneously. Aid architecture promotes a compartmentalization of humanitarian and development aid which are governed by different principles, rules and regulations. Humanitarian Aid may sometimes bypass government structures whereas development aid strives to work with and through governments. This can create tension between the need to protect humanitarian principles such as impartiality and neutrality while working to build government capacity. Reality on the ground requires coherent integrated strategies, strong partnerships across aid modalities as well as clarity on roles and responsibilities. Over the years, this field of tension in the aid architecture - or aspects of it - have been referred to as the continuum-contiguim dimension, linking relief and rehabilitation, transitional cooperation or comprehensive cooperation. In this paper, we will use the terms comprehensive cooperation and "whole of SDC approach" to refer to this field of tension. In addition, engagement in such contexts also requires "whole of government" and "whole of systems" approaches with coherence, coordination and complementarities (i.e., division of labor).

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\(^46\) SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section is in the Staff of the Director General and independent of line management. The evaluations it commissions provide an independent perspective and constitute one of SDC’s instruments for rendering accountability and promoting learning.

\(^47\) Although fragile contexts tend to correspond to fragile states, there can be a discrepancy between development of fragility and designation as a Fragile State, sometimes due to political reasons or to inability of the actors involved to acknowledge the reality. Hence the use of the more encompassing term fragile context rather than fragile state throughout this paper.

\(^48\) The OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) defines state fragility “as a lack of capacity to perform basic state functions, where "capacity" encompasses (a) organizational, institutional and financial capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and territory, and (b) the state’s ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society. (…) state capacity is achieved through political processes of constructive state-society bargaining, which in turn require legitimacy; capacity and legitimacy can then become mutually reinforcing, and contribute to state resilience. The dynamic can also be negative if a lack of capacity undermines legitimacy and vice versa, contributing to state fragility.” (OECD 2010: The State’s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity, p. 15). The list of fragile states is a compilation of 3 lists: The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2008, the Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2009, and the Carleton University Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CFIP) 2008 index.
between the different external actors (diplomacy, defense, development) and the partner country.

A recent high level working group on Afghanistan and Pakistan set out a number of principles as a useful starting point for all sets of actors working in fragile states (and indeed in all complex systems) to challenge their way of thinking and acting. These principles are as follows:

- To work to understand the systemic and contextual nature of the problems faced in fragile states, how these problems have evolved and continue to evolve over time.
- To involve those people who matter the most in the decisions that matter the most.
- To avoid ‘silver bullet’ strategies and instead attempt multiple parallel experiments with realistic timeframes and high acceptance / tolerance of failure.
- To establish real-time strategic analysis & learning as a key form of operational feedback.
- To be open to the fundamental adaptation of efforts, along with changes in local contexts and conditions.
- To reframe the overall fragile state engagement as a dynamic network of multiple systems and actors.

This analysis leads to the unambiguous conclusion that working in fragile contexts is as much about the ‘how’ as it is about the ‘what’. Understanding the context, being flexible, adapting to increasing insight and changing circumstances, creatively combining approaches and instruments, are all critical.

The goal of the SDC’s engagement in fragile contexts is to combat and overcome the vulnerability of the poor, the marginalised, those affected by violent conflict, and victims of natural disasters. The poor are in general more likely to be victims of violent conflict (refugees, for example) or of natural disasters. Failure to prevent natural catastrophes and violent conflict, coupled with neglect of their needs in post-crisis situations (peace building etc.) often results in the vulnerable being punished twice over. In the interests of justice, therefore, this group should receive more attention from those global actors that are equipped with the values and the opportunities needed for difficult contexts. The costs, in terms of security and collaboration efforts, and to a certain extent the risks, of such engagement are in general higher if compared to programmes in more stabile situations. And the probability of the results being achieved through our efforts in such difficult environments might tend to be lower. But they are justified if there are opportunities for the SDC to generate a value-added for a vulnerable population and to render visible the SDC’s reputation in this area of fragility.

SDC is challenged to achieve a “whole of SDC approach”. SDC has several mandates and deploys various modalities and instruments in its programs in fragile contexts: humanitarian aid, multilateral aid, development and transition cooperation across a broad spectrum of thematic sectors and instruments including policy dialog, programmatic aid, etc. In all of its programming, SDC pursues two transversal themes: gender and governance. All SDC

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50 See for instance the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations has this as its first principle, the DFID Summary Note on Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations, Menkhaus, K in PRISM.
51 Ben Ramalingam “Foreign Aid and Complex Systems Research: Exploring the Potential” Presentation Given at Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, February 24, 2011.
programs must demonstrate a clear and critical understanding of these transversal themes and address them adequately.

SDC is organised in four Departments with the following mandates: Regional Cooperation (RC) encompassing bilateral cooperation in the South, Global Cooperation (GC) covering multilateral aid and global programs in the areas of migration, water, climate, health and food security, Cooperation with Eastern Europe (OZA) and Humanitarian Aid (H). SDC’s Humanitarian Aid Department engages in (i) emergency relief, (ii) reconstruction and rehabilitation, (iii) prevention and preparedness and (iv) protection and advocacy. SDC Humanitarian Aid is directly operational through its Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA), a reserve unit of 700 specialists. It also works with and through multilateral organisations, state agencies, NGOs and the private sector.

In the context of the 2008 reorganisation, the Europe /Middle Eastern Division in the Regional Cooperation Department was fused with the Europe / Middle Eastern Division in Humanitarian Aid Department into a new overarching E/MM Division crating a joint team with humanitarian and development backgrounds. A review conducted in 2010 found that it was too early to ascertain whether this new organisational form is more effective and many institutional solutions are possible to better integrate humanitarian and bilateral instruments. Many questions about how to best coordinate the RC/OZA/GC and H remain to be addressed.

In addition to striving for a “whole of SDC approach”, SDC has also been strongly engaged in a “whole of Swiss government” approach. SDC, the other Political Directorates in the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other implicated Swiss governmental agencies have jointly elaborated several country strategies in fragile contexts.

Engagement in fragile environments presents SDC with human resource challenges. SDC is finding it difficult to recruit and retain staff willing to work in such environments and having the appropriate experience and skills mix is difficult. In addition, implementation of programs in fragile environments is more human resource intensive and more process oriented than normal development programs. SDC is beginning to address these challenges.

SDC is presently developing its new Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft). This is a comprehensive binding document which lays out and legitimates SDC’s strategic orientation for the coming years. SDC’s management is committed to increasing SDC’s engagement in Fragile States and is deciding during the course of 2011 how it will re-orient SDC in this direction. An ad hoc SDC working group led by the South Asia Division with representatives from the Regional Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, Global Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe tabled a paper at the June 2010 SDC Senior Management Retreat entitled “What Engagement for SDC in Fragile Contexts?”.

The ad hoc Working Group proposed that

- SDC’s commitment in Fragile States be increased from 28% of its budget to 40-50% to be more in line with the international donor “average”,
- The number of countries of concentration and the special programs in fragile contexts be successively increased to 12-15 countries /regions, so that in the medium term, about half of SDC’s areas of concentration would be in such contexts,
- The commitment per country / region be at least CHF 5 million for stronger focus and more visibility,
- SDC’s engagement be flexible over time horizon of 10-15 years,
- SDC’s mode of engagement should optimally and systematically combine all its mandates and instruments (humanitarian, bilateral and multilateral) in a comprehensive approach that takes regional contexts into consideration.

The paper identifies several areas of Swiss competitive advantage: Switzerland is perceived to be a modest, neutral player without a colonial legacy and hidden geopolitical agendas able to develop relationships of trust with a broad range of actors (governmental, nongovernmental and private sector). Its own history of multicultural integration and direct democracy lends credibility to its approaches. It is well-positioned to grasp the “chance for early action” and to engage with the “bad guys.” SDC’s modest size, decentralized organizational structure, policy of long-term engagement and experience in difficult contexts as well as its proximity to the “field” are strong advantages when working in complex and emergent contexts and enable it to react flexibly in volatile situations.

While SDC’s Director General agreed that in comparison to other OECD countries, SDC is under-engaged and would be well positioned to strengthen its profile, SDC’s Directorate has not yet taken decisions regarding the proposals put forward by the working group, which were mentioned above.

SDC is working internally and has contributed actively at the international level to establish principles for engagement in fragile contexts and aims to implement them in its own activities, for example:

- Good Humanitarian Donorship (2003)
- Paris Declaration (2005)
- Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007)
- Accra Agenda for Action (2008)
- 3 D’s (diplomacy, defense, development)
- 3 C’s (coherence, coordination, complementarity)
- Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM)
- “Do no harm” Principles
- DAC INCAF Statebuilding Guidance
- Security Sector Reform (SSR), etc.

In summary, SDC is looking for answers to many challenges it faces in fragile contexts:
- Comprehensive programming: Addressing SDC’s institutional/organisational, political and financial constraints in order to achieve integrated, comprehensive programs (development/transition cooperation and humanitarian aid);
- Setting appropriate geographic and thematic priorities in its engagement in fragile contexts: dealing with the fields of tension between universal engagement / high visibility and priority setting / concentration and between the need for broad based humanitarian engagement versus domestic and peer pressure to concentrate development aid resources in a limited number of countries;
- Achieving the required flexibility for engagement in emergent contexts with regard to human resources, financial resources, geographic engagement and responsible phasing out;
- Programming effectively in fragile complex and emergent contexts;
- Demonstrating and communicating about results in fragile contexts;
- Appropriate partner selection.
Why an Evaluation and Why Now? – Rationale
The evaluation is timely and appropriate for several reasons:

The changing political landscape, the dynamics in partner countries and SDC’s reorganisation are leading to a new paradigm with a focus on fragile contexts. SDC is in the process of redefining its mission and is committed to increasing its engagement in fragile contexts. The shift laid out in the new Dispatch will have strategic, organisational and human resource consequences. Evidence coming out of the evaluation should inform this process and be useful to SDC for implementing the new Dispatch.

SDC recognizes that it must transcend the compartmentalisation between modalities / instruments and move towards a “whole of SDC approach”. SDC’s reorganisation has been a step in this direction but serious challenges remain in ensuring that SDC’s various mandates with their corresponding modalities and instruments complement each other and create synergies to achieve maximum effectiveness.

SDC’s thematic networks are still young and evolving, including the Network for Conflict Prevention and Human Rights. Here too, there are windows of opportunity to better serve all SDC constituencies, including those working in fragile contexts.

The Evaluation Unit in Internal Revision (IR/E) in the General Secretariat of the Swiss Ministry for Foreign Affairs is interested in integrating the results of this evaluation in a synthesis it is compiling of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ engagement in fragile states.

Purpose, Objectives and Focus

Purpose
The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a better understanding of the quality and effectiveness of SDC cooperation in fragile contexts to draw lessons and inform decision-making and strategy development in SDC at various levels for the implementation of SDC’s new Dispatch with increased engagement in fragile contexts:

- Directors of SDC’s Departments for improving the “connectedness” of SDC programming across SDC’s mandates;
- Management for designing new strategies regarding future areas of engagement, staffing requirements, and improving operational processes in fragile contexts;
- SDC operational staff for improving ongoing and designing future programs in fragile contexts.

This evaluation also serves to render accountability to taxpayers in Switzerland, to partners and to the ultimate beneficiaries: SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section, which is commissioning this evaluation, is outside of line management and reports to SDC’s Director General. The evaluation team, which must be independent of SDC, will provide a critical perspective. Through such evaluation processes, SDC demonstrates that it is open to outside scrutiny, reflects on its performance and effectiveness and strives to learn in order to improve its programs.
Objectives
The key objectives of the evaluation are the following:

- Judge SDC’s performance in its present engagement in selected fragile contexts from “comprehensive aid” and “whole of system” perspectives;
- Provide a solid evidence base of where SDC stands and an analysis of where it needs to improve;
- Through a process of reflective inquiry with stakeholders in SDC’s departments and case study cooperation offices during the evaluation, develop a shared understanding among staff of each others mandates and how to engage in fragile contexts so that SDC activities across its departments / mandates become more coordinated, complementary and coherent;
- Develop “priorities for change” for SDC and with the Core Learning Group (CLP) develop clear, targeted and actionable recommendations for SDC’s future engagement in fragile contexts.

Focus and Scope
This is a formative process evaluation which will assess SDC’s performance in developing and implementing its programs in fragile contexts. It will focus on “the whole of SDC”, encompassing the interplay of SDC financed Humanitarian Aid, Regional Cooperation, Global Cooperation and Aid to Eastern Europe and the CIS and the choice of instruments SDC deploys in these modalities. The evaluation will also examine SDC’s performance from a “whole of system” perspective including SDC’s coherence, coordination and complementarity with others in the partner country context. The evaluation will consider overarching organisational, management and human resource issues to the extent that they relate to SDC’s performance in fragile contexts.

In light of the limited resources, this evaluation is not expected to collect primary evidence of the outcomes and impacts of SDC programs. It will, however, render judgement regarding SDC’s result orientation and ability to report on the effectiveness of its activities. It will take available reporting on outcomes / impacts into consideration.

SDC’s understanding of and efforts to contribute to “whole of Swiss government” and “whole of system” approaches are to be covered. The performance of other parts of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of other Swiss government agencies and of the overall Swiss mechanisms for “whole of Swiss government” approaches are not within the scope of this evaluation.

This is not an evaluation of SDC’s partners and their activities. The appropriateness of SDC’s partner selection will, however, be examined to the extent relevant for assessing SDC’s performance.

The evaluation will focus on “what is” and look back only to the extent necessary in the particular case studies to understand and assess the present engagement and to assess SDC’s performance in adapting to changes in context (i.e., looking back at pivotal changes in country context which require adaption of SDC programming.

The scope will encompass a representative sample of SDC country or regional programs in fragile contexts chosen to cover interesting constellations of mandates and different types of fragile circumstances. Chosen programs should encompass both humanitarian aid and development / transition cooperation. The sample should be large enough to draw
conclusions representative of SDC but manageable within the time and resource constraints of the evaluation.

SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section, in collaboration with the operational Departments, has identified the following programs as case studies (see also pg. 15):

- Grands Lacs (Ruanda, Burundi, Congo) with a field mission,
- Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) with a field mission to Tajikistan and telephone interviews with Kyrgyzstan,
- Emerging Hindu Kush Program (Afghanistan, Pakistan)\(^{52}\) as a desk study with electronic communication with stakeholders and
- Haiti as a desk study with electronic communication with stakeholders.

The new organisational structure of the Europe/Middle East Division and its work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) were reviewed in 2010. OPT will not be an in-depth case study, but relevant staff may be interviewed to complement/clarify the 2010 review.

**Key questions**

The question catalogue below is a preliminary "wish list" compiled by the SDC evaluation officer reflecting preliminary discussions with the evaluation stakeholders in SDC. The evaluation team will refine and prioritize the questions in consultation with SDC’s evaluation officer and the Core Learning Group during the inception phase.

Note: In the questions below, “mandate” refers to the humanitarian aid mandate, development cooperation mandate, transition cooperation mandate and the overarching global programs mandate.

**A. Context Awareness, Flexibility and Adaptability:**

1. **How well does SDC conduct context analysis and diagnostic work and then translate this knowledge into strategy and program development:** How effective is SDC’s Monitoring System for Development Changes (MERV)? Are the root causes of conflict and fragility as well as crisis and risks dynamics sufficiently and accurately considered? Are gender equality, governance, social inclusion and humanitarian issues sufficiently considered? How well is SDC able to grasp rapidly changing, emergent contexts? Does SDC conduct joint analysis across its mandates? Does SDC contribute to joint assessments? Are the analysis kept up to date? Are context analysis and diagnostic work translated into relevant strategies and objectives? In particular are the cross-cutting issues of gender and governance sufficiently understood and adequately addressed in diagnostic work then translated into strategies and programming?

2. **How flexibly is SDC able to react to changing situations:** Do SDC programmes adapt appropriately and in a timely manner to changes in context? Is SDC able to take advantage of the narrow windows of opportunity during transition points between conflict and peacebuilding / emergency and development?

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\(^{52}\) The Regional Program Hindukush will focus on the narrow border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan as Switzerland’s contribution to regional stabilization. SDC is phasing out its Pakistan Program. SDC will draw on its Pakistan experience and resources and integrate its Afghanistan Program into the Regional Program. If the Hindukush Program is chosen as a case study, it would need to be conducted in a “development evaluation” mode as the program is in the inception phase.
3. **How conflict sensitive is SDC:** Assess the quality of SDC’s tool “Conflict Sensitive Program Management” (CSPM). Assess the extent to which it, as well as the “Do no harm” Principles, are operationalised in the case studies. How appropriate is SDC’s choice of partners from a “do no harm” perspective? How well does SDC deal with the tensions and risks faced by national program officers and partners as well as their mindsets (due to their own situations within the conflict dynamics as members of the society) and the repercussions this may have on the program?

**B. Cohesion of Organisational Mandates**

4. **How well does SDC practice comprehensive cooperation and manage the tensions between its mandates as well as between development objectives:**

   a) To what extent do SDC personnel across mandates understand each other’s perspectives and modes of engagement? How aware is personnel of the tensions between the goals / perspectives / principles of the different mandates? How well are personnel across mandates able to develop a common understanding of goals/objectives and the means for achieving them? How supportive are staff of each other across institutional boundaries? Are there differences in staff perceptions depending on where they work (i.e. cooperation offices, headquarters)? Are the thematic networks able to establish bridges across the mandates? How well is SDC able to draw capacity and expertise from the different parts of SDC to enable holistic context analysis, strategies and programming? How can “connector” tendencies be strengthened and “divider” tendencies weakened?

   b) How well does SDC deal with the hierarchy, responsibility and decision-making challenges associated with integrating the different mandates into a comprehensive program? Which aspects of SDC’s organisational structure and corporate culture promote a comprehensive cooperation mindset and which hinder it? How well does SDC manage the tension between headquarter policy evolution and overall coherency versus devolution of responsibility to the cooperation offices and the need for country driven, locally owned approaches and in-country coordination?

   c) To what extent are SDC programs integrated programs and tensions between mandates and objectives effectively managed: Within SDC programs, are the different mandates and instruments embedded in a coherent, comprehensive strategic framework? Does SDC combine the mandates and their instruments in its program in ways that are sequentially appropriate and mutually reinforcing? Does SDC create synergies between the mandates? How does SDC meet the challenge of upholding the distinction between humanitarian action and development / transition cooperation given that overall goals and principles differ and may compromise each other? Is SDC able to engage early and flexibly to address development needs in transition situations? How does SDC manage the tensions between development objectives, e.g., providing service delivery to meet immediate needs vs. building capacity of the state to do so, strengthening and empowering civil society vs. working with a government disconnected from its population to promote statebuilding?

**C. SDC’s Role in the Broader System**

5. **How well does SDC operationalize the 3 Cs (coherence, coordination, complementarity) and the 3 Ds (diplomacy, development and defense) from “whole of system” and “whole of Swiss government” perspectives?** Looking at SDC programs as systems operating within larger systems, how well does SDC implement the 3 Cs (coordination, coherency, complementarity) and work jointly to define and implement coordinated activities to reach shared objectives (examine with regard to “Swiss whole of
government” and with regard to “whole of system” in the partner country)? To what extent do SDC personnel understand the perspectives and modes of engagement of the diplomatic and defence sectors? To what degree does the SDC program form part of and is connected to an overall country framework and coordinated with other policies, programmes within the partner country/region or thematic cluster? To what extent does SDC strive to fill gaps and avoid duplication in the partner country landscape? Assess the extent to which SDC has established an appropriate niche for itself which reflects its comparative advantage and identify where it could do more in this direction.

D. Delivery Mechanisms and Modalities

6. How well does SDC analyze and manage the risks inherent in engagement in fragile context? How well does SDC manage corruption and fiduciary risk? How well does SDC manage the risk of program failure (“theory of change” failure due to flawed underlying assumptions as well as implementation failure due to flaws in execution)? How does SDC manage the tension between the need to be innovative and risk aversion? How well does SDC deal with security issues? How well does it assess the minimal security conditions for engagement? Does SDC have appropriate exit strategies?

7. How well does SDC capture and report on the results of its engagement in fragile contexts?
   a) How well does SDC state an explicit theory of change, establish clear objectives, develop and monitor indicators, evaluate and report on the results of its engagement in fragile contexts? Are anticipated results based on realistic assumptions about the time it will take to deliver change? To what extent does SDC recognize and use jointly (donor and partner country) agreed results frameworks? To what extent does SDC use information coming out of such systems as well as its own program cycle management for its decision-making for future programming? Does SDC promote nationally-owned indicators and local capacity to collect and use evidence for national policy-making and program implementation? How can SDC best address the challenge of capturing results in emergent and rapidly changing contexts under difficult conditions as is the case in fragile contexts?
   b) In rendering accountability domestically, to what extent does SDC effectively communicate its case for engagement and the risk involved (e.g., risk of program failure, fiduciary/corruption risk, risk to personnel)? Is it adequately managing expectations and safeguarding the space it needs to be flexible (with Parliament, in its new Dispatch)? How well is SDC handling the field of tension between political demands for Swiss visibility, universal engagement, and clear attribution of results to Switzerland versus concentration of resources, longer term engagement towards effectiveness and sustainability and a contribution rather than attribution mindset?

8. SDC is facing significant human resource problems in fragile contexts with difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified, experienced staff. How can SDC best address this challenge?
Expected Results

At Output Level
By the Evaluation Team:
- Aide Memoire of the Kick-off Meeting of the Inception Phase with the CLP,
- Inception Report, Debriefing on the Inception Report with the CLP, Aide Memoire of the meeting, finalisation of the Inception Report based on SDC feedback,
- Short briefing note to SDC’s Directorate on the finalised evaluation design and key questions,
- Aide Memoires of End of Mission Debriefings with the CLP,
- Aide Memoire of the Debriefing with the CLP on the Draft Evaluation Report,
- Facilitation of the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the CLP including elaboration of recommendations and lessons learned (in collaboration with the SDC Evaluation Officer),
- A fit to print Final Evaluators’ Report in English consisting of
  - Final Evaluation Report not exceeding 40 pages plus annexes and including an executive summary of maximum 4 pages,
- A short and a long Evaluation Abstract according to DAC-Standards for the DAC DeRec database.

By SDC:
- Review of the findings and conclusions, and participation in the elaboration of recommendations based on the findings and conclusions.
- An Agreement at Completion Point containing the Stand of the Core Learning Partnership and recommendations for SDC
- Lessons drawn by the Core Learning Partnership
- Senior Management Response
- Dissemination of the evaluation results

At Outcome Level
SDC’s management translates the insights from the evaluation into its strategies, program development and human resources management related to SDC’s engagement in fragile contexts. SDC improves the coherency, coordination and complementarity of its activities in such contexts both in the “whole of SDC perspective” and the “whole of country system” perspective.

Partners

Organisational Set-up and Respective Roles
- A Core Learning Partnership (CLP) to accompany the evaluation will be constituted at SDC HQs as well as in each of the Cooperation Offices in the case study countries with field missions. The CLP comments on the evaluation design and the key questions in the Kick-off to the Inception Phase. The CLP comments on the Inception Report and on the Draft Evaluation Report. During the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop, the CLP receives and validates the evaluation findings and conclusions and together with the Evaluation Team elaborates lessons learned and recommendations for SDC which will be noted in an Agreement at Completion Point during the workshop.
- SDC’s Directorate (Department-level Management and the Director General) will be interviewed by the Evaluation team. The Directors of Regional Cooperation and of Humanitarian Aid in consultation with the Director of Cooperation with Eastern Europe /
GUS will consider the Agreement at Completion Point of the CLP and draft a Senior Management Response which they will table in a meeting of the Directorate. The consensus of the Directorate is noted in the Senior Management Response which will be published with the evaluation report and form the basis for rendering accountability on the follow-up to the evaluation.

- The **Management Reference Group** will be periodically interviewed by the evaluation team to bring in their perspectives on SDC. They will be periodically briefed by the evaluation team on emerging findings, should participate in the Priorities for Change Workshop, will help draft the Senior Management Response to the evaluation and ensure its implementation.

- **Consultants** contracted by SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section will elaborate an evaluation work plan and an Inception Report and carry out the evaluation according to DAC and SEVAL evaluation standards. They will conduct a Kick-off Meeting with the CLP at the beginning of the inception phase. They will conduct a debriefing for the CLP on the Inception Report and finalize it in consultation with the SDC Evaluation Officer to reflect the feedback as appropriate. They will conduct additional events with stakeholders throughout the evaluation process to ensure reflection and learning during the process (e.g., Visioning event during the inception phase). They will conduct debriefings for the stakeholders as appropriate following their evaluation missions. They will present a draft of their Evaluators’ Final Report to the CLP, follow up on the CLPs feedback while safeguarding their independence and submit the Evaluator’s Final Report in publishable quality as well as an Evaluation Abstract according to DAC specifications. In an Agreement at Completion Point Workshop (1 ½ day retreat) with the CLP, they will draw together the main conclusions of the evaluation and set out the evaluator’s view of what needs to change ("priorities for change" and scenarios, if appropriate). From this starting point, they will facilitate a workshop process in which the CLP draws lessons learned and develops options and recommendations for consideration by SDC’s senior management, which will be recorded by the evaluation team. The evaluation team leader may be asked to de brief SDC’s Directorate at the end of the evaluation process.

- **Corporate Controlling Division (CC Division)** commissions the evaluation, approves the final evaluation design and key questions in consultation with the CLP and the evaluation team, drafts and administers the contracts with the Evaluation Team, ensures that the evaluators receive appropriate logistical support and access to information, safeguards the independence of the team and facilitates together with the evaluation team the overall process with respect to the discussion of evaluation results and the elaboration of the Agreement at Completion Point. It is responsible for the publication and dissemination of the evaluation report.
Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) and Management Reference Group (MRG)

The Corporate Controlling Section has tentatively identified the following persons for the Core Learning Partnership at SDC Headquarters:

**Humanitarian Aid and SKH**
- Roland Schlachter and Marie Schärlig, Haiti Desk and Deputy Head, America-Asia Division
- Armin Ullmann, Hindu Kush / Afghanistan / Pakistan / Central Asia Desk, America-Asia Division
- Roland Anhorn, Great Lakes Desk, Africa Division
- Véronique Bourquin, Occupied Palestinian Territories Desk, Europe and Mediterranean Division

**Regional Cooperation**
- Markus Heiniger, Focal Point Conflict and Human Rights Network, South Asia Division
- Armin Rieser, Conflict Prevention and Transformation / Peacekeeping / Human Rights, South Asia Division
- Lorenzo Suarez, Pakistan / Hindu Kush / Multilateral Affairs Desk, South Asia Division
- Frank Wiederkehr, Afghanistan / Sri Lanka Desk, South Asia Division
- Giorgio Bianchi, Great Lakes Desk, Southern and Eastern Africa Division
- Vesna Roch, Haiti Desk, Latin America Division
- Rahel Bösch, Multilateral Affairs Desk, West Africa Division (formerly COOF Amman)
- Anne Claude Cavin, Burundi / Sudan Desk, Conflict Prevention, Eastern and Southern Africa Division

**Cooperation with Eastern Europe**
- Sophie Delessert, Tajikistan Desk
- Santi Vega, Kirgistan Desk
- Stephanie Guha, Bosnia-Herzegovina Desk (formerly Humanitarian Aid Sudan, Gender)

**Global Cooperation**
- Ségolène Adam, Conflict Prevention and Transformation / Post-conflict Management / Peacekeeping, Global Institutions Division
- Milena Mihajlovic, Gender Desk, Office of Chief of Staff, Global Cooperation

In the case study countries (Grands Lacs and Tajikistan), the evaluation team will constitute a **COOF Core Learning Group** and work with them during the missions. This CLP will draft a Management Response for the COOF indicating its follow-up to the evaluation.
It will be important to consult with as well as to anchor the evaluation results with SDC management. The following management staff will form a “Management Reference Group”. They will follow the evaluation process, provide inputs as appropriate and take responsibility for implementing the Senior Management Response. They are welcome to attend all meetings or can delegate attendance to their staff in the Core Learning Group.

Management Reference Group

Humanitarian Aid and SKH
- Hans-Peter Lenz, Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid and Head America-Asia Division
- Bernhard Huwiler, Head Africa Division and/or Martin Jaggi, Deputy Head Africa Division
- Burgi Roos, Head Europe and Mediterranean Division

Regional Cooperation
- Maya Tissafi, Head Regional Cooperation
- Willi Graf, Deputy Head Regional Cooperation (former Country Director Afghanistan)

Cooperation with Eastern Europe
- Véronique Hulmann, Head Commonwealth of Independent States Division

Global Cooperation
- Christoph Graf, Deputy Head Global Cooperation (formerly head South Asia Division)

Process

Approach
The evaluation process should be utilisation focused and engage the stakeholders throughout the process to ensure utility of the results for the stakeholders and encourage learning. The evaluation process will be iterative with periodic engagement of the Core Learning Partners and other relevant SDC staff and will include the following milestones:

- Kick-off of the Inception Phase with the CLP conducted by the SDC Evaluation Officer and the Evaluation Team to:
  - introduce the Evaluation Team,
  - discuss the Draft Approach Paper
  - enable the Evaluation Team to better understand SDC’s needs and priorities with regard to the evaluation.
  - hear their suggestions and concerns
- Priorities for Change Workshop with the CLP and MRG: Brainstorming on Priorities for Change in SDC
- End of Inception Mission Debriefing with the CLP conducted by the SDC Evaluation Officer and the Evaluation Team to
  - receive CLP feedback on the emerging Inception Report
  - reach agreement for finalisation of the evaluation scope, analytical framework, case studies, key questions and methodology
- End of Mission Debriefings of the CLPs at Headquarters and in the case study countries by the Evaluation Team as appropriate to
  - inform the CLP of emerging findings
• Debriefing of the CLP by the Evaluation Team on their Draft Evaluation Report
  - forum for the CLP to ask questions of clarification to the evaluation team
  - provide a sounding board for the evaluation team (Any factual errors? Difficulties of comprehension? Opportunity to ask additional questions, etc.) before the report is finalised.
• Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the CLP and MRG conducted by SDC Evaluation Officer and the Evaluation Team (1.5 day retreat outside Bern)
  - to conduct a process for the CLP to generate lessons learned and recommendations for SDC.

An innovative feature of this evaluation is that the Core Learning Partnership and Management Reference Group will be actively involved in generating the lessons learned and the recommendations for SDC. Evaluation research shows that involvement of those responsible for implementation in generating recommendations leads to a higher rate of implementation. In the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop, the Evaluation Team will present their conclusions and “priorities for change” and will be responsible for assisting the CLP / MRG to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations by facilitating an effective process of consideration of possible actions. The Evaluation Team, assisted by the SDC Evaluation Officer, will be responsible for the process of generating and recording recommendations in an Agreement at Completion Point. This document will go to heads of Regional Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid as the basis for their elaboration of SDC’s Senior Management Response which they will table with SDC Directorate.

Methodology
The evaluation will pursue a mixed methods approach, drawing as extensively as possible on available data with supplementary primary research where necessary.

The evaluation will develop an evidence base on which to form key decision-making debates on policies, organisational structure and approaches.

In this sense the process is as important as the output; both have to be right to achieve the desired outcome. The aspiration is that through a process of mixing evidence and insight from a forensic look at the work of SDC in fragile contexts, key policy approaches will become clearer. For this to happen the involvement of key stakeholders from the start is a prerequisite. This evaluation will therefore serve two purposes simultaneously:

• Provide a context for increasing organisational awareness of its policy coherence and its structures, processes, and culture and how these affect its performance in fragile states.
• An objective analysis of the policy coherence, structures, processes and culture, and how these affect SDC’s performance in fragile states.

The first three main lines of inquiry relate to the internal cohesiveness within the organization, and how well this is reflected in and aided by the organisational coherence and corporate culture. Perceived tensions between mandates and main definitions of purpose can cause centrifugal forces within the organisation, threatening to pull it apart or reducing its effectiveness. How can these mandates be integrated into one comprehensive approach, and how can synergy be created between the mandates?
Thus the overall approach taken should be strongly informed by the latest thinking on developmental evaluation, as outlined by leading evaluation thinker Michael Quinn Patton. This approach is tailored to complex environments, and sees the evaluator combining the rigor of evaluation (evidence-based and objective) with the role of enhancing a program’s capacity for using evidence in reflective thinking on its work. It ensures that a program team learns during the evaluation process—not just at the end. This will not only increase the utility of the evaluation to SDC but will also support the ongoing commitment of the organization to develop strong design, monitoring and evaluation capacity.

This approach will build on the notion of organisational behaviour as an emergent property, arising from the interaction between individuals and the systems and processes in which they are embedded. Values, norms, behaviours, routines and practices are mutually interacting elements that determine the actual performance of the organisation, and the congruence between the espoused theory; the way an organisation is supposed to function, and the theory-in-use; the way the organisation actually functions. A primary deliverable of the evaluation will be a shared sense of purpose, and a clear understanding of the complementarity of the sub-components of the organisation which can lead to a stronger collaboration and internal cohesion.

Through this innovative process of reflection and clarification, potential synergies can be made visible to diverse members of the organisation, which will strengthen the sense of consensus, common purpose and complementarity of approaches.

The developmental evaluation process should be an active, collaborative process with the actors themselves, not a static evaluation by the evaluation team. For this reason, the evaluation team will combine review of primary and secondary sources with a more dynamic approach, in which groups of actors are being taken through an exploratory search for cohesion and integration. This approach will take the management and staff of the organisation through an active learning process, which will have its immediate effects on larger organisational system awareness, and will make the impact of the evaluation higher in the long-run. This process-component of the evaluation will work on the basis of specific case studies, and use these as a locus of learning. It will also conduct workshops with relevant staff, such as the Priorities for Change Workshop during the Inception Phase.

The evaluation will essentially take a case study approach, looking in detail at two regional strategies in fragile contexts. This will provide the empirical evidence needed for the policy debate on the degree to which integration can be achieved in practice, and how to go about this. It will also allow for analysis of policy and decision making process throughout the organisations. Because similar exercises will be carried out at different levels (and in HQ and in field offices) it allows for comparative analysis between the levels. This lends it a degree of objectivity that will allow the evaluation team to draw empirical conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. In addition, working from the basis of a specific case study allows for the simultaneous assessment of the espoused theory and the theory-in-use. In other words, it captures the devil in the detail.

The case studies will combine desk-based data analysis, key informant interviews and site visits. A learning workshop will be carried out using evidence generated in the data-gathering phase to discuss the processes of policy and strategy formulation and strategy execution.

The case studies will include two with field missions and two desk based studies. The two field missions will be the Great Lakes (DR Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) and Central Asia
(Tajikistan, with telephone interviews with Kyrgyzstan). The two desk based studies will be Haiti and Hindu Kush.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes</td>
<td>Ongoing conflict across the region, extreme poverty, regional instability, huge humanitarian caseload.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>States in transition post-cold war and in some cases post-conflict. Proximity to areas of major conflict, in particular Afghanistan. Authoritarian regimes, weak institutions, significant governance challenges, insurgencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Government capacity severely constrained by the earthquake. Massive vulnerability and political fragility.</td>
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<td>Hindu Kush</td>
<td>Emerging programme in region in conflict. Strategy being developed.</td>
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**Main steps**

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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Actors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call for Expression of Interest to identify potential team leaders</td>
<td>March 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft Approach Paper for Call for Offers</td>
<td>April 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer with feedback from relevant staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Call for offers launched</td>
<td>April 15, 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selection of Evaluators</td>
<td>June 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contracts signed with Evaluators</td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer and CC Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recruitment of CLP</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logistical and administrative preparations</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team., Corporate Controlling (CC) Secretariat,</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Contact List for Evaluation Team (CC Secretariat)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Reservations of venues for all meetings and retreats (CC Secretariat)</td>
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<td>Logistics for Evaluation Missions</td>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team with very limited support by the CC Secretariat. Plane fares to be approved by Bundesreisezentrale</td>
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<td>- Interview Appointments</td>
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<td>- Hotel Reservations</td>
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<td>- Travel Reservations</td>
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<td>Inception Phase</td>
<td>mid-August-September 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Evaluation Team Mission for Inception Phase</td>
<td>September 12-16 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kick-off Meeting with the CLP</td>
<td>September 12, 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer, Evaluation Team Leader,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Actors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priorities for Change Workshop with selected staff including CLP and MRG</td>
<td>Sept. 15, 2011 10:00-12:30</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate, CLP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefing Paper for Meeting with Senior Management (final key questions)</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader to SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting with SDC Senior Management (DirKo) to discuss final key questions</td>
<td>September 2011</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer, CLP</td>
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<td>Inception Mission Debriefing with the CLP</td>
<td>Sept. 16, 2011 9:30-11:00</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate and SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<td>Evaluation Implementation</td>
<td>Sept.-Dec. 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate</td>
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<td>First Country Mission Tajikistan</td>
<td>November. 2011</td>
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<td>Second Country Mission, Great Lakes</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Validation of Emerging Findings Meeting with CLP</td>
<td>Dec. 15, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Draft Final Evaluators’ Report</td>
<td>January 10, 2012</td>
<td>Evaluation Team delivers to SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<td>CLP Meeting to give feedback on Draft Evaluators' Report</td>
<td>January 19, 2012</td>
<td>Evaluation Team Leader, other Team Members as appropriate, SDC Evaluation Officer, CLP</td>
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<td>Final Evaluators' Report</td>
<td>January 26, 2012</td>
<td>Evaluation Team delivers to SDC Evaluation Officer</td>
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<td>Feb.y 2-3 2012</td>
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<td>Senior Management Debriefing (if necessary)</td>
<td>end of February or beginning March 2012</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer, Evaluation Team Leader</td>
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<td>Senior Management Response</td>
<td>March 2012</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer SDC Senior Management, CLP</td>
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<td>Publication and Dissemination</td>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>SDC Evaluation Officer and CC Secretariat</td>
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Evaluation Team

SDC’s Corporate Controlling Section has recruited an evaluation team that is independent of SDC and has not been implicated in the activities under evaluation. The evaluation team with Lewis Sida as team leader with Ben Ramalingam, Frauke de Weijer, William Frej, and Ross Mountain brings together high level practitioner experience in both humanitarian aid and development cooperation including the following experience / skills mix:

- Demonstrated ability to evaluate in emergent realities from a complex systems perspective
- Demonstrated ability to engage stakeholders in reflective inquiry using data coming out of the evaluation
- Demonstrated ability in assessing organisational capacity and proposing corrective measures
- Extensive knowledge of and demonstrated experience in implementing the principles for engagement in fragile contexts (e.g. 3 C’s, 3 D’s, SSR, do no harm, Conflict Sensitive Program Management, and other relevant principles in conflict /crisis contexts) and in implementing comprehensive cooperation
- Demonstrated experience at a senior level in implementing humanitarian, development and transition programs in fragile contexts (field experience in the “comprehensive cooperation” dimension)
- Competency in equality and gender issues (application of gender sensitive evaluation methodologies)
- Excellent English (report to be delivered in “native speaker” quality)
- French and German competency (some case studies will require French),
- Analytical and editing skills, ability to synthesize and write well
- Communication skills

Total person-days (for entire team) for this assignment: 170. The budgetary envelope for this evaluation is CHF 206’000. including all travel and per diems to SDC headquarters and to the case study countries.
Annex 4 Document review

Collier, P (2007). The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. Oxford University Press.
Danida (2011). What is special about assistance to Fragile States?
DFID (2005). Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states.
World Bank (2009). Contracting out core state functions and services in fragile and post-conflict situations: a transitional arrangement or an option for long-term delivery. Discussion Note.

SDC Documents
Annual Report Great Lakes 2011
Annual Report Great Lakes 2010
Annual Report Nepal 2010
Annual Report Occupied Palestinian Territory 2010.
Annual Report Tajikistan 2010
Concept for the Monitoring of Cooperation Strategies and Medium-Term Programs.
Conflict Analysis Tip Sheet.
Conflict-sensitive programme management CSPM. Integrating conflict sensitivity and prevention of violence into SDC programmes.
Cooperation Strategy Occupied Palestinian Territory 2010 – 2014
CSPM: A quick guide.
Do no harm Tip Sheet.
Gender and Peace-building Tip Sheet.
Guiding Principles SDC.
Kreditantrag DOCO: Nepal Resident Coordinator Office Support in Transition.


SDC’s program “Gaza 2009” Implementing the continuum and contiguum: from emergency to early recovery to development.

SDC in fragile and conflict affected situations. SDC FP Conflict and Human Rights Draft 1.

SDC Strategy 2010.


UN-WB Cooperation in Implementing the review of civilian capacities.

UN – World Bank Partnership Trust Fund Partnership Activity Project Proposal.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2011/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011/1</td>
<td>SDC’ HUMANITARIAN AID: EMERGENCY RELIEF</td>
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<td>2010/1</td>
<td>SDC’S RESEARCH RELATED ACTIVITIES</td>
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<td>2009/5</td>
<td>SDC’S CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS BIODIVERSITY: Impact in the Andean Region</td>
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<td>SWITZERLANDS’ BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION: To what extent do operational synergies exist?</td>
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<td>TWO RURAL FINANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES IN INDIA</td>
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<td>2009/2</td>
<td>KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING IN SDC</td>
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<td>SDC HUMANITARIAN AID IN ANGOLA 1995–2006</td>
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http://www.deza.admin.ch/de/Home/Wirksamkeit/Evaluationen

Bern, May 2012